1. The First Claimant being the new sole Shareholder and Director of the DIFC registered Private Company and the DIFC Private Company the Second Claimant (collectively the “Claimants”) jointly submit this Particulars of Claim further to the service of Claim Form dated 23 September 2024. [1]Noting that all of the Defendants failed to acknowledge the Claim Form.
Response [1] – I formally acknowledged service on 19 November 2024. The Acknowledgment of Service Identifies my name, Records that I am acting as a litigant in person, that “I intends to defend all of this claim and Carries Court event reference EVN-9379351124-3129.
Evidence Relied On – Acknowledgment of Service_253627.pdf
2. The Claimants rely on the documentary evidence contained in Exhibits Ex-Cl-01 to Ex-Cl-50, including corporate records, DIFC Registry extracts, employment contracts, bank statements, witness statements, correspondence, and financial documents. All references to “Ex-Cl-__” within these Amended Particulars of Claim correspond to the numbered exhibits within this bundle. Additional references to parties pleadings (B-section), witness statements (WS-section), and supplementary materials are included where relevant to support the factual and legal assertions herein.
Response to Para 2 and 3 are noted only as statements of the materials on which the Claimants say they rely. The existence of an exhibit, extract or earlier bundle is not an admission by the First Defendant of its truth, completeness or the Claimants’ interpretation of it. The First Defendant requires the Claimants to prove every disputed factual proposition drawn from those materials.
3. The Claimant also refers as necessary to the documents contained in the Fourth Defendant’s submitted documents as part of the bundle submitted for the Case Management Conference held on 3 March 2025 (the “March 2025” Bundle), Case Management Conference held on 10 November 2025 (“November Bundle”) and to the new documents shared by the Fourth Defendant and submitted as part of the hearing bundle submitted by the Claimant in February 2026 for the Application hearing 17 Feb 2026 (“February Bundle”). The Claimant relies on specific documents and extracts within these bundles in support of the claims set out in this Amended POC. Where necessary, references to specific pages or exhibits within these bundles are provided in the relevant paragraphs below.
Response to Para 2 and 3 are noted only as statements of the materials on which the Claimants say they rely. The existence of an exhibit, extract or earlier bundle is not an admission by the First Defendant of its truth, completeness or the Claimants’ interpretation of it. The First Defendant requires the Claimants to prove every disputed factual proposition drawn from those materials.
4. The First Defendant, the former Shareholder and Director of the Second Claimant did make contact with the legal representatives of the Claimants by email on 19th November 2024 confirming he had received the Notice of Claim served on 1 October 20242024. [1] No further acknowledgment of the Claim has been received.
Res 1 – The First Defendant formally acknowledged service on 19 November 2024. The Acknowledgment of Service:
- Identifies Salah Masri as the Defendant.
- Records that he was acting as a litigant in person.
- States: “The Defendant intends to defend all of this claim.”
- Bears his name and signature.
- Carries Court event reference EVN-9379351124-3129.
Evidence Relied On – Acknowledgment of Service_253627.pdf
5. The First Defendant only sent the email querying the DIFC claim [1] after the Dubai Court of First Instance Judgement was issued in the Dubai Court Case No. 2759/2024 (“the Dubai Case”) filed by the First Defendant against both Claimant’s, the First Claimant and Hair Creators Salon Limited, holding commercial License number CL4114 (the “Second Claimant” and/or the “Company”).
Response [1] – I deny any suggestion in paragraphs 4–8 that I ignored the Claimants or engaged only after the Dubai judgment. The Claimants’ own correspondence shows that their Pre-Action Notice was sent on 15 July 2024 and that I provided a substantive response on 17 July 2024, copying their legal representatives.
I referred to my earlier unanswered correspondence and legal notice, confirmed that the Dubai proceedings had already commenced, identified the hearing fixed for 22 July 2024 and supplied supporting documents. This was before both the DIFC Claim Form dated 23 September 2024 and the Dubai jurisdiction judgment dated 11 November 2024..
Evidence Relied On – Pre Action Emails with the Claimants’ legal attorney
6. The First Defendant also filed a case in the DIFC SCT Courts under SCT Case No. 352/2024 against the First Claimant, on the basis that he claimed he was employed by the Second Claimant as the Manager and sought cancellation of his Employment Visa as well as compensation for his End of Service work benefits. The Case was filed and deemed served by Aramex on 27 August 2024 noting that the First Defendant acknowledged the jurisdiction of the DIFC over the dispute
Response – SCT-352-2024 was a narrow employment claim arising because, after my resignation and the sale of the business, my expired employment visa had not been cancelled and my name remained associated with the Company’s licence.
Although my original claim included AED 30,000 in employment dues, I withdrew all monetary claims at the hearing and pursued only cancellation of my visa. The Claimants attempted to resist cancellation by raising DEWS penalties, the Share Purchase Agreement, alleged breaches of duty and CFI-066-2024.
H.E. Justice Nassir Al Nasser expressly found that the DEWS penalties and the SPA dispute were separate matters from the employment and visa-cancellation issue. The Court found that my employment had ended by resignation and ordered Hair Creators Salon Ltd to cancel my employment visa.
Accordingly, SCT-352-2024 did not determine any allegation of fraud, concealment, breach of the SPA or breach of directors’ duties. Nor did filing an employment claim amount to accepting that the SCT had jurisdiction over the separate share-sale dispute. The judgment determined only the employment-visa issue, in my favour.
Evidence Relied On – SCT-352-2024-Judgment-of-H.E.-Justice-Nassir-Al-Nasser-dated-18-October-2024
Evidence Relied On – Claim Form SCT 352 2024.pdf
7. The Claimants contested the Dubai Case brought by the First Defendant on the grounds that the Dubai Court had no jurisdiction the subject matter of the case, being the same subject matter of the case raised herein before the DIFC Courts, namely the sale and purchase of the shares of a private DIFC company known as “Hair Creators Salon LTD” (the Company), holding DIFC commercial license number CL4114 also the Second Claimant in this action.
Response – As per the Governing Law and Jurisdiction Clause of the Agreement, ” This Agreement shall be governed by and construed in accordance with the laws of the United Arab Emirates.” The First Defendant initiated a Contract Enforcement Case against the First Claimant following her refusal to honor her contractual obligations and make payments arose from the liabilities of the Second Claimant.
8. The Dubai Court handed down the Judgement on 11 November 2024 [1] in favour of the Claimants (Defendant in the Dubai Court), ruling that the Dubai Court did not have any jurisdiction in relation to the matter and that the matter in dispute was subject to the jurisdiction of the DIFC Courts.
Response [1] – As per the Governing Law and Jurisdiction Clause of the Agreement, ” This Agreement shall be governed by and construed in accordance with the laws of the United Arab Emirates.” The First Defendant initiated a Contract Enforcement Case against the First Claimant following her refusal to honor her contractual obligations and make payments arose from the liabilities of the Second Claimant.
The Dubai Court’s jurisdictional decision did not determine the merits of the present allegations. It is denied that the timing of the First Defendant’s correspondence or commencement of other proceedings gives rise to any inference of concealment, fraud or bad faith
9. [1] Neither the Second nor Third Defendant have acknowledged the Claim Form served upon them despite also being served on them at the same time through the same means at the same address given on the SCT Claim Form, namely DIFC Liberty House, PO Box 501705 Dubai, as noted on SCT Case 400-2024 served by the Third Defendant on the Second Claimant; the address being the location of the Second Defendant which is Owned by the Third Defendant whilst being Managed by the First Defendant. Interestingly and coincidentally the ownership and management of the [2] Second Defendant changed at the same time as the First Defendant sold the shares in the Second Claimant and breached all of his disclosure obligations to the First Claimant, and the [3] Third Defendant assisted the First Defendant in this breach of obligations by collecting customer data whilst advising of the new “Hair by Salah” venture whilst the Notice Period was underway.
Response [1] – Third Defendant acknowledged the claim form on 21 Nov 2024.
Document: ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF SERVICE
Response [2] – I sold my shares in the Second Claimant on 14 Feb and 20 March 2024 while the Third Defendant entered into Share Transfer Agreement buying the shares of the Second Defendant on 5 July 2024. at minimum a gap of 4 month in between, I am not identified as purchaser or shareholder in any document. the Commercial License of the Second Defendant identifies me only later, in October 2024, as an authorised signatory, while my employment contract records my employment from 14 November 2024 as a hairdresser. Those later positions do not establish that I founded, acquired or owned the company.
Annexure D35 — Company Share Transfer Agreement
Commercial Commercial License Grove
Annexure D29 — The DIFC Registrar of Companies certification issuance on 13 Aug 2024
Response [3] – The Claimants did not prove and are still required to prove that the Third Defendant collected any client’s data, this is denied because no material evidence whatsoever.
10. The Third Defendant stated she was employed by the Second Claimant pursuant to an employment contract dated 22 September 2021, the employment contract is signed by the First Defendant with the Stamp of the Second Claimant, at this time according to regulatory records the Third Defendant was the Shareholder of the Company before 10 November 2022.
Response [1] – No Cause of action pleaded.
11. On provision of access to the DIFC portal and instruction on how to use the same after the formal transfer of the DIFC Licence of the Company to the First Claimant on 27 June 2024, the First Claimant became aware of the history between the First Defendant and the Third Defendant, intermittently transferring ownership of the business between themselves:
A. Transfer of 100% shares on 25 October 2022 from First Defendant to Third Defendant through request number SN 0824556
B. Transfer of 100% shares on 10 November 2022 from Third Defendant to First Defendant through request number SN 0829423
C. Transfer of 100% shares on 25 January 2023 from First Defendant to Third Defendant through request number SN 0846551
D. Transfer of 100% shares on 15 February 2023 from Third Defendant to First Defendant through request number SN 0851018
Response [1] – The historical share transfers recorded between the First and Third Defendants pre date the transaction in dispute. They were lawful corporate acts and caused no pleaded loss to the Claimants. Any allegation that a particular transfer was unlawful, fraudulent or caused damage is denied and must be proved by identifying the legal wrong, the affected property or right, causation and loss. no pleaded loss caused by the historical shareholdings.
12. In the hearing of the SCT Case 400-2024, in which the First Defendant represented the Third Defendant, he made it known for the first time they were married. [1] The First Defendant deliberately concealed the relationship of the First and Third Defendant from the First Claimant, that includes their personal relationship as well as their professional relationship and history.
Response [1] – The Claimants are required to identify a specific duty to disclose family arrangements matter, the sale in dispute and the relative contract between the parties did not obligate either First or Third Defendants to disclose private details. It is denied that I was under a contractual duty to disclose my personal relationship, that my marriage altered the assets, liabilities or terms of the business sold, or that any alleged non disclosure of my marriage caused loss.
13. In the course of SCT 400-2024 the Third Defendant provided an employment contract that had not been signed by her dated 22 September 2021, and [1] the First Claimant who was not made aware of any employment contracts signed between the Company and the Third Defendant was only able to locate a countersigned contract dated 14 October 2022.
Response [1] – The Claimants herein are the party who filed unsigned employment contract of the Third Defendant in SCT-400-2024 on 15 Oct 2024 as ANNEXURE A The allegations are denied as they suggest that the Third Defendant’s employment was concealed, that her remuneration was improper, or that withdrawing her salary claim amounted to an admission of wrongdoing.
First, the Order with reasons in SCT-400-2024 records that the Third Defendant and the Second Claimant entered into an employment agreement on 22 September 2021. Her employment was therefore a documented relationship, not a concealed arrangement.
Secondly, EX-CL-08 the Claimants’ own bank exhibit records 38 transfers expressly described as salary payments to Julia/Iuliia Valiullina between 6 February 2023 and 30 May 2024, totalling AED 160,100. These repeated salary descriptions are consistent with her employment. Her employment contract provided for a monthly salary of AED 10,000 and a 40% commission on hair-extension sales. The separate commission payment should therefore not be mischaracterised as an unexplained or improper transfer.
The assertions that the First Claimant was unaware of the Third Defendant’s employment is unsupported when the Claimants’ own banking evidence records repeated salary payments in her name. At minimum, EX-CL-08 contradicts any inference that the payments had no identifiable employment basis.
Thirdly, the Third Defendant submitted her resignation on 13 June 2024, stating an effective termination date of 28 June 2024. The SCT judge found that the employment relationship had ended by resignation and ordered the Second Claimant to cancel her employment visa under Article 57(3) of the DIFC Employment Law.
The Third Defendant withdrew her AED 30,000 monetary claim at the SCT hearing and proceeded only with the visa-cancellation relief. The order does not state that she withdrew because the Claimants proved misconduct, nor does it record any admission of fraud, conspiracy, competition or improper receipt of company funds. No determination was made against her concerning the withdrawn salary claim.
The judge also found that the DEWS notices relied upon by the Second Claimant did not refer to any system block preventing cancellation of the visa. The responsibility to cancel the visa remained with the employer after termination. Any separate dispute concerning the SPA or responsibility for the DEWS penalties was expressly left to be determined in CFI-066-2024.
Accordingly, SCT-400-2024 does not support the Claimants’ allegations of fraud or misconduct. It confirms a documented employment relationship, resignation, termination of employment and the Second Claimant’s obligation to cancel the Third Defendant’s visa.
38 transfers expressly described as salary payments to Julia/Iuliia Valiullina, totalling AED 160,100
| No. | Transfer date | Amount | Bank description |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | 6 Feb 2023 | AED 5,000 | Half January salary |
| 2 | 16 Feb 2023 | AED 5,000 | January salary |
| 3 | 10 Mar 2023 | AED 5,000 | Half February salary |
| 4 | 16 Mar 2023 | AED 2,000 | February salary |
| 5 | 5 Apr 2023 | AED 3,000 | February salary |
| 6 | 11 Apr 2023 | AED 2,500 | March salary |
| 7 | 12 Apr 2023 | AED 7,500 | March salary |
| 8 | 10 May 2023 | AED 4,000 | April salary |
| 9 | 30 May 2023 | AED 4,500 | April salary |
| 10 | 19 Jun 2023 | AED 5,000 | May salary |
| 11 | 20 Jun 2023 | AED 1,600 | Salary Julia |
| 12 | 1 Jul 2023 | AED 5,000 | May salary |
| 13 | 24 Jul 2023 | AED 5,000 | June salary |
| 14 | 31 Jul 2023 | AED 5,000 | Salary Julia |
| 15 | 21 Aug 2023 | AED 4,000 | July salary |
| 16 | 25 Aug 2023 | AED 6,000 | Salary Julia |
| 17 | 27 Sep 2023 | AED 5,000 | Salary Julia |
| 18 | 6 Oct 2023 | AED 6,000 | Salary Julia |
| 19 | 9 Oct 2023 | AED 4,000 | Salary Julia |
| 20 | 3 Nov 2023 | AED 2,000 | Salary Julia |
| 21 | 4 Nov 2023 | AED 3,000 | Salary Julia |
| 22 | 9 Nov 2023 | AED 2,000 | Salary Julia |
| 23 | 13 Nov 2023 | AED 2,000 | Salary Julia |
| 24 | 25 Nov 2023 | AED 1,500 | Salary Julia |
| 25 | 27 Nov 2023 | AED 1,500 | Salary Julia |
| 26 | 30 Nov 2023 | AED 1,000 | Salary Julia |
| 27 | 30 Nov 2023 | AED 1,000 | Separate salary transfer |
| 28 | 8 Dec 2023 | AED 1,000 | Salary Julia |
| 29 | 12 Dec 2023 | AED 1,000 | Salary Julia |
| 30 | 18 Dec 2023 | AED 1,000 | Salary Julia |
| 31 | 27 Dec 2023 | AED 1,000 | Salary Julia |
| 32 | 29 Dec 2023 | AED 7,000 | Salary Julia |
| 33 | 13 Jan 2024 | AED 2,000 | Salary Julia |
| 34 | 19 Jan 2024 | AED 1,000 | Salary Julia |
| 35 | 2 Feb 2024 | AED 17,000 | Salary |
| 36 | 1 Mar 2024 | AED 10,000 | Salary |
| 37 | 2 May 2024 | AED 10,000 | April salary |
| 38 | 30 May 2024 | AED 10,000 | May salary |
| Total | AED 160,100 | 38 transfers |
Document: The Claimants’ Defence in SCT-400-2024
Document: SCT-400-2024-Order-with-Reasons-of-SCT-Judge-Maitha-Alshehhi-29-October-2024
Document: The Claimants’ filed Annexure A employment contract of the First Defendant
14. [1] Given the Third Defendant’s role in the fraud against the First Claimant by the First Defendant so that the First Defendant could carry out the Breach of Contract flawlessly and obtain the full value he wanted for the shares without full disclosure of all the true facts related to the Company and [2] he could start a new enterprise with the Third Defendant under the licence of the Second Defendant before the First Claimant became aware, thus depriving the First Claimant and Second Claimant of any future turnover to be able to take action against any and all of the Defendants.
Response [1] – The Claimants are to specifically detail the alleged fraud made by the Third Defendant including actions, spoken words, and provide material evidence as what exactly she had done that amount to Fraud, nothing in her employment contract is breached or her lawful purchase of shares in the second defendant amount to fraud. Under RDC 17.43, an allegation of fraud or dishonesty must be supported by full and specific particulars.
The pleading must identify the precise representation, omission or act relied upon; when, where and how it occurred; what made it false; the Defendant’s alleged knowledge or recklessness; the primary facts supporting that inference; the intention to induce; actual reliance; and causally connected loss.
Where concealment is alleged, the specific legal or contractual duty to disclose must also be identified. the blanket assertion of fraud in paragraphs 10 to 14 fail specify any breached contract or duty or agreement. Third Defendant did not start Space X enterprise with of the Claimants money, it a small size hair salon.
15. The Third Defendant jointly with First Defendant, whilst both were still under employment contracts and visa’s of the Second Claimant, formally [1] acquired on or around 17 July 2024 the license of a competing Hair Salon in the DIFC, namely ‘The Hair Crafters Company Limited’ with DIFC Registration No. 1280 operating out of Unit CC4, Ground Floor, Liberty House, DIFC, UAE, with the Trading Name ‘The Grove Salons’. The First Defendant is the named Director on the licence of the Second Defendant.
Response [1] – The Claimants allegation is untrue, the sale and purchase in dispute was during Feb and March 2024 while the Third Defendant entered in to contract with the previous share holder of the the Second Defendant on 5 July 2024, following the resignation of the First Defendant on Jun 2024, then the Third Defendant resignation on 13 June 2024, effective 28 June 2024.
Document: First Defendant Work visa cancellation request email
Document: Third Defendant Annexure D34 — resignation email
Document: SCT-400-2024-Order-with-Reasons-of-SCT-Judge-Maitha-Alshehhi-29-October-2024
16. Upon reviewing the Social medial of ‘Hair Crafters Company Limited’ also known as ‘The Grove Salons’ with Instagram @thehaircrafterscompany; website link thehaircraftersco.com; Facebook page The Hair Crafters Company [1] have not published any new media since March 2024, approximately the same time the First Defendant entered into the MOU with the First Claimant. Whilst the social media site ‘Hair by Salah’ previously used to advertise the Second Claimant made a declaration on 28 July 2024 “We are so happy to finally welcome you into our new Salon located at Liberty House Tower C Floor DIFC.”.
Response [1] – The assertions about the grove salon media inactivity are irrelevant and do not prove the alleged fraud and denied, the First Defendant is not in charge of the that media maintenance. the assertions about the hair by salah media are denied as no cause of action is identified there in and the claimants are required to prove these allegations with material evidance
17. The First Defendant with the aid of the Third Defendant was able to promote their new business they set up together in DIFC under a very [1] similar name, initially [2] using the phone number that the Company had used and same social medium advertising during the “handover period” or “transition” without the First Claimant being any wiser of the actual intentions of the parties.
Response [1] – The assertions about the grove salon name is similar are inaccurate, the name is different.
Response [2] – The Claimants are required to prove any company phone number was taken.
18. The employees of the Company were not aware of the new ownership of the Company as the First Defendant remained the Manager in this transition period his wife the [1] Third Defendant remained a senior stylist working amongst the Employees, able to control any communication regarding the First Claimant.
Response [1] – The Claimants are required to prove any allegation of spying.
19. Several of the Second Claimant employee’s will confirm the conduct of the First and Third Defendant’s.
Response [1] – The Claimants did present the employees confirmation.
20. The actions of the First and Third Defendant appear to be premeditated, and notwithstanding the were also in breach of DIFC Employment Law [3] Article 58 and Clause 7 of their Contracts as identified to them in defence of their respective SCT cases when they tried falsely to also claim for compensation stating:
a. on 09/09/24 the Third Defendant under statement of Truth alleged to her date of leaving [1] 13 June 2024 she had not been paid for her last 3 months and was claiming AED 30,000 and her Visa cancelled and claiming she lost a job offer; and
b. on [2] 6/08/24 the First Defendant under statement of Truth alleged he sold the salon more than 5 months ago and was claiming personally against the First Claimant for AED 30,000 for the keeping his name as GM on the license of the Company and the delays in cancelling his Visa for more than 5 months.
Response [1] – The Third Defendant resignation date was 13 June 2024, this is true, until September the Claimants herein refused to cancel her visa Claiming that they had no access to Difc Portal despite their admission in Paragraph 11 that they had access in July 2024.
Document: Third Defendant Claim Form 6 Sep 2024
Response [2] – The First Defendant submitted the visa claim on 6 Aug 2025, exactly 5 month since 20 March 2024 the Date of the Share Transfer Agreement was executed, the Claimants did not particularise the damage caused.
Document: First Defendant Claim Form 6 Aug 2024
21. During the hearings with both First and Third Defendant’s the Claimants brought the facts presented in this Particulars of Claim to the attention of the respective presiding Judge, at which point both the First Defendant and the Third Defendant, in their [1] respective hearings immediately dropped their financial claims for outstanding dues requesting only that their visa be cancelled, as such Judgement without costs for the cancellation was ordered.
Response [1] – The Claimants herein are presenting their own personal opinion about the judgment.
Document: Third Defendant Claim Form 6 Sep 2024
22. The Fourth Defendant holds DIFC Company License No. 5684. The Claimants were unaware of the nature of the relationship between the Second and Fourth Defendants; however, it was discovered that funds were being disbursed from the bank accounts of the Second Claimant to those of the Fourth Defendant, despite there being no contractual documentation or records of such a relationship left at the premises.
23. The Fourth Defendant, Hair By Rojin Salon Ltd (Licence No. CL5684), is currently a DIFC-registered company wholly owned by Ms. Roushin Bashar Haj Ali (“Ms. Rojin”), as evidenced by the DIFC Public Registry (B5/623–625 of the November Bundle; Ex-Cl-44 found at D1.44 of February Bundle ). It has operated from Unit GA-00-SZ-G0-RT-130, Gate Avenue, DIFC since 15 April 2022 (D2 of February Bundle, para 7).
24. However, the Owner and Legal Representative of Fourth Defendant has confirmed that whilst the company was incorporated on 15 April 2022 (B2 of February Bundle, para 7) she also states contrary to this in the same witness statement that “a share transfer in 2021 and a subsequent trade name change, the Fourth Defendant became an independent entity entirely distinct from the Second Claimant” (D2 of February Bundle, para 8). It is the Claimant’s position that no such share transfer took place as the Licence as disclosed by the Fourth Defendant shows that the legal entity of the Fourth Defendant was only created in April 2022 and did not exist prior to that date.
25. If a [1] share transfer had taken place, the DIFC would have a record of the same against the Second Claimant, as the Fourth Defendant would have been owned by the Second Claimant. There would have been some form of valuable consideration passed between the Legal Representative of the Fourth Defendant and the Second Claimant for the transfer of the shares, though there is no evidence of any share transfer nor of any valuable consideration.
Response [1] – there was a formal Lease Transfer not a sale and purchase contract.
26. Furthermore referring to the same witness statement at paragraph 9 “It runs its trade out of Unit GA-00-SZ-G0-RT-130, Level GF, Gate Avenue – South Zone, DIFC, where on 22 May 2022, it took over the lease initially held in the name of the Second Claimant”. [1] The legal representative of the Fourth Defendant confirms, that the Second Claimant was the lessee and legally responsible for the payment of the lease of Unit GA-00-SZ-G0-RT-130, Level GF, Gate Avenue – South Zone, DIFC even after the Fourth Defendant was legally incorporated in April 2022, and after the alleged share transfer.
Response [1] – The assertions that the Second Claimant is paying for the lease on Retail Unit 130 is not true, the Claimants are required to prove this assertions, official correspondence with DIFC Retail Leasing Management dated 14 January 2022, Regarding SR-24431 definitively establishes that rental cheque copies, dated 15 September 2021 till 15 June 2023, were drawn on Ms Rojin’s personal account and made payable directly to DIFC Investments Ltd. the Claimant are required to prove this allegation.
Document: Approval of Application – HairbyRojin Initial Approval SR-24431
27. In addition, Unit GA-00-SZ-G0-RT-130, was [1] fitted out at the expense of the Second Claimant and operated by the Second Claimant as part of its ladies’ division, Hair Creators Ltd – Ladies Only Hair by Rojin, as shown in the DIFC Preliminary Notice of Fine dated 15 April 2024 (B5/405 of the November Bundle). It can be noted from the [2] Notice of Fine that the lease and operational costs were borne by the Second Claimant (Ex-Cl-47 found at D1.47 of February Bundle) and that the fine is to be bourne by the Second Claimant though it is dated 2024, after the date of incorporation of the Fourth Defendant.
Response [1] – The assertions that the Second Claimant paid fitting and decoration cost of the Retail Unit 130 are wrong, the full Cost was paid by Ms Roshain the sole share holder of the Fourth Defendant to Falcon Decorations LLC by way of Cheques from her personal account.
Document: Approval of Application – HairbyRojin Initial Approval SR-24431
Response [2] – The Notice to pay dated 9 Aug 2025 that the Claimants rely on is addressed to Retail Units 133, 135 and 137 only as clearly stated on the schedule that the total amount of 81,200 is divided over these 3 units exclusively. the First Defendant respectfully request the Court to validate the details of this Notice of Fine with DIFC Investment as the document may have been altered. and further require the Claimants to provide a proof the payment if any.
Document: DIFC Investments Notice To Pay dated Aug 9 2025
28. The [1] First Claimant having received the RAK Bank account statements and Loan Documents in the disclosure from the First Defendant (Ex-Cl-48 SM1-13, found at D1.48 of February Bundle, page 1953) notes that the RAK Bank Loan and Account statements are addressed to the Second Claimant operating at all of the Units originally leased by the Second Claimant, when owned and/or managed by the FIrst Defendant and/or Third Defendant. This includes the unit occupied by the Fourth Defendant. The date on the documents from RAK Bank are after the incorporation of the Fourth Defendant.
Response [1] – The Claimants had these account statements from 17 April 2024 the day the Authority approved the new shareholder as further evidenced in the there filing on the 3ed of Sep 2024 of their supporting documents in the SCT-352-2024 a document titled personal loan taken under corporate account .
Document: Personal Loan taken under corporate account
Relationship Between the First Defendant and the Fourth Defendant
29. Both the First Defendant and the owner of the Fourth Defendant, Ms. Roushin Bashar Haj Ali , were employed by the Second Claimant pursuant to employment contracts dated 1 July 2021 and 1 August 2021 respectively (Ex-Cl-49 found at D1.49 of February Bundle). They were also married during the relevant period, as evidenced by Divorce Certificate #1219/M/2021 (Annexure D37 Reference B9/P1479-1481 of November Bundle).
30. As per the witness statement of the representative of the Fourth Defendant, Ms. Roijn, the Fourth Defendant claims ” following a share transfer in 2021 and a subsequent trade name change, the Fourth Defendant became an independent entity entirely distinct from the Second Claimant”.
31. The Fourth Defendant conducts the same business activities as the Second Claimant, including hairdressing, beauty services, training, and hair-fixing (D2 of February Bundle, para 7). [1] The First Defendant admitted in his written comments dated 27 February 2025 that he “opened the Hair by Rojin Salon in 2021 as a gift to his wife” (First Defendant’s Comments, 27 Feb 2025).”.
Response [1] – The purported admission is denied, a gift for the wife does not prove any cost paid by the Second Claimant, the Claimants are required to prove any historical payments allegedly made by the company and any damage such payments has caused.
Dramatis Personae
32. The principal human characters which feature in these claims are as follows:
a. First Claimant is the Purchaser of the Shares in the Second Claimant located at “Unit GA-00-SZ-G0-RT-130 , GA-00-SZ-G0-RT-133 , GA-00-SZ-G0-RT-135 , GA-00-SZ-G0-RT-137 , Level GF, Gate Avenue – South Zone, Dubai International Financial Centre” which were previously owned by and sold by the First Defendant and historically controlled and managed by the First and Third Defendants.
b. The First Defendant is the Husband of the Third Defendant, and as per the DIFC Registry for the Company has with [1] the Third Defendant managed, operated, and owned both the Second Claimant and the Second Defendant at the same time. Currently the Second Defendant is Licensed in the DIFC with the shares being registered to the Third Defendant but the [2] trademarks owned by the Second Claimant are being promoted by the Second Defendant which is advertised as under the control of the First and Third Defendant.
Response [1] – the Third Defendant held shares in the Second Claimant back early 2022 while her Shares in the Second Defendant were held by Aug 2024, she further never been designated as a Manager of the Second Claimant. Claimants are required prove such broad allegation and specify the Damage it supposedly caused.
Response [2] – The Second Defendant never promoted any alleged trade marks of the Second Claimant, the Seconed Claimant doe not own any registered trade marks . Claimants are required prove these allegedly misused trade marks.
The Fourth Defendant is a ladies-extended division of the Second Claimant’s salon, which came to light upon admission by the First Defendant in his Memorandum of Defence: “The Defendant operated multiple salons under the same trade name, Hair Creators, as evidenced by the attached documentation, including trade licenses for various branches.” and the Fourth Defendant’s address being “Unit GA-00-SZ-G0-RT-130, Level GF, Gate Avenue – South Zone, Dubai International Financial Centre, Dubai, United Arab Emirates“
c. Prior to its incorporation it was set up and operated as [3] part of the the Second Claimant with all of its costs and expenses bourne by the Second Claimant. As per the admission of the First Defendant it was set up for his then wife, who later became his ex-wife, also a hairdresser and operated under the trading name Ladies Only – Hair By Rojin.
Response [3] – The costs of the Interior Fit out, including furniture and equipments for Unit 130 were remitted via cheques drawn from Emirates Islamic Bank Account No. 3708174278301. This is a personal account held in the name of Ms. Roushin Bashar Haj Ali, the First Defendant personally funded Mr. Roushin to cover up the cost of her project.
d. Mr Sokol Cici (‘Mr. Cici), a real estate agent and the owner of Premium International Real Estate Broker who brokered the transaction between the First Claimant and the First Defendant for the sale and purchase of the Shares of the Second Claimant as well as providing the draft the MOU and the Share Transfer Agreement referred to herein.
e. Mr. Bardhyk Eshja (Mr. Eshja), the husband of the First Claimant, the Purchaser of the Shares in the Second Claimant and was a principal witness to the conversations between the First Claimant and the First Defendant and Mr. Cici.
f. Ms. Marsela Kollacaku (Ms. Kollacaku), is a friend of the First Claimant and key principal witness to the transaction of the purchase of Shares of the Second Claimant.
g. Ms. Lolita Caban Tines (Ms. Lolita), is an employee under the role of accountant of the Second Claimant from 13 May 2024 but had joined the Company on and around 10 May 2024, she holds a diploma in accounting and finance and is one of the key witness present during the transition period or Probationary Period per se to take handover of the financial and company files and records.
h. Mr. Shady Gorge Zaiat (Mr. Shady), an employee of the Company from 1 February 2023 until [4] 31 May 2024, the last day he attended the work to never return. Mr. Shady held the position of Assistant Accountant with the Second Claimant and was a primary individual responsible for the handover of financial records and company files to the First Claimant during the Transition Period.
Response [4] – The former Accountant Mr Shadi was remotely assisting the Claimants following the DIFC Initial Approval on 17 April 2024.
i. Ms. Abeir Imadeddin AlKordi (“Ms. Abeir”), was employed by the Company from 1 May 2022 until 31 May 2024, serving as a Sales Executive. Evidence indicates that Ms. Abeir assisted the First Defendant and Mr. Shady in managing the financial and operational matters of the Company. Ms. Abeir, who had access to the Company’s email and domain server accounts, was also responsible for ensuring their proper handover to the First Claimant.
j. Ms. Roushin Bashar Haj Ali (“Ms. Rojin”), the owner and registered shareholder of the Fourth Defendant, was likewise employed by the Second Claimant [5] during the relevant period and held the position of Senior Stylist pursuant to an employment contract dated 1 August 2021 (Ex Cl 49) found at D1.49of February Bundle. Evidence indicates that Ms. Rojin worked closely with the First Defendant in the day to day operations of the Second Claimant and had access to sensitive operational and financial information, including client records, booking systems, and internal communications. During the transition period and prior to the First Claimant obtaining full control of the Company’s DIFC licence, Ms. Rojin continued to operate within the Second Claimant’s premises and was involved in activities that facilitated the diversion of clients, goodwill, and business opportunities to the Fourth Defendant. This included the use of the Second Claimant’s branding, equipment, and staff, as well as the continued operation of the ladies’ division under the “Hair Creators” trade name despite the absence of any lawful basis for doing so. Ms. Roushin Bashar Haj Ali (“Ms. Rojin”) is understood to be the sole shareholder of the Fourth Defendant and its directing mind and will. Her knowledge and conduct are attributable to the Fourth Defendant for the purposes of paragraphs 128–150.
Response [5] – The shareholder of the Fourth Defendant was not employed at the Second Claimant during the sale and purchess.
33. Against the background of the most recent events in the SCT Courts and the Dubai Court of First Instance between the respective parties in this matter the following section sets out the events leading to, the [1] false representations made during, and the actions which took place during and after the sale and purchase and transfer of the shares of the Second Claimant from the First Defendant to the First Claimant; together with the [2] unapproved removal of the assets of the Second Claimant by the First and Third Defendant, both tangible and intangible, post the execution of the MOU and Share Transfer Agreement, and the breach of contract by the First Defendant acting through the Second Defendant as if it were still the Second Claimant, given in further detail as follows.
Response [1] – The purported false representations are denied. Response [2] – the removal of assets is denied.
34. In January or early February the [ADM] First Claimant engaged Mr. Cici of Premium International Real Estate Broker to locate a business for sale in the DIFC in the hair and/or beauty industry for a target price in the region of AED 1,500,000 (One Million Five Hundred Thousand Dirhams).
Admission relied upon.
35. Mr. Cici of Premium International Real Estate has built up a number of referral connections with other agencies who deal with parties selling real estate or companies and these agencies often refer buyers or sellers between one another.
36. Through the network Premium International Real Estate advertised that they had a ready buyer for a salon in DIFC and another agency contacted a member of Premium International Real Estate staff to advise that [1] the Partner of the First Defendant had listed the Second Claimant as being for sale originally for the price of [ADM] AED 2,500,000 (Two Million Five Hundred Thousand Dirhams). The referring agency provided Premium International Real Estate with the details of the First Defendant to allow Premium International Real Estate to meet and negotiate directly with the First Defendant on behalf of the First Claimant.
Response [1] – the First Defendant never had a partner in the Second Claimant. Claimants are required to prove this assertion.
37. Mr Cici confirmed that he [ADM] personally undertook the negotiations, initially reducing the price of the sale and purchase of the shares to AED 2,000,000 (Two Million Dirhams) then finally to AED 1,500,000 (One Million Five Hundred Thousand Dirhams), in line with the expectations of the buyer, the First Claimant.
[ADM] This Admission is incomplete, the real state Agent or the Claimants never referred or mentioned why the substantial price reduction was made, in particular it was as equivalent amount to the extent 1 million Dirham Company Financing loan and under the false promise made Mr. Cici that his principale will pay the monthly installments of the Loan.
38. On completion of the negotiations, on 14 February 2024, the First Claimant acting as a Buyer entered into a Memorandum of Understanding (the “MOU”) printed under the letterhead of the company Premium International Real Estate Broker, with Hair Creators Salon LTD with License No. CL0181 and having its registered office at level 14, The Gate, DIFC, Dubai, UAE with the First Defendant as its Owner, bother parties referred to as the Seller..
39. The MOU confirms the terms agreed for purchase of the business known as the Second Claimant, including but not limited to all of the matters listed below for the agreed total purchase price of UAE Dirhams One Million Five Hundred Thousand (AED 1,500,000) (Purchase Price) in particular noting that the Second Claimant was sold as a going concern and that irrespective of the [ADM] poor drafting by Premium International Real Estate of the documentation, only personal items of the First Defendant may be removed, ie items that are not owned by and purchased with monies from any of the Second Claimant’s accounts or income, Clause 1 specified that the Buyer was agreeing to purchase:
“the entire business of the Seller, including all assets, liabilities, contracts, goodwill, intellectual property rights, accessories, staff, products, equipment, and other rights and obligations related to the business as a going concern”.
40. The salient terms of the MOU were:
a. Clause 3 that the Buyer, the First Claimant, would be entitled to conduct due diligence on the Seller’s, the Second Claimant’s business, books, records, relevant documents and information.
b. Clause 5 the Seller to explain the key elements of the business, provide assistance to the Buyer for a period of 1-2 Months after completion of the sale if necessary, [1] and to guarantee all information about the business activity.
Response [1] – Clause 5 is misstated. “Seller guarantees the validity of information actually provided about the business activity“ this term itself refer to the informations disclosed or provided, the Claimants herein omitted these informations from their pleading and never addressed what informations were supposedly disclosed or provided.
c. Clause 7 The Seller shall guarantee the validity of all information provided and [2] not to misrepresent the same.
Response [2] – Clause 7 does not state that the Seller “shall guarantee” or “shall not misrepresent.” It provides that if information supplied by the Seller is found to be invalid or misrepresented, the Buyer may terminate the contract and recover the deposit. and again this Clause refers to provided material information.
d. The MOU was to be confidential as between the First and Second Claimant and the First Defendant, thus all information on the Second Claimant was only available from the First Defendant or anyone he nominated.
Response [3] – Clause 9 requires confidentiality concerning the terms and existence of the MOU. It does not state that all information about the Second Claimant was available exclusively from the First Defendant or his nominee.
41. On the execution page of the MOU it clearly listed the following as part of the transaction: “Seller is offering for sale: a. Trade license b. Company name and associated intellectual property rights; c. Social media assets, including telephone numbers for booking purposes; d. Business contact details, including telephone numbers for booking purposes; e. All business related equipments, products, and inventory, excluding personal items such as computers and cameras; f. Supplier contacts and agreements; g. Assistance with the transition process and communication with mall management”
42. As per Clause 6 of the MOU the First Claimant was required to pay a deposit to prove “interest to purchase the business”, which the First Claimant [ADM] provided by way of cash deposit to Premium International Real Estate to pay to the First Defendant. The First Defendant provided a typed receipt on Company Letterhead of the Second Claimant to confirm that the Second Claimant and the First Defendant jointly received AED 100,000 (UAE Dirhams One Hundred Thousand) [1] as an earnest and deposit against the MOU, signed by the First Defendant and every page was signed in Arabic by the First Defendant, the receipt was also dated 14 February 2024 and stamped with Company Stamp. There is no record of the funds being entered into any of the Second Claimant’s accounts at this time.
Response [1] – the Claimants filed there Supporting Exhibit EXCL22 and in that statement of bank account these is record of 100,000 Dirham cash deposited into the Second Claimant ADIB account on 14 Feb 2024. but there is no term mondationg ths payment to be deposited exclusively into the company account.
43. Based on the intention of the parties and the wording of the terms of the MOU there was clearly a mistake or error in the expression of who the Seller was under the MOU as per Article 38 of the DIFC Contract Law, given neither of the drafting parties was a legal practitioner or imbued with any legal background. The actions of the parties make it clear that the First Defendant understood he was legally the Seller, with the First Defendant accepting all of the payments from the First Claimant, understanding that the shares were in his name to transfer to the First Claimant, as well as [1] the money being paid for the shares being his to keep.
Response [1] – Denied. The MOU expressly identifies the Second Claimant as the Seller and the First Claimant as the Buyer. It was drafted by Premium International, the First Claimant’s own agent. The First Defendant designated as owner of the company in reference to its shareholding not its land or premises, receipt of deposit do not prove a drafting mistake or alter the written parties. The AED 100,000 was a deposit toward the transaction, and no contractual term required it to be paid into the Second Claimant’s operating account.
44. After signing the MOU, the Second Claimant Represented by First Defendant and the First Claimant signed the Company Share Transfer Agreement on 20 March 2024, noting that the Company License Number in this Agreement was CL1441.
45. The term investor was now used for the First Claimant and the First Defendant is now the representative of the Company as opposed to the Joint Seller.
46. The recitals confirm that the First Claimant is the purchaser of 100% shares in the Company (Second Claimant) along with its business for the agreed value of 15,00000 AED as described in the MOU. Again the First Claimant would assert that the mistake in the definition of the Seller is due solely to the poor drafting by the parties involved who have no formal legal training. It is clear, based on the wording of the terms of the Agreement, that the purpose is for the First Claimant to purchase the shares from the First Defendant in the Second Claimant, thus the Company is purchased as a going concern including with all of its existing assets, good will, intellectual property etc, as opposed to a business asset sale.
47. Clause 1 stated that the Shares would be purchased and acquired over two stages: First Claimant purchases 50% only of the total 100 shares of the Second Claimant for AED 750,000 agreement effective when the funds are either in the hands of the First Defendant or bank account as specified and on the condition that the “Agreement becomes valid but effective starting day is the date of the DIFC approval of the 50% share transfer”
48. The First Claimant paid the first instalment of the Purchase Price balance of 750,000 on 26 March 20024, within 6 days of entering into the Agreement. This was acknowledged by the First Defendant in a printed receipt signed by Mr. Cici, the First Defendant, and stamped with Company stamp.
49. On the same date as noted above, the First Defendant acknowledged receipt of AED 50,229 in cash as the Manager stated as being for rent in the month of April, 2024 it is counter signed by Mr Cici and stamped with Company Stamp, notably [1] this payment does not reflect in the accounts of the Second Claimant.
Response [1] – The Salon rent payment for April 2024 was pre-paid in advance by the First Defendant on 1 March 2024 via ADIB cheque no. 500158 for AED 110,458.00, cleared from ADIB account ending with 8723, beneficiary DIFC Investments LTD, for the period of March and April 2024. Ms. Marsella paid AED 50,000 in cash, as reimbursement to cover the rent for the month of April when the salon was handed over.
Document: Claimants Exhibit EX-CL-22
50. In light of the fact the [1] First Defendant failed whether negligently or deliberately to seek approval of or [2] register the Share Transfer with the DIFC, as per the terms of the Agreement, whilst the same was valid, it was not effective with respect to the start of the “Probationary Period” which was considered to be the temporary partnership of 30 days between the First Claimant and the First Defendant.
Response [1] – The First Defendant initial request sent to the DIFC Authority for adding the First Claimant was on 19 March 2026 and before the execution of the STA with her Agent in Copy followed by the instructions of the Authority on the requirements for the registration of which is fully documented by the First Defendant.
Document: DIFCA Requests to add Share Holder.pdf
Response [2] – it is denied that The First Defendant neglected seeking approval or that he failed to register her shares, it is after all subject to the Authority approvals and indeed the registration process is not an option that the First Defendant can enforce without these mandatory approvals .
51. The [1] First Defendant wilfully misled the First Claimant by accepting 50% payment of the agreed value for the Shares of the Company but failing to submit the application to the DIFC for the approval of the transfer of the Shares to the name of the First Claimant. The [2] Partnership as detailed in the Agreement never came into being due to the wilful or negligent actions or lack thereof by the First Defendant.
Response [1] – The 50% Payment was a request made by the First Claimant on 20 March 2024 via her real estate Agent Premium International, this request is documented by the First Defendant and The AED 750,000 was the contractually agreed first instalment for 50% of the shares. Accepting it was performance of the Share Transfer Agreement, not deception. therefore it is denied that the First Defendant intended to mislead the Claimant by dividing payments as alleged.
Document: SOKOL CICI WhatsApp correspondence
Response [2] – the temporary partnership defined on the Share transfer agreement is contractually drafted with specific terms apply within the specified period to protect the interests of both parties rather than it is an actual partnership that the First Defendant thought to be committed to. I did not fail to begin the DIFC process. After receiving the First Claimant’s required documents, I submitted them to DIFC on 26 March 2024, with the First Claimant and her representative copied.
52. The [1] First Claimant had no legal or beneficial control over the Company, and save for the payment of AED 750,000 to the First Defendant, the Second Defendant was no better off financially [2] the money having not been deposited in its accounts nor being used for the benefit of the Second Claimant and the Second Claimant, including [3] all its business and assets still being managed and controlled by the First Defendant.
Response [1] – The First Claimant had beneficial control over the Company as the documented physical and actual handover of Salon was on 1 April 2024, this is requested, agreed and handled by the First Claimant’s representative Ms. Marsela.
Document: Marsela WhatsApp Correspondence
Response [2] – The AED 750,000 was purchase consideration for the shares, not income belonging to the Second Claimant. Clause 1, Stage 1 of the STA expressly permitted payment either by bank transfer or in cash directly to myself as the then company manager. No contractual term required the share-sale proceeds to be deposited into the Second Claimant’s bank account or used for its benefit. the Claimants are required to identify the contract provision they rely on for this assertion.
Response [3] – The transition period terms and conditions at the 4th page term 2 is that the then Company Manager to remain with full management rights until the full purchase consideration of 1.5 million is paid in full. therefore this was a negotiated transitional term concerning the gradual payments of the sale price.
Document: Share Transfer and MOU Contracts
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53. Despite the [1] First Claimant having no legal responsibility or liability for the Company in April 2024 the First Defendant insisted on payment to himself [2] personally for the rent payable for the month of April 2024 upon execution of the Agreement. The First Claimant paid this to the First Defendant and is [3] entitled to claim these funds back on the grounds that contractually there was no legal obligation the First Claimant to pay the funds, the First Defendant did [4] not use them for the benefit of the Second Claimant as rent but rather misappropriated the funds from the Second Claimant and/or the First Claimant for his own personal use.
Response [1] – The First Claimant was personally liable to pay the rent of the premises pursuant to Term #1 of the transitional period as it clearly stated thereon that the responsibility of paying the rent is on hers, the April 2024 Salon rent was prepaid on 1 of March 2025 by way of Company Cheque no. 500158 for value of AED 110,458.00, cleared from Second Claimant ADIB account ending with 8723, beneficiary DIFC Investments LTD, for the period of March and April 2024. The separate AED 50,000 payment was partial reimbursement for April rent.
Document: ADIB Account Statment Page 4
Response [2] – The assertion that payment is personal is denied. Response [3] – The assertion that the Claimant is entitled to recover that amount is denied. Response [4] – the assertion that the payment was a misappropriation of funds is denied.
Document: Share Transfer and MOU Contracts Page 6
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54. At the start of the Agreement, Probationary is defined in the Agreement as “The term “probationary” is a period of management, shares, and money transition between the two.” In simple terms, the transition period for transferring shares through a registered deed with the DIFC, along with the handover of the business assets, management, and operations, must be completed within the 30-day Probationary Period valid on 26 March 2024, the date the First Defendant receives the first instalment (Stage 1 of Agreement) but only effective as a starting date on the date the DIFC approval is given. Probationary Period is also referred to as the Temporary Partnership.
Response [1] – The First Claimant was personally liable to pay the rent of the premises pursuant to Term #1 of the transitional period as it clearly stated thereon that the responsibility of paying the rent is on hers, the April 2024 Salon rent was prepaid on 1 of March 2025 by way of Company Cheque no. 500158 for value of AED 110,458.00, cleared from Second Claimant ADIB account ending with 8723, beneficiary DIFC Investments LTD, for the period of March and April 2024. The separate AED 50,000 payment was partial reimbursement for April rent.
Document: ADIB Account Statment Page 4
Response [2] – The assertion that payment is personal is denied. Response [3] – The assertion that the Claimant is entitled to recover that amount is denied. Response [4] – the assertion that the payment was a misappropriation of funds is denied.
Document: Share Transfer and MOU Contracts Page 6
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55. In light of the [1] First Defendant’s failure to register the legal right of the First Claimant to the shares of the Company during the period that should have been the Probationary Period, the First Defendant [2] became the holder of the shares in trust for the benefit of the First Claimant, and such was still bound by all of the terms of the Agreement as set out in the terms, together with responsibilities as a manager and a trustee, but the [3] First Claimant could not be bound by the obligations without having the legal benefit.
Response [1] – I deny that the Failure is already established, Response [2] – I deny that I held Shares by Trust. and the reason is that the documented DIFC register of companies preliminary Approval was issued and received on 17 April 2024 falling exactly within the Probationary Period.
Document: Registrar of Company email correspondence Page 1
Response [3] – The First Claimant was bound by the contract transitional terms.
Document: Share Transfer and MOU Contracts Pages 6 to 8
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56. The First Defendant had [1] breached his legal obligation to the First Claimant to make her a legal part of the Company but as the incoming purchaser of the Shares and having paid 50% of the Company shares plus having [2] unlawfully been asked to pay the rent for the month of April 2024 the First Defendant owed the First Claimant both contract obligations and a duty to not to misled, deceive or act in any manner that would be detrimental to the interests of the First Claimant knowing that she was to legally acquire the business of the Second Claimant, and thus not to do anything which would [3] lead it damages to the Second Claimant as the First Defendant was bound to the implied obligation of good faith and fair dealings, as per Article 57 of the Contract Law DIFC Law No. 6 of 2004.
Response [1] – I deny that the alleged breach as already established, I am not holding power to make the Claimant a legal. Response [2] – I deny that the April rent reimbursement was unlawful.
Response [3] – I deny the alleged damage had been and the claimants are required the particulars of such damage if any.
57. The First Defendant had an express obligation under [1] Clause 5 of the MOU transfer the shares legally to the First Claimant and assist with the transition and the system followed by the Company according to DIFC laws and regulations. Due to the [2] failure to transfer the First Claimant was forced to undertake this action herself with the DIFCA on learning that she had no control of the Company or [3] access to the DIFC Portal to carry out any of the functions required for managing and operating the Company thus [4] committing a breach of Article 58 of the Contract Law which states, Cooperation Between the Parties “Each party is bound to co-operate with the other party when such co-operation may reasonably be expected for the performance of that party’s obligations.”.
Response [1] – I deny that the alleged breach as already established, I am not holding power to make the Claimant a legal of the company before the Authority Approval. Response [2] – I deny that the April rent reimbursement was unlawful.
Document: Registrations of Emirates ID Cards in May 2025
Response [3] – I deny the alleged no access to the DIFC Client Portal as the registered Emirates Id Cards of the Claimants’ employees in May 2024 has followed their Employment Visa issuance under the Second Claimant sponsorship which is a process done by formal submissions on the DIFC Client Portal precisely in March and May 2024 proving that the Claimants had access to the same at the relevant time.
58. After signing the Agreement the [1] First Director made no attempt to change any of the details registered on the DIFC Portal with respect to the shareholding, the directors or the managers of the Company.
Response [1] – I deny that the alleged no attempt alleged, the First Documented formal request to add shareholder was indeed submitted on 19 March 2024 with the Claimants real estate Agent fully informed about it resulting in the ROC approval on 17 April 2024, any latter delay in the formal share transfer was due to the further approvals required by the Authority and such matter is beyond my power, any opposing statement may the Claimants have is required to proved by verifiable documents.
Document: DIFCA Requests to add Share Holder
59. The First Defendant, who was also the only Company Director, [1] purportedly held a Director’s meeting of the Company on 1 April 2024 and passed a Board Resolution for the transfer of 100 shares from the First Defendant to the First Claimant [2] to take place only on 1 May 2024. The document demonstrates that the First Defendant [3] never sought approval of the initial 50% registration of the Shares of the First Claimant, nor entered into the Provisional Partnership as detailed in the Agreement.
Response [1] – Registration of the First Claimant as Shareholder
- On 19 March 2024, my employee, Abeer Kurdi, contacted DIFC Mall Management, copying me, to request the procedure and documents required to add a shareholder.
- On 20 March 2024, DIFC explained that the proposed change required:
- Clearance of the company’s outstanding payments;
- The reason for the change;
- The proposed shareholder’s name, percentage and biography;
- Six months of the proposed shareholder’s bank statements; and
- DIFC Committee approval, followed by the formal process through the DIFC Client Portal and final ROC review.
- I forwarded those requirements for the necessary documents and also requested a meeting with DIFC concerning the proposed new business partner.
- On 26 March 2024, I submitted the proposed shareholder’s documents and requested approval to add the First Claimant initially as a 50% shareholder.
- DIFC then requested confirmation that the company had cleared its outstanding payments. I clarified the requirement and supplied the company’s clearance confirmation on 27 March 2024.
- I repeatedly followed up with DIFC on 29 March, 5 April and 15 April 2024 while the request was awaiting Committee consideration.
- On 17 April 2024, DIFC Retail Leasing confirmed that the request had been approved by the DIFC Committee and instructed me to liaise with the Registrar of Companies Helpdesk to make the necessary corporate changes.
- On 1 May 2024, I informed the ROC that the intended transfer had changed from 50% to 100% of the shares. I expressly confirmed that I had no objection to the full transfer and attached the transfer document, acceptance document and the First Claimant’s passport.
- On 2 May 2024, the ROC instructed that the formal transfer request had to be submitted through the DIFC Client Portal using the “Update Company Shares” service and the “Transfer” option.
The First Claimant and Marsela Kollcaku were copied into the material correspondence. The emails therefore show that I openly initiated, pursued and obtained the necessary preliminary approval for the transfer; I did not conceal, obstruct or refuse the process.
Important distinction: The DIFC Committee’s approval on 17 April 2024 was preliminary approval, not the final legal registration of the shares. The correspondence ends with the ROC’s Client Portal instructions on 2 May 2024. The subsequent portal record, amended share register, share certificate or licence is required to prove the exact date on which the First Claimant became the legally registered shareholder.
Document: DIFCA Requests to add Share Holder
60. An additional point of note is that the [1] Resolution fails to specify who attended the meeting and refers to itself as a “Certified True Copy of the Resolution Passed at the Meeting of the Board of Directors of Hair Creators Salon LTD,” but lacks certification by any external party.
Response [1] – I allegation herein is unclear, such Resolution was as standard company instrument to comply with the company’s Articles of Association. which itself require director approval, surrender of the existing share certificate. it was accepted by the ROC and caused no damage to the Claimants .
Document: DIFCA Requests to add Share Holder
61. Despite the [1] breaches by the First Defendant with respect to the one month Provision Partnership, the First Claimant paid remaining portion of the Purchase Price of AED 750,000 on 1 May 2024 the cash payment was completed by Ms. Kollacaku, on behalf of First Claimant, acknowledged by the First Defendant in a typed undated receipt on Company Letterhead, signed by the First Defendant and stamped by the Company. [2] The funds were not deposited in the Second Claimant’s account.
Response [1] – the allegation herein are denied, unspecified and do not identify a particular breach, the Claimant had received the entire the salon on 1set of April, the April income was managed by the First Claimant, likewise the April expenses were paid via the Company accounts, the DIFCA Approval was gained and the transition process resulted in completed share transfer, the Claimants are required to clarify the alleged Breach.
Response [2] – there is no contract term, agreement or any material evidence that the Sale consideration was mandated to be deposited into the Company account and used by the Company, the Claimants are required to prove such agreemnt.
Document: DIFCA Requests to add Share Holder
62. However, as stated earlier and despite the Board resolution, the [1] First Defendant failed to transfer the 100% shares in the Company to the First Claimant via DIFC Portal or in person.
Response [1] – the agreement doe not necacciate the DIFC Portal submission to be done by the First Defendant, the Former employee Ms Abier, submitted the Portal request on the mid May 2024 right after the First Claimant’s passport was attested by the Authority, a step than can not be skipped before the Portal Submission. the Claimants could have produced the portal submissions if allegations were true.
Document: DIFCA Requests to add Share Holder
63. The First Defendant [1] continued to exercise sole control over the Company’s assets, management, operations and financial activities including [2] concealing liabilities and fines imposed by authorities, [3] theft of tangible and non tangible assets of the Company until at the very earliest 30 May 2024 when the First Defendant left the Second Claimant’s premises and did not return again.
Response [1] – the continued sole control of the company is denied, every matter related to the operations and every decision in relation to the salon financial management during the transitional phase was negotiated with Marsela, this is documented by WhatsApp correspondence where as she made decisions suitable for them and I facilitated these decisions by the Manager or Authorised Signatory capacity on their behalf.
Response [2] – it is denied, that any liabilities were concealed, the bank accounts were fully accessed on 17 of April by the person nominated by Marsela and designated as Salon Manager Ms Rexhina Mema, the DIFC Portal was as well browsed and viewed by her during the transitional phase in order to review matters related to the employees.
Response [3] – the broad assertions of stolen assets without specifying the allegedly stolen items is denied, the Court is invited to order that the CCTV footage of the Gate Avenue mall be brought and reviewed if necessary, I have nothing to hide, the only Items removed are the listed personal items for removal in Subparagraph E on the Second Page of the STA and these are Cameras or photography lights and computers. the Claimants are required to prove their position regarding “theft assets”.
Document: Sharer Transfer Agreement
64. The First Claimant did not become aware of the [1] fraud that had been perpetrated on her and on the Second Claimant until she gained full control of the license of the Company.
Response [1] – .
65. The First Defendant deliberately in breach of the Agreement,[1] delayed transferring the business license to the First Claimant as required under Term #2, Clause 1(1.1) initially [2] stating he would continue to be a Director and/or General Manager during the transition period from March 20, 2024 until May 1, 2024, then continuing with the Company and leaving without notice on 30 May 2024, [3] having not transferred the Shares nor handed over the access or control to the Company’s DIFC portal. Ensuring that the First Claimant [4] could not access any data about the Company, its filings or any fines on any of the systems.
Response [1] – the Company Trade License is not a transferable right like Company shares, the change of the registered manager on the Trade License is a formal request to be submitted on the DIFC Portal and it requires no permission, approval or any other form of acceptance by myself. that request for a manager change can not proceed the ROC’s registration of the First Claimant as the new shareholder of the Company, therefore the First Claimant following the amendment of the Share Certificate held the required authority to replace the name of the Authorized Signatory on the Trade License with no further needed from myself to do that.
Response [2] – the Term 2 on the STA obligated me to transfer the company management as in general to the First Claimant but that term does not obligate me to change the registered Authorised Signatory on the trade license on behalf of the First Claimant, especially that following the formal submission of the Board Resolution on 1 May I had no more Authority to initiate any company related formal requests.
Response [3] – the access to the Second Claimant’s DIFC Portal was handed over during April as the VISA Permit approvals issued between end of April and early May 2024 are indeed submitted for the DIFC Authority via the Portal said to be inaccessible, the Super User Portal Admin Account was registered under Accountant@haircreators.net, it was originally operated by the former accountant, Shady Zaiat, who transferred access during the handover to the First Claimant’s appointed accountant, Lolita Tines, and manager, Rexhina Mema. DIFC confirmed on 25 June 2024 that Shady’s personal email access had been deactivated following a request submitted by the company’s Super User. This demonstrates that the Claimants’ management team was exercising portal administration before the licence update on 27 June 2024. Lolita’s subsequent use of Accountant@haircreators.net to retrieve and forward the historical DIFC notices further contradicts the allegation that the Claimants never had access to that account.
Document: Email correspondences from Lolita regarding DEWS Enrollment
Response [4] – it is denied that the First Claimant never had access to that account.
66. The First Defendant’s [1] actions were a deliberate fraudulent non-disclosure under the terms of the MOU and the Agreement to hide the fines incurred by the First Defendant for failure to comply with mandatory provisions of the law related to employees end of service benefits. As well as the records of the [2] legal notices that the relevant DIFC departments had issued to the Company whilst under the management and ownership of the First Defendant.
Response [1] – it is denied that I hid any fines, when I received the Notice of Fine on 15 April 2024, I instructed the former assistant manager Ms Abeir to submit and objection and full the enrollment requirements, it is important to draw a clear understanding of the reasons of the fine notice, it that the DIFC required the Second Claimant to enroll in the DEWS and was not about any amount unpaid, SR 206759 was therefore submitted via the Portal by Ms Abier with new salon Manager clearly informed to follow up and that the new accountant to prepare and the submit the employees related documentation in order to avoid the fine, the resignation notice of Ms Aber and Ms Shadi was over by end of may, both left the company relying on the Claimants appointed employees to carry on the necessary remaining part of the process, the DIFC email on 27 May 2024 clearly indicated the SR raised and mentioned herein and extended the compliance deadline until 16 June 2024, which is the Claimants’ responsibility to deliver.
Response [2] – it is denied that any legal notices were sent by DIFC Authority to the Second Claimant or to me at any point of time, the Notice of fine is a notice to pay a potential fine it is not legal notice.
Document: Email correspondences from Lolita regarding DEWS Enrollment
67. The First Claimant herself had to approach DIFC herself in person to update the license with her details as Shareholder and Manager at the end of June 2024, receiving DIFC’s approval of the transfer and the updated license only on 27 June 2024.
Response [1] – .
68. Following completion of the payment price for the shares and a month’s rent for April 2024, and the First Defendant’s to failure to return to the Company after 30 May 2024, the First Claimant had not received a complete handover of all keys to the business. A set of keys was found to remain in the possession of the employees of the Second Claimant but this was not made known to the First Claimant until she made enquiries. The First Claimant remains unaware as to whether the [1] First Defendant still retains possession of any keys to the business, thereby raising concerns about the continued control or access to the premises by the First Defendant..
Response [1] – it is denied that I kept any spare keys with me, DIFC facilities are highly secured with CCTV camera in every corner in security guards standing in everywhere there is no way any person can access any facility without permission.
69. The Claimants raise this matter as a [1] recent audit carried out on the Second Claimant highlighted serious irregularities in the differences between stocks and supplies and business equipments that the Second Claimant should be in possession of and is in possession of, together with missing security footage from the Second Claimant’s premises.
Response [1] – in order for any audit report to be accurate it requires the original receipts, statements of accounts, invoices, supplier accounts, payments receipts and many other material financial and operational records to be available, therefore this allegation inconsistent with the allegations that the I no access to digital assets was granted nor was there any handover of company related accounting and managerial records.
70. A forensic [1] audit report is currently being processed in this regard, the Second Claimant having now collated copies of all documents from Suppliers, records of all inventory, assets and stock as well independent sources of footage to ascertain the discrepancies. This would be in breach of [2] Clause 1.E, Term 5, Term 9, and both Claimants will seek for restitution for all of the amounts that have been taken by way of assets, inventory and stock.
Response [1] – in order for any audit report to be accurate it requires the original receipts, statements of accounts, invoices, supplier accounts, payments receipts and many other material financial and operational records to be available, therefore this allegation inconsistent with the allegations that the I no access to digital assets was granted nor was there any handover of company related accounting and managerial records.
Response [2] – I do not recognize these terms to honest.
71. Under the Agreement [1] only the ADIB bank account is referred to or acknowledged by the First Defendant as a corporate account for the Second Claimant, it was not a mistake that the First Defendant [2] withheld the details of any other banks accounts but a fraudulent non-disclosure as per Article 40 of the DIFC Contract Law.
Response [1] – the reference on the STA dated 20 March 2024 is reference to the rental pay cheques issued from ADIB Account, it is not a reference to a single account itself with the intention of hiding another account, I rely of the 2ed April documented disclosure of all other bank accounts including bank name and individual account numbers. therefore I deny the reference on the STA to constitute an intentional conduct to conceal anything.
Response [2] – the Claimants produced and relied on their WhatsApp correspondence between myself and their identified representative Ms Marsela, she was tasked to handle all matters of handover during the Due Diligence therefore the details related to the comapny banking I provided to her on early April undermines the Claimants allegations that banking details were withheld.
72. [1] Since February 14, 2024, the First Defendant deliberately interfered with and obstructed the First Claimant’s ability to conduct full due diligence on the Second Claimant after paying the deposit as per Clause 3 of the MOU and during Probationary Period as per Clause 2 (1) of the Agreement which states,
Clause 2. the (“Investor”) rights during the probationary period, “The (“Investor”) shall have the right to conduct due diligence on the Company’s business, books, records, and other relevant documents and information, including the online booking system and print out of company bank account statement without having access to the company bank account subject to the terms of a confidentiality agreement entered into between the (“parties”)”.
Response [1] – it is denied that I had met the First Claimant at any date prior to 26 March 2024, I deny obstructing her from performing any investigations on the company documents before the two contracts are already executed on 26 March, I further submit that I was transparent with my obligations to disclose any matter before and after the contracts execution.
I require the Claimants to prove and or specify any act, omission, or conduct that I allegedly made, including date, words, person and or material that amount to deliberate obstruction.
73. [1] Failing to fully disclose that there were two separate corporate bank accounts: Abu Dhabi Islamic Bank (ADIB) and Ras Al Khaimah Bank (RAK Bank) and a Loan Agreement which was guaranteed by the Company and [2] secured by the Company POS system.
Response [2] – it is denied that the loan is secured or guaranteed by the Second Claimant, the Loan is guaranteed by a personal cheque signed by myself.
Response [1] – it is denied that I failed to disclose the loan agreement, I rely on the very first contract executed, its Clause no. 5 and No. 7 both refers to the informations provided thereof, these referred to informations are the financial disclosure of the bank statements, audit reports and copy of the loan agreement, these were the materials relied on for drafting the contract, I rely on the price reduction admitted by the claimant in the equivalent amount to the loan of 1 million, which is exactly why the Claimants declared or contractually assumed all liabilities and obligations. the Claimants do not allege any altered or fake documents provided, they only ommit to admit the pre-contractul disclosure made to their identified real estate Agent.
74. The First Claimant was [1] provided with only limited access to both the RAK Bank account and the ADIB Bank account during the Probationary Period which the First Defendant [2] stated was due to a bank issue, limited paper documents were available.
Response [1] – it is denied that the banking access provided during the transitional phase was limited, the First Claimant being a self litigant filed a supporting document to the DIFC SCT Court on 3 Sep 2024 before the present proceedings was even registered, this document evidences that the First Claimant logged into the Rak Bank account and managed to screenshot the full details of the company loan including its terms, repayments proving that the login username and password were provided to her appointed employees during the transitional phase. Furthermore, the Claimants’ own appointed Accountant and Manager names are showing in the bank transactions statements, their additions of new beneficiaries, transactions for suppliers, payments made to the DIFC Investments establish a full unrestricted access was granted.
Response [2] – the First Claimant did not clarify how they managed to provide many screenshots and generate an online bank statements while not being the Authorised Signatory at Rak Bank, it technically impossible for a person to sign in bank account without having the required logging credentials. it is denied that the provided documents papers were limited, a 12 month account statements are not limited.
Document: Personal-Loan-Undertaken-under-Corporate-Name SCT-352-2024
75. The [1] First Defendant failed disclose any of the leases held or guaranteed by the Second Claimant, whilst under his management. Noting that the First Defendant in failing to disclose the bank statements of RAK Bank failed to disclose that RAK BANK was operating under the assumption that the leased premises Unit GA-00-SZ-G0-RT-130, 133, 135 and 137, Level GF, Gate Avenue – South Zone, DIFC were still all under the control of the Second Claimant.
Response [1] – it is denied that the I failed to disclose leasing history of the company. By 26 Feb 2024, I transparently placed the Claimants’ real estate Agent on direct contact with the DIFC Leasing Management at a time the only payment made by the Claimant was 100K deposit and further on 2 April I introduced the First Claimant as my new business partner to the DIFC Leaning Management senior level officers in person whereas any informations related to company leasing history could then be clarified directly from the Authority.
Document: Email correspondence with the DIFC Leasing Management Page 10
76. Such failure to disclose or deliberate refusal, by [1] First Defendant, assisted in concealing the relationship between the First Defendant, Third Defendant, Fourth Defendant and Second Claimant, and preventing the First Claimant from carrying out proper due diligence enquiries with the Fourth Defendant whose business was directly opposite the premises of the Second Claimant.
Response [1] – I require the Claimants to provide at least 1 request for disclosure of such immaterial and personal matter that I refused to answer, there is contractually no duty to disclose such matter, nor was there a true reason for private relationships to be disclosed.
Document: Email correspondence with the DIFC Leasing Management Page 10
77. The First Defendant [1] maintained this failure to disclose for the period of the probation and the entire time that he acted as the Manager for the Second Claimant.
Response [1] – I was formally designated as a manager from before the sale in dispute, I remained as a manager until med May 2024, I request the Claimants to specify the contract term that obligated me to voluntarily prepare and submit informations that I was not asked to provide at first place.
Document: Email correspondence with the DIFC Leasing Management Page 10
78. The [1] Third Defendant also maintained this failure to disclose for the the entire time that she continued in the employment of the Second Claimant until the Second Defendant was incorporated and the fit out works complete.
Response [1] – it is denied that the Third Defendant had been obligated by any contract or term of agreement to disclose her private marriage details to any of the Claimants, I require the Claimants to specify the contract term that obligated my wife the Third Defendant to voluntarily prepare and submit informations that she was not asked nor obligated to provide at first place.
79. The Fourth Defendant, owned by the ex-wife of the First Defendant, a former division of the Second Claimant, failed to report to the Claimants having received funds incorrectly from the Second Claimant [1] incorrectly as admitted by the owner of the Fourth Defendant in her witness statement.
Response [1] – it is denied that the Fourth Defendant the transactions were or funds were received incorrectly.
80. The First Claimant came to learn later after the full transfer of ownership that a result of the First and Third Defendant changing positions in the Company as owner the requirement to update the banking KYC and authorised signatory had fallen behind, consequently the [1] access to the ADIB Bank account became inconsistent, intermittently on and off. The First Claimant was forced to make a physical visit to ADIB Bank in order to obtain full access to the banking system in ADIB.
Response [1] – the Claimants failed to explain how the historically transferred shares in 2022 caused the later bank access issues in 2024. Any banking access interrupted by historical and lawfull share transfer is denied, I rely on the documented reminder I sent on the 26 June 2024 for the First Claimant and requested her to perform her necessary KYC updates at the ADIB Bank.
Document: Email correspondence sent on 26 June 2024 by Ms Abeir to Update KYC Details with ADIB Bank
81. The First Claimant [1] had brief supervised access to the RAK Bank Business account in May 2024, after she had completed the sale and purchase of the shares, [2] she was able to take a screenshot before the access was revoked by the First Defendant. In that screen shot she noticed an inwards loan transaction of AED 1,012,221.00 on 28 December 2023 and an immediate dispersal on the same day of AED 389,244.75.
Response [1] – the First Claimant filed several documents including statements of bank account, full loan details, repayments transactions and more in which it is clear the access was unlimited and unrestricted.
Response [2] – the Claimants are invited to explain how their supporting documents shows all the Digital banking details, transactions, balance and payments covering several months while I remain the Authorised Signatory till the date.
Document: Rak Bank related transactions with names and banking details
82. On or around 24 May 2024, the First Defendant [1] contacted the First Claimant’s husband in relation to the loan knowing that the First Claimant had seen it briefly and admitted that the First Defendant had taken a loan [2] that was a personal loan and he deliberately withheld this information to ensure the sale of shares proceeded. The First Defendant [3] further admitted after the first EMI withdrawal that he provided to RAK Bank a cheque drawn under the Second Claimant name as a guarantee for the personal loan and the Second Claimant’s proceeds under the POS are being pledged to secure the loan.
Response [1] – the assertion that First Claimant had seen the loan details briefly is denied, Mr Eshja via voice note sent confirmed that he agreed the terms of a partnership that was supposed to happen between myself and the first claimant, that day the Claimants’ appointed representative received a confirmation that the earlier security bank instrument guaranteeing the loan was cancelled, they were asking ms Abier what was the replacement of that Cheque.
Response [2] – I deny that I made any admission that the Loan was personal loan, Response [3] – I sent Mr Esha a copy of the replacement security cheque submitted during the loan Top-Up process which is signed by myself in a personal capacity not personal liability, I clearly mentioned Company Loan in my documented voice note. following that the First Claimant refused making repayments claiming that the loan is personal and been withheld.
Document: WhatsApp correspondence with Mr Eshja Page 84.
83. The First Defendant [1] promised via Whatsapp voice to have the Second Claimant cleared from this liability and to provide the clearance papers to the First Claimant’s husband on the same day. This is confirmed in the Witness Statement of Mr. Eshja.
Response [1] – it is denied, I made any promise to clear or pay the loan.
Document: WhatsApp correspondence with Mr Eshja Page 84.
84. The First Defendant [1] failed to provide the clearance papers and on June 1, 2024, the amount of [2] AED 28,799 was debited from the RAK Bank account of the Second Claimant as the First EMI Instalment payment against the Personal Loan of the First Defendant.
Response [1] – security cheque guaranteeing the earlier Loan Agreement No. 20649173 was canceled on 7 May 2024.
Response [2] – I was paying the installments of the loan throwout the transition phase, on 30 May I transferred 29000 to the Second Claimant Rak bank account using the personal account of former accountant therefore the deduction on 1 Jun had followed the deposit, after June the shares transfer process was completed and I pursuant to the contract the claimants are liable for the remaining installments.
Document: WhatsApp correspondence with Mr Eshja Page 84.
85. The RAK Bank account is now understood to be attached to the POS system; notably Term 10 of the Agreement shows the First Defendant tried to pass full responsibility for the “POS Machine, fees, online platform charges… business bank accounts charges or another auto or manual payments linked to the Company”. Apparently trying to pass off the EMI instalment as an auto payment hoping the First Claimant would not understand that this was a Personal Loan repayment on behalf of the FIrst Defendant and therefore defrauding both Claimants within the meaning of Article 40 of the DIFC Contract Law.
Response [1] – any allegations of bad faith attempt is denied, Term# 10 “The First Claimant to be responsible for covering the POS machine fees, online line platforms charges and fees such as the company website, company email hosting fees, the DIFC Portal charges, employees work permit issuing and cancellation’s costs, business bank accounts charges and any other auto or manual payments linked to the company.”.
86. The [1] RAK Bank account statements as now provided indicate that the details provided by the First Defendant to RAK Bank include “Unit GA-00-SZ-G0-RT-130, Level GF, Gate Avenue – South Zone, DIFC,” the operating address of the Fourth Defendant. The Statements are addressed to all of the Units as originally leased by the Second Claimant when under the ownership, management and control of the First Defendant.
Response [1] – it is denied that Rak Bank account statements are only now provided, these were provided from 26 March 2025 before the execution of the STA and the Claimants produced and submitted several account statements proving their possession of the same prior to any disclosure with these proceedings.
87. The Claimants can only assume that the Fourth Defendant’s details have been used by the First Defendant in order to secure the Loan as there is no other explanation as to why the Fourth Defendant’s details would still be included on the RAK bank documents from 2023 onwards if it was operating as an entirely separate business.
Response [1] – .
88. [1] RAK Bank have contacted the First Claimant and she has discovered the [1] First Defendant had taken out a personal loan from RAK Bank on 28 December 2023, for the principal amount of AED 1,012,221.00, with an interest rate of 16%, for a tenure of 48 months, with a monthly instalment (EIM) of AED 28,799.00 to be paid on the 1st of every month until 01/01/28. The loan agreement no. was 20669222 and the debit account no was 0243169101001.
Response [1] – if the Claimants’ statement here is true it establish that they had the required loan documents, interest rate, loan installment date, funds release date and other details are correct except that the loan is personal, it is denied the bank had contacted the First Claimant, despite being shareholder, within the bank records she has no recognizable authority to retrieve any information regarding the Rak Bank Accounts or the Company financing facility while she remained unregistered Authorised signatory without a court order, it is denied that the bank disclosed any information via a phone call to unregistered account administrator.
89. To date, the Claimants have been unable to ascertain the full extent of the Second Claimant’s potential liability or involvement in this loan agreement as the First Defendant has [1] only provided a draft of the loan agreement, refusing to provide any original papers including bank statements, he [2] states the draft is the similar to the loan agreement he signed with the RAK Bank.
Response [1] – it is denied that loan agreements are drafted, the material provided to the First Claimant is the Digital form of the financing agreement, Response [2] – I deny stating the draft is similar and I require the Claimants to prove this allegation.
90. Despite 27 days having passed since the loan installment was debited, and with the [1] First Defendant neither making payment nor providing any proof of cancellation, despite assurances given (para 66), the First Defendant’s failure to act constitutes a breach under Article 77 of the DIFC Contract Law No. 4 of 2006.
Response [1] – I deny that I was obligated to any further repayments after 17 May 2024 the date that the First Claimant became officially the new shareholder and as per the Foundational Term of the Contract and the term of the STA shw was obligated to repay her company Financing repayments.
Response [2] – I shared the cancellation email with Marsela during may and she was aware that the previous cheque is cancelled.
91. On or before June 28, 2024, Ms. Kollacaku contacted Mr. Shad who, as the former accountant to the Second Claimant and [1] the Fourth Defendant, was we assume aware of the loan and the terms of the application, the documents submitted in support of this Loan and the first Loan from RAK Bank, both of which appear to have been dispersed to the Second Claimant operating at all four units including “Unit GA-00-SZ-G0-RT-130, Level GF, Gate Avenue – South Zone, DIFC,” the operating addresss of the Fourth Defendant suggesting that the Fourth Defendant is still treated as part of the Second Claimant or a Group Entity.
Response [1] – .
92. In response, the First Defendant replied on the same day, raising concerns. He claimed that, following recieving of the final installment of the Purchase Price,[1] he had verbally offered to remain a shareholder with a 20% shares in the Company and to retain his position as General Manager (GM). In the same response he [2] acknowledged his failure to disclose the loan’s existence. The Claimants assume this omission was an attempt made by him to secure profits from the Company whilst being held liable for the loan repayment.
Response [1] – this is misstatement of fact and is denied, I rely on the Claimants’ 24 April 2024 email confirming their agreement about the partnership whereas I stay 10% share holder, this documented. the Claimants denied their knowledge of the company financing loan upon knowing that the security instrument held by the financing bank is enforceable against me not against the company itself.
Response [2] – it is denied that I admitted or acknowledged any failure to disclose, to the contrary, in the email I clearly mentioned the Loan in a company loan and that the Claimants as responsible for its payments from June 2024.
Document: Email correspondences with Marsela.
93. Further, in the same response, First Defendant [1] stated that as a result of him not being retained as a General Manager and a shareholder in the Company, he decided to, by his own volition, absolve himself of liability for the personal loan, explicitly denying any responsibility for it.
Response [1] – interpretation is denied, I by the exact words said that, sincs the partnership is no longer considered the parties should stick to the terms of the initial STA and its terms as executed by the parties. I require the claimants to prove their allegation to the contrary.
Document: Email correspondences with Marsela.
94. Since [1] July 2024, the [ADM] First Claimant’s access to the RAK Bank account under the Second Claimant’s name remains blocked after the First Defendant changed the User Name and Password despite numerous attempts to meet with the management and advise of the Sale and purchase of the Company.
Response [1] – I rely on this admission that the First Claimant had access, I deny changing the username, it is not true the Claimants were unable to access Rak Bank accounts since july, the Claimants appointed accountant made transactions after July and her name is present on these transaction, it is the Claimants changed the password after transfering funds out of the account and shift the company sales back to ADIB account.
Document: 1 Aug Transaction by Lolita.
95. Based on the [1] limited access that the First Claimant has, the First Claimant has been able to ascertain that the [2] First Defendant had the loan proceeds withdrawn in large sums to another account, the same were not used for the benefit of the Second Claimant.
Response [1] – the First Claimant managed to have over 443 transactions following the handover, several cash withdrawals, paid salaries, transferred funds between company accounts, made generated several account statements and screen printed all the details about the Company Financing facility, such access was not limited.
Response [2] – the First Claimant failed to mention which accounts were these funds transferred and the dates of these transactions and crutilly failed to clarafy the inward transactions in the other company account, these transactions were withdrawn from Rak Bank and deposited in ADIB bank and used for the benefit of the Company.
Document: Fully loged in evidance filed by the Claimants in Sep 2024 in SCT-352-2024 DIFC Courts.
96. The First Claimant [1] only after being able to take full control of the Company in late June 2024 was able to access the full true accurate details of the ADIB and RAK bank accounts. The First Claimant observed several suspicious transactions in ADIB and RAK Account. These transactions involve payments made to;
a. a third party entity identified as [1] ‘Liberty House‘ since the early months of 2023;
Response [1] – The Liberty House payments were not unexplained transfers to an unknown third party. They were payments to the Liberty House Principal Body Corporate account for documented chiller, utility and property charges relating to Unit 24/2419. The filed evidence identifies the beneficiary’s account, the underlying invoices and the stated payment purposes. Four payments totalling AED4,594.13 are documented.
DOCUMENT: TRANSACTIONS TO LIBERTY HOUSE PRINCIPAL
b. a third party entity identified as [1] DIFC Investments such payments are not supported with an documents or contracts;
Response [1] – 96(b) is denied. DIFC Investments was not an unidentified or unrelated third party. It was Hair Creators’ contractual landlord under Lease No. 202038 for its Gate Avenue premises. Clauses 3.2.1 and 3.2.2 required Hair Creators to pay rent and other amounts to DIFC Investments. Schedule 2 expressly identifies the receiving bank account as “DIFC Investments LLC” and provides for base rent, service charges, marketing contributions and metered utility charges. The lease commenced on 1 September 2020 and continued until 31 December 2025.
DOCUMENT: Hair Creators Lease Agreement
c. the Third Defendant over 60,000 and more being paid within a span of 14 days which again [1] fails to show any contracts or documents;
Response [1] – Paragraph 96(c) is denied. The payments to the Third Defendant were not unexplained. Her signed employment contract dated 22 September 2021 provided for a total monthly salary of AED10,000 and a 40% commission on hair-extension sales. Her Emirates NBD statement records payments from Hair Creators of AED17,000 on 2 February 2024 described as “salary,” AED59,000 on 5 February 2024 described as “commission,” and AED10,594 described as “goods sold.” These descriptions are consistent with her employment and commission arrangements. The amount and timing alone do not establish that the payments were unauthorised, suspicious or misappropriated. The Claimants now possess and control the salon’s booking and sales system, which records appointments, sales invoices, payments, income generated by individual employees, salaries and commissions. If the Claimants dispute the purpose or calculation of these payments, they should disclose the relevant system reports covering the period from which the disputed salary and commission were calculated.
DOCUMENT: JULIA CONTRACT AND PERSONAL ACCOUNT STAT
d. [1] Large sums of monies withdrawn in a span of two weeks by the Defendant that may [2] not be used for the purpose of the Company as they are not recorded in the Company accounts.
Response [1] – Paragraph 96(d) is denied. The filed schedule identifies over 1 million in cash deposits and in direct transfers from Hair Creators’ RAK Bank account into Hair Creators’ ADIB operating account between 1 Jan 2023 and 30 April 2024.
Response [2] – these records prove that over 100% of the business finance funds were indeed deposited into the company operational account and used for the benefit of the company including, equipments, products, rent and more, some of these transactions predated the Business financing facility and constitute my personal support as then-shareholder to my company using my own money.
DOCUMENT: Cash Deposits and DIFC Transactions
e. rent charges paid to selective employee’s specifically Mr. Shady beyond the agreed terms of their employment contact;
f. Additional payments to selective employees specifically the Third Defendant and Ms. Abier for extra allowances or commissions outside the normal range /average of the Company;
g. Several Outward TT payments made to Fourth Defendant as per the available records on 3rd February 2024 a value of AED 20,000; on 16th Feb 2024 – AED 20,000; 11 March 2024 of AED 10,000, 12th March 2024 of AED 10,000, and 30 March 2024 the value of AED 20,000 unsupported with any documents or contracts to define the reason for the transfers or the relationship between the parties, save that the owner of the Fourth Defendant is the ex-wife of the FIrst Defendant;
h. Bank statements disclosed on 11–18 August 2025 show that the Fourth Defendant received multiple transfers from the Second Claimant’s corporate accounts without contractual basis, board approval, or supporting documentation, including: i. AED[1] 20,000 on 3 February 2024 ii. AED 20,000 on 16 February 2024 iii. AED 10,000 on 11 March 2024 iv. AED 10,000 on 12 March 2024 v. AED 20,000 on 30 March 2024. These transfers occurred immediately after the disbursement of a RAKBANK loan of AED 1,012,221 into the Second Claimant’s account on 28 December 2023.
Response [1] – the total amount of these transactions is 80,000, I refer to my employment contract with the Socned Claimant including my entitlement for a monthly salary of 40,000, the transferred amount represent my Feb and March unpaid Salaries.
i. [1] using Company funds for personal and leisure, noting many other employees in the company have informed the First Claimant that [2] they have never been fully paid their salaries whilst working with the First Defendant and/or Third Defendant.
Response [1] – it is denied that I used the Company Funds from any personal, the Claimants are required to prove such assertions with material records, accounting statements. Response [2] – I rely on the salaries payments proof filed to the court showing timely payment of all Salaires.
j. using the company funds to pay off some undisclosed transactions as follows: a. A certain undisclosed loan recovery transaction, identified by reference number 20649173, was noted on December 1, 2023, when approximately AED 14,000 of the Company’s funds were disbursed towards repayment. On December 28, 2023, [1] a personal loan amounting to AED 1,012,000 was disbursed into the relevant account. On the same date, a sum of approximately AED [2] 389,244.75 was debited from the account for the purpose of settling the same loan transaction, number 20649173. b. Certain [3] undisclosed Credit Card payments assuming it falls under the liability of the First Defendant.
Response [1] – it is Denied that Facility 20649173 was not an undisclosed personal loan. It was the first RAKBANK business-financing facility granted to Hair Creators Salon Ltd for AED412,000. Its contractual monthly instalment was AED14,041, explaining the ordinary loan-recovery debit on 1 December 2023.
Response [2] – On 28 December 2023, RAKBANK credited the Company’s top-up facility, no. 20669222, for AED1,012,221 and automatically deducted AED389,244.75 to settle the outstanding balance of facility 20649173. This was a bank-generated refinancing transaction, not a personal payment or discretionary transfer made by the First Defendant. The First Defendant’s personal guarantee did not convert the Company’s borrowing into his personal loan.
DOCUMENT: Rak Bank SMS confirms that the card was blocked at your request page 93 of 159
97. The [1] First Defendant attempted to justify the transfers to the Fourth Defendant as “financial commitments” relating to his children but the divorce certificate contains no such obligations.
Response [1] – The allegation is denied. I do not rely on the divorce certificate as creating a mandatory child-support obligation. My Defence states that the five transfers, totalling AED 80,000, represented salaries owed to me, which I directed to the Fourth Defendant to support my daughter, principally for her schooling expenses. The absence of a prescribed obligation from the divorce certificate does not remove the separate lawful basis for the payments.
My employment contract provided monthly remuneration of AED 40,000, and my Defence states that salary for February and March 2024 remained outstanding. Only AED 20,000 was transferred after the Share Transfer Agreement, followed by an AED 50,000 deposit into the Company’s account the next day. The American School of Creative Science records provide additional corroboration that: I was registered on the school’s parent platform by 17 October 2023, before the challenged transfers.
Raghad Salah Masri was enrolled at the school. The school communicated with both me and her mother, Roushin Basher Haj Ali. I relay on the school email correspondence and the later statement of account records substantial tuition and transport fees. These school records support the genuine and continuing schooling arrangement. However, because the financial statements are from 2026, I would not say that they directly trace the five transfers made in February and March 2024 to particular school invoices.
Document: American School of Creative Science – Statements Of School Acount.
Document: My Employment Contract with Hair Creators.
98. Furthermore, the Second Claimant is a private company as per the Companies Regulations 2018 under the DIFC Companies Law No. 5 of 2018 Article 9 and “A Company incorporated pursuant to Article 8(1) shall have a separate legal personality from that of its Shareholders.” not the legal representative who is the exwife of the First Defendant. Therefore [1] any personal obligations that the First Defendant might owe to his exwife cannot legally be fulfilled by the Second Claimant, as such would amount to breach of the First Defendant’s Fiduciary Duties as the General Manager, Director and Shareholder of the Company for failing to (a) act in good faith in the best interests of the company; (b) exercise powers for a proper purpose; (c) avoid conflicts and not misuse position; (d) not accept unauthorized benefits; and (e) exercise reasonable care, skill, and diligence.
Response [1] – I accept that the Second Claimant has a separate legal personality under Article 9 of the DIFC Companies Law. I do not claim that my former shareholder or authorised-signatory status gave me personal ownership of the Company’s funds.
However, the allegation is denied because the payments were not the Company discharging a separate personal debt owed by me to my former wife. My case is that the payments represented remuneration already lawfully owed to me, including unpaid salary for February and March 2024, which I directed towards supporting my daughter, principally her schooling expenses.
My employment contract, EXCL33, provided monthly remuneration of AED 40,000. The five transfers totalled AED 80,000. Once remuneration was lawfully due to me, directing its payment to a third party did not, by itself, amount to misuse of Company funds or breach of fiduciary duty.
I do not rely on the divorce certificate as creating the Company’s liability or prescribing child support. The school records corroborate that my daughter was enrolled at the American School of Creative Science from at least October 2023 and that genuine and continuing tuition and transport expenses existed. The account statements received from that school are relied upon only as supportive material to the stated purpose.
The Claimants must still prove that the remuneration was not due, that the payments exceeded my entitlement, that they were made for an improper purpose or unauthorised benefit, and that the Company suffered an identifiable loss. Those matters are not established merely by citing Article 9 or the general duties of a manager or director.
Document: My Employment Contract with Hair Creators.
Document: American School of Creative Science – Statements Of School Acount.
99. [1] Misappropriating company funds for personal use is a paradigmatic breach of fiduciary duty and triggers remedies including account of profits, repayment, equitable compensation, and proprietary relief.
Response [1] – The allegation that these lawfull salary payments amount to misappropriation of company funds is denied. I do not rely on the divorce certificate as creating a mandatory child-support obligation. My Defence states that the five transfers, totalling AED 80,000, represented salaries owed to me, which I directed to the Fourth Defendant to support my daughter, principally for her schooling expenses. The absence of a prescribed obligation from the divorce certificate does not remove the separate lawful basis for the payments.
My employment contract provided monthly remuneration of AED 40,000, and my Defence states that salary for February and March 2024 remained outstanding. Only AED 20,000 was transferred after the Share Transfer Agreement, followed by an AED 50,000 deposit into the Company’s account the next day. The American School of Creative Science records provide additional corroboration that: I was registered on the school’s parent platform by 17 October 2023, before the challenged transfers.
Raghad Salah Masri was enrolled at the school. The school communicated with both me and her mother, Roushin Basher Haj Ali. I relay on the school email correspondence and the later statement of account records substantial tuition and transport fees. These school records support the genuine and continuing schooling arrangement. However, because the financial statements are from 2026, I would not say that they directly trace the five transfers made in February and March 2024 to particular school invoices.
Document: American School of Creative Science – Statements Of School Acount.
Document: My Employment Contract with Hair Creators.
100. Equally, the Fourth Defendant, in receiving funds from the Second Claimant without justification was knowingly [1] unjustly enriched at the First and Second Claimant’s Expense. Pursuant to the DIFC Law of Obligations the Fourth Defendant is obligated to make restitution for those funds which the Fourth Defendant has knowningly received from the Second Claimant without legal justification, which include not only those that have been identified as being [2] distributed from the loan proceeds but any and all such other distributions after the separation of the legal entities.
Response [1] – it is denied that the First Claimant herself paid any part of the 80,000 transfers.
Response [2] – it is denied that the First Claimant was entitled by any agreement, contract to have the business Financing funds preserved for her in the company account.
Document: American School of Creative Science – Statements Of School Acount.
Document: My Employment Contract with Hair Creators.
101. The Fourth Defendant has admitted it has received the sums transferred to it by the Second Claimant, yet failed to make restitution. The Fourth Defendant, being directly opposite the Second Claimant’s premises were the First and Third Defendant’s worked on a daily basis, with common back office[1] staff was aware of the change of ownership, yet failed to return the monies that were transferred to the Second Claimant, knowing that the Fourth Defendant had no entitlement to the same.
Response [1] – The allegation appears in APOC paragraph 18, “The employees of the Company were not aware of the new ownership of the Company…”.
102. In addition the Fourth Defendant is the subject of fines from the DIFCA dating from 2021, which remain unpaid to date, and which were incurred at the premises occupied only by the business of the Fourth Defendant as per the witness statement of the legal representative of the Fourth Defendant. These fines are being followed up by the DIFCA with the Second Claimant, who is seeking payment directly from the Second Claimant, stating that they are liable for the fines of the Fourth Defendant.
Response [1] – it is denied that the Claimants paid the alleged fine or submitted evidence for its enforceability.
103. All the points raised above raise concerns that the Second Claimant’s funds have been used by the First Defendant [1] whilst under the Ownership/management of the Third Defendant for personal benefit and the Company was [2] sold under false pretences by way of misrepresentation to the First Claimant with a loan, numerous outstanding debts and debts owed to employees; such that the value of the Company was only to take advantage of the First Claimant, [3] unlawfully deceive her into paying for something of tangible or intangible value and leave her with all the debts and liabilities of the Company.
Response [1] – The Claimants are required to prove that under the ownership of the Third Defendant any company funds were used for personal matter, there is no evidence to such assertion.
Response [2] – The Claimants are required to prove that there representation made directly to the First Claimant at any point of time before she already signed the two contracts by relying on her real estate Agent.
Response [3] – The Claimants are required to prove that she paid any of the company liabilities to Rak Bank or provided a replacement of the security cheque or that was deceived into purchasing the salon and that she was not totally relying on her real estate Agent.
104. It also illustrates that (1) funds have been wrongfully transferred and diverted to the Fourth Defendant who has failed to refund the same and (2) that the Fourth Defendant [1] may still be linked to the Second Claimant as a group company given that both [2] RAK Bank and DIFC consider that the Second Claimant responsible for all of the business activities conducted under all units leased including GA-00-SZ-G0-RT-130.
Response [1] – The group company assertion is incorrect, each of these companies has it own trade license and lease agreement. The allegation is denied. It improperly combines two separate matters: the challenged payments and the historical reference to Unit 130.
Response [2] – Unit 130 was not part of the Second Claimant’s leased premises at the relevant time. Although Unit 130 had historically operated under the Second Claimant’s licence, its lease was separately transferred and varied before the disputed sale, and the Fourth Defendant subsequently operated as an independent company with its own registration, trade licence, lease and funding.
Most importantly, the DIFC Investments late-payment notice dated 15 October 2024 was issued specifically concerning the Second Claimant. It identifies the Second Claimant’s lease dated 29 August 2020 and expressly defines its premises as: “Unit 133, 135 and 137, Gate Avenue, DIFC.” Unit 130 is not included. This directly contradicts the assertion that DIFC considered the Second Claimant responsible for all leased units, including Unit 130, at that time. The notice was issued after the handover. I replied on the same day, informed DIFC that I was no longer associated with the Second Claimant, copied the First Claimant and her appointed team, and requested that future correspondence be sent to them.
This is inconsistent with any allegation that I concealed either the new ownership or the Company’s leasing position. A historical reference to Unit 130 in RAKBANK or earlier administrative records does not establish that the Fourth Defendant was a group company, that the Second Claimant owned it, or that the Second Claimant remained responsible for its activities. The Claimants have identified no shareholding, control document, current lease or DIFC determination establishing such a group relationship.
Document: DIFC Notice to Hair creators 15 Oct 2024
105. In addition, the Claimants note that no deed of transfer, or other such document exists for the transfer of the assets, equipment, fittings and fixtures associated with the Fourth Defendant upon incorporation, which as the legal representative of the Forth Defendant admits was formerly part of the Second Claimant. Accordingly [1] it is assumed that the Fourth Defendant is holding all such assets, equipment, fittings and fixtures on trust for the Second Claimant.
Response [1] – The group company assertion is incorrect, each of these companies has it own trade license and lease agreement. The allegation is denied. It improperly combines two separate matters: the challenged payments and the historical reference to Unit 130.
Unit 130 was not part of the Second Claimant’s leased premises at the relevant time. Although Unit 130 had historically operated under the Second Claimant’s licence, its lease was separately transferred and varied before the disputed sale, and the Fourth Defendant subsequently operated as an independent company with its own registration, trade licence, lease and funding. Most importantly, the DIFC Investments late-payment notice dated 15 October 2024 was issued specifically concerning the Second Claimant. It identifies the Second Claimant’s lease dated 29 August 2020 and expressly defines its premises as: “Unit GA-SZ-G-133, 135 and 137, Gate Avenue, DIFC.” Unit 130 is not included. This directly contradicts the assertion that DIFC considered the Second Claimant responsible for all leased units, including Unit 130, at that time.
The notice was issued after the handover. I replied on the same day, informed DIFC that I was no longer associated with the Second Claimant, copied the First Claimant and her appointed team, and requested that future correspondence be sent to them. This is inconsistent with any allegation that I concealed either the new ownership or the Company’s leasing position.
A historical reference to Unit 130 in RAKBANK or earlier administrative records does not establish that the Fourth Defendant was a group company, that the Second Claimant owned it, or that the Second Claimant remained responsible for its activities. The Claimants have identified no shareholding, control document, current lease or DIFC determination establishing such a group relationship.
Document: Lease Hold Transfer Authority Approval
Document: Hair by Rojin Approval SR-24431 Fit-Out Cost payment and Rent Payment
106. Accordingly, [1] the Claimant’s seek remedies under DIFC Law of Damages and Remedies (Law No. 7 of 2005, as amended) that: a) an account of profits in respect of any gain the Fourth Defendant made (including benefits in kind, rewards/points, rebates, kickbacks, discounts, or third-party inducements); (b) equitable compensation for the profits made by the Fourth Defendant using all such assets, equipment, fittings and fixtures on trust for the Second Claimant ; (c) tracing of all such assets, equipment, fittings and fixtures on trust for the Second Claimant (e.g., where Second Claimant funds were used to acquire identifiable assets or to reduce liabilities of the Fourth Defendant), and proprietary claims/constructive trust-type relief to the extent available under DIFC law; (d) ancillary orders for disclosure of bank statements and asset information to support tracing. First Defendant’s refusal to transfer control as per STAGE 2 of the Agreement over items BCDEF: Goodwill and virtual Assets (including Social media assets, Including instagram page and other relevant platforms:
Response [1] – The allegation is denied. It assumes, without identifying any particular asset or evidence of ownership, that the Second Claimant owned Unit 130’s equipment, fittings and fixtures.
No deed of transfer exists because the Defendants’ case is that no assets owned by the Second Claimant were transferred to the Fourth Defendant. The lease variation is legally and factually different from a transfer of physical assets.
The contemporaneous evidence shows:
- On 26 October 2021, DIFC confirmed that the Variation Agreement concerned Unit 130.
- DIFC subsequently sent the Variation Agreement through DocuSign and requested rent cheques before execution.
- Eight unique rent cheques were drawn from Ms Roushin Bashar Haj Ali’s personal Emirates Islamic account in favour of DIFC Investments between 15 September 2021 and 15 June 2023. They total AED 588,822. Duplicate copies within the PDF have been counted only once.
- Personal Cheque No. 000075, dated 9 December 2021, was drawn from Ms Roushin’s account in favour of Falcon Interior Decoration LLC for AED 293,305.85 and bears an acknowledgement dated 10 December 2021. This corroborates personal funding of the principal fit-out.
- The January 2022 correspondence records Hair Creators’ accountant telling DIFC that Ms Roushin had her own clients and revenue, held and paid the rent cheques and would continue funding her salon.
- Falcon addressed its fit-out correspondence and quotations directly to Ms Rojin. She was treated as the client and controlled which additional works were approved, rejected or removed. The original additional-works quotation of AED 23,770 was revised to AED 14,270 following her instructions.
- On 18 April 2022, Hair Creators’ accountant informed DIFC that Unit 130 was no longer under Hair Creators’ name and was under Hair by Rojin. On 20 May 2022, DIFC confirmed that the Variation Agreement bearing the revised name was under execution.
This contemporaneous evidence materially contradicts the suggestion that there was no documentation concerning the lease, funding or fit-out of Unit 130. It supports the Defendants’ case that the rent and fit-out were independently funded and managed for Hair by Rojin.
The Claimants must identify each particular asset allegedly owned by the Second Claimant, produce its purchase invoice and payment evidence, prove its alleged transfer to the Fourth Defendant, establish the legal basis for the alleged trust and prove the value and loss claimed. The mere absence of a deed does not prove ownership, transfer or the existence of a trust.
Document: Lease Hold Transfer Authority Approval
Document: Hair by Rojin Approval SR-24431 Fit-Out Cost payment and Rent Payment
107. On or around 30 May 2024 after the First Defendant left the Company without Notice was when the the First Claimant became aware of the number of issues that had been deliberately withheld from the First Defendant’s knowledge during the due diligence phase, whether by misrepresentation or failure to disclose, namely it was discovered :
A. the [1] Claimants did not have access nor control to the email server or website server that “Haircreators.net” was registered under, being the domain server ‘One.com’, as the rights were not held by the Company nor had they been transferred. Specifically, the Claimants discovered they were unable to control or even access: 1) the official email address of the business as per advertising and social media; 2) the website itself; and 3) the official email address for the accounts department and registered with the government etc.
Response [1] – The allegations that I deliberately retained or obstructed control of the Second Claimant’s website are denied.
Since its creation in 2019, the haircreators.net domain was registered and administered through One.com, while the website’s design, content, galleries and images were created and published through Webflow.
In July 2023, the Company’s web designer, Kent Tupas, proposed redesigning the website and migrating its content from Webflow to WordPress. I understand that Kent subsequently carried out that work and changed the website’s design, although the technical records or Kent’s evidence would provide the best confirmation of the completed migration.
Mr Thomas was the Second Claimant’s full-time media manager. He prepared fresh website content and communicated directly with Kent for uploading and publication. Ms Lolita’s own witness statement also identifies Thomas as being involved with the website or associated accounts.
I did not personally perform the routine preparation, uploading or publication of website content. The Claimants must therefore prove, through platform activity logs or other technical evidence, that I personally retained control, refused any identified request for access, interfered with the website after handover or caused it to become unavailable.
The post-handover payments to Kent, Ms Lolita’s demonstrated access to accountant@haircreators.net, and the involvement of Thomas support the position that the Claimants and their appointed employees had continuing operational access and assistance after the handover.
Document: Website Evidence
B. the [1] Claimants did not have any access to the email account associated with the address ‘info@haircreators.net’ and/or ‘Accountant@haircreators.net’, past or present, which were critical to the running of the Company. The email addresses had been used as the primary means of communication for the Company, either for potential clients and third parties to make bookings for services and submit inquiries or for all financial matters with Staff and Suppliers.
Response [1] – I rely on the on the Claimants own supporting Rak Bank statement showing continuous payments to the web designer Mr Kent Tupas after the handover of the company and I rely on his plan to shift the website contents from their previous development platform called Web Flow to another developing platform called Word Press, I further rely on the emails I received from the allegedly obstructed email address on 15 October 2024 proving that the Claimants fully administered these emails and placed their own signature and name at the digital Signature fields, by searching the web it shows that the domain is hosted by a different Company than the previous one and I believe Mr Kent shafted the website completely.
Document: Website Evidence
C. The email account of Salahmasry@live.com is connected to the [1] POS system installed in the Company by RAK Bank for the collection of payments by credit and debit card, [2] entering bookings and recording client details, this was not made known to the First Claimant and [3 ] cannot be changed by the First Claimant due to the Loan Arrangement between the First Defendant and RAK Bank. Notably, the First Claimant came to learn that RAK Bank had included the premises of the Fourth Defendant in its KYC and therefore the First Claimant is unsure as to whether the POS system was also meant to be attached to the system of the Fourth Defendant, or what relationship the Fourth Defendant has been disclosed as having with the Second Claimant.
Response [1] – Point of sale merchant device ID 4001714 is a fact disclosed to the Claimants’ real estate Agent from day one in the 12 Month Bank Statements he received, further the second representative Ms Marsela requested another POS merchant device and linked it to the Second Claimant Bank account during due diligence, the First Claimant by her shareholder position can change the registered email address with Card Payment device provider regardless any current email is being used.
Response [2] – Point of sale merchant device ID 4001714 is not a booking platform for salon clients appointments or such services and this assertion is denied.
Response [3] – it is denied that the Business financing agreement is between myself and the bank, I rely on the Actual agreement executed between the Second Claimant and Rak Bank, I am the guarantor not the borrower.
Document: Merchant ID 4001714 and Income Letter
Document: PHYSICAL BUSINESS LOAN AGREEMENT.PDF
D. the [1] First Defendant admitted at the end of November 2024 he continued to retain control over the domain Haircreators.net and the associated email accounts, after having been served with legal notices to comply with the MOU and Agreement to honour his obligations and transfer the same to the First Claimant. The First Defendant explicitly refused to comply, deliberately continuing to cause damage to the Company and the investment made by the First Claimant. Thus, committing a breach of Article 80 of the Difc Contract Law No. 4 of 2006.
Response [1] – I wholly deny the allegation of admitting to retaining control over the domain and email accounts. The First Defendant’s email dated November 28, 2024, found in the file “suspended the domain name.pdf”, explicitly states that all company information, including email addresses and passwords, was handed over to the Claimant’s employee, Rexhina, on March .
The domain suspension was not a deliberate act to cause damage, but the result of a failed automatic payment of 268.35 USD on November 6, 2024. As noted in the email, the Claimant’s team had access to the accounts but failed to respond to the payment notifications. This payment failure is independently verified by the document “Auto-payment Unsuccessful – haircreators.net.pdf”.
I did not explicitly refuse to comply with obligations. The November 28 email points out that no prior requests for information had been made before the present proceedings. Furthermore, the First Defendant explicitly offered to share the recovery details to restore the website and emails if the opposing counsel simply replied and asked.
E. the [1] company telephone number +971 55 6165769 as used on all promotional and contact information was never registered in the Company Name, this was not disclosed at any time to the First Claimant, this should be transferred back to the business as the [1] business was responsible for the payment of this number for the entire time of its connection, together with the internet and associated provision, the failure to register it under the name of the Company was either an oversight on the part of the First or Third Defendant, depending on who was Manager at the time, or reckless or negligent, either way the Second Claimant claims indemnity for any resultant costs or fines resulting from the failure on the part of the First or Third Defendant to properly register the Phone and Internet services as Commercial and not Residential.
Response [1] – The phone number in dispute is a mobile number not a telephone as the Claimants stated. it is clearly stated on the STA “telephone number” in reference to the salon landline number that is used for bookings, there is not term or any written agreement classify my personal mobile number as an asset included in the transfer.
Response [2] – The Claimants are required to prove that the company was paying for my personal mobile number.
F. On or after 27 June 2024, third-party [1] suppliers had an outstanding debt of approx AED 57,478.44, which had remained unpaid since 13th March 2024. There was no record in the accounts of this debt, and copies of the invoices and supply sheets were obtained with the signatures to corroborate the information being provided. The First Defendant, deliberately hid the financial status of the Company to make it appear in a healthier position than it [1] was to induce the First Claimant to purchase the same.
Response [1] – The Statement of Account filed by the Claimants as Exhibit EXCL14 ls missing the signatures said to be supporting and this copy does not prove any payments made against it by the Claimants, I personally paid the outstanding balance and filed the evidence as AnnexureD59 yet the Claimants maintained this allegation, I refer to the supplier admission in the email produced that their email addresses were not working which is why I was not able to speed up the clearance and make timely payments, the Claimants are required to prove any allegedly payment the made against the same if any.
Response [2] – The allegations that I induced the First Claimant to but the salon should be forwarded against her own real estate Agent who failed to introduce her to me in person before she had already signed the two contracts, these allegations are denied, I never met the first claimant and never ever made any dirct presentation to her before the two contract are executed already on 26 March 2024.
g. The [1] First Defendant also conspired with the owner of the Fourth Defendant, to hide the relationship between the Second Claimant and the Fourth Defendant, which was recognised [2] by both RAK Bank and DIFCA as a legal relationship binding the companies togther in such a manner that the Second Claimant was liable for the pre-sale debts of the Fourth Defendant..
Response [1] – denied, is the first claimant has any evidence to prove the manufactured conspiracy she would not hesitate to submit it to the Court.
Response [2] – denied, the DIFC Authority clearly state the second claimant’s leased units as 133, 135 and 137 only in the Lease Contract of the company and further in the latter Notice dated 15 October 2024 onward sent by the Authority for the second claimant.
Document: DIFC FORMAL NOTICE IDENTIFYING THE UNITS
108. Save, Clause 11 of the MOU included a conditional offer, stating: “In the event that the turnover of the purchased business does not meet satisfactory levels within a period of 1 month, the full amount of the purchase price shall be returned to the Buyer party.”
Response [1] – The wording of Clause 11 is admitted, but it is denied that the Claimants established that the condition was triggered. The MOU was dated 14 February 2024. The Defence’s position is that the one-month period expired on 14 March 2024 and was not indefinitely exercisable. The Claimants have not identified the required level of “satisfactory” turnover, the turnover actually achieved, or when and how they invoked the clause.
The subsequent Share Transfer Agreement dated 20 March 2024 clarified the requirement by setting a turnover benchmark of AED 180,000 within one month. The Company’s income exceeded that amount by 20 April 2024, as recorded in the RAK Bank statements.
The First Claimant also completed due diligence, paid the final purchase-price instalment and proceeded with the share registration. The alleged entitlement to a full refund or restitution of the Company is therefore denied..
Document: Share Transfer Agreement Clause 6 Page 6
109. The Agreement crystallised on the [1] 27 June 2024 when the First Claimant was able to take full control of the business under the license as reflected. [2] Despite the turnover failing to meet satisfactory levels within 1 month of the purchase of the business save the undisclosed weak financial health of the company and [3] the misappropriation of the assets of the Company, the Company’s financial health drastically weakened. Hence, under the pretext of Clause 11 of the MOU, the Claimants are entitled to a full refund of the Purchase Price, including restitution of the Company.
Response [1] – The .
Response [2] – The assertion that the turnover failed to meet satisfactory level is denied, the STA was executed on 26 March, its Clause 6 set the minimum agreed amount as 180,000, the Claimants’ own EXCL08 shows that the sales between the 27 of March till 27 April was 208,000 exceeding the minimum level permits the First Claimant to Claim anything.
Response [3] – The allegation of misappropriation is denied, the Claimant failed to prove that.
Document: Share Transfer Agreement Clause 6 Page 6
110. The DEWS system is a workplace savings plan for the expatriates employed within the DIFC, subject to the Clause 66(7) of DIFC Employment Law No.2 of 2019 and DIFC Amendment Employment Law No. 1 of 2024 “DIFC Employment Law” which states, “an Employer shall, on a monthly basis, pay to a Qualifying Scheme, for the benefit of each Employee who is not an Exempted Employee.”
Response [1] – The .
Document: Share Transfer Agreement Clause 6 Page 6
111. At the time the DEWS system came into effect, the First Defendant served as the official [1] authorized signatory for the DEWS system from the end of December 2023.
Response [1] – The assertion that from December 2023 I served as DEWS Authorised Signatory is denied and I require official documents from the DEWS.
112. The First Claimant, having fully acquired ownership of the shares and assumed complete control by late June 2024, received a Final Notice issued by DIFCA on June 15, [1] due to non-compliance with the Notice dated April 15, 2024. This notice imposed a penalty of approximately AED 69,500 and resulted in an automated block on the DEWS system, which restricted the First Claimant’s ability to cancel visas and apply for new visas and employment permits for new recruits. DIFCA informed the First Claimant that these restrictions could be lifted upon full payment of the penalty.
Response [1] – it denied that the 15 April notice itself was an already imposed penalty rather it is was a formal Notice of intended fine from DEWS which occurred after the 2 contracts. And sent on 15 April to the registered email address of the Second Claimant to which Ms Rexhina the newly appointed salon Manager had access and I received a copy on my personal email as well, during the relevant time, Ms Abier Al Kourdy was serving her 2 weeks notice after the Handover dated 1 April and indeed responded by rising an objection to DEWS via the DIFC Portal under SR 206759 on the bases that the company did not receive prior direction to enroll its employees before 15 April, further she guided the new Manager on how to follow up with the process, Ms. Shamma from the DEWS team responded on 27 May by referring to the objection raised and encouraged the Second Claimant to complete the enrollment before 15 June 2024 to avoid the said by that time the new salon accountant was already hired and had access to the DIFC Portal as evidenced by her own visa issuance and access to the company email as evidenced by her replies received with the necessary employees salaries informations as evidanced by the timely salaries paid on 30 May 2024 including the salaries of Lolita and the Manager Rexhina as evidenced in bank statement of account.
Document: Decision Notice of Fine and Dews email correspondence
113. The [1] First Claimant was unaware of any prior warnings issued against the Second Claimant having received no related documentation from the First Defendant, and requested the Initial Warning Notice from DIFCA. It was discovered that [2] the First Defendant had intentionally failed to pay the required amounts on a monthly basis for the employees to the Qualifying Scheme thereby violating Article 66(7) of the DIFC Employment Law. The First [3] Defendant had wilfully and deliberately breached his duties as a General Manager whilst named on the licence and deliberately concealed the information from the First Claimant to ensure that she would be liable for the Fine.
Response [1] – it denied that the First Claimant was not aware, her appointed Salon Manager received and reviewed the DEWS email dated 15 April, her appointed accountant received the team related account records and the former business manager raised the objection to the DIFC, I instructed the former business manager to coordinate with the former accountant and the new accountant to submit the required documents and enroll the employees during april. by the term 10 of the STA the First Claimant was contractually responsible for the DIFC charges and any other payment linked to the company from 26 March 2024, therefore the non follow up and the absence of timely submission during May and before the 15 June deadline after extended time by the DIFC can not be considered a failure of my own failure.
Response [2] [3] – I deny the assertions intentions to cause harm, and deliberate concealment I am such conduct will only only damage and I no reason to willfully cause damage and latter be sued for it.
Document: DEWS Emails and Portal User correspondence
114. The Claimants requested that DIFCA waive the penalty, but, the prescribed time period for appealing DIFCA’s decision had expired. Consequently, the First Claimant had no option but to pay the penalty at the end of October 2024 so that the Company could proceed with the issuance of employment visas for new recruits. [1] The First Claimant requests repayment of this fine and the legal costs incurred by the First Claimant in ascertaining all the information surrounding this matter, including the SCT cases brought against the Second Claimant and/or the First Claimant as a result of the FIrst Claimant not being able to cancel visas on time.
Response [1] – I accept that I received the preliminary DEWS notice on 15 April 2024. The same notice was separately delivered by DIFC to the Company’s registered accountant mailbox, accountant@haircreators.net. I did not conceal it. On the same day, I telephoned Abeer Kurdi and instructed her to submit an objection through the DIFC Portal and complete the necessary DEWS enrolment documents with the assistance of the Company’s former accountant, Mr Shadi Zayat. I then immediately forwarded the complete notice and attachment to Abeer. That same-day forwarding is proved by the contemporaneous email.
At that time, Abeer and Shadi were serving their two-week resignation notices. My evidence is that Abeer submitted the objection, demonstrated it to the incoming salon manager, Ms Rexhina, and instructed her to follow up with DIFC. This is independently corroborated in part by DIFC’s email of 27 May 2024, which expressly records an objection raised by Hair Creators Salon Ltd and gives the Company until 15 June 2024 to complete its DEWS enrolment and employee payments.
Shadi subsequently handed the Company’s accounting records to the newly appointed accountant, Ms Lolita Tines. Abeer and Shadi had left by May, and my earlier team had entirely left the Company by approximately mid-May. Responsibility for following up the objection, enrolment and regulatory correspondence therefore passed operationally to the incoming management.
The transition of portal control is also documented. On 25 June 2024, DIFC emailed Shadi at his personal address, shadyzaiat@gmail.com, confirming that his access to the Client Portal for Hair Creators Salon Ltd had been deactivated with effect that day following a request submitted by the entity’s Super User. The email copied Rojin Haj Ali and me. This objectively confirms the removal of the former accountant’s personal portal access. The email does not identify the individual who submitted the Super User request.
The subsequent documents further prove that the incoming management had notice and the means to act. A portal-user update was submitted on 29 June. On 1 July, DIFC requested re-upload of the signed authorisation, and Rojin forwarded that requirement to Abeer, the Company accountant mailbox and Ms Lolita. On 3 July, DIFC confirmed that Ms Lolita had been appointed Super User with extensive Company, employee, financial and other permissions.
The formal USD 19,000 Decision Notice was issued on 10 July—after the former accountant’s access had been removed and after Ms Lolita had become Super User. It was sent to the Company’s registered accountant mailbox and addressed directly to the First Claimant, Klesta Eshja. A reminder was sent on 17 July before the 25 July payment deadline, followed by another reminder on 9 August.
The correspondence shows that the incoming management used a mixture of personal email addresses and the Company’s registered accountant mailbox during the transition. Formal DIFC notices continued to be delivered to the registered Company mailbox, which Ms Lolita later accessed and used. Any failure to coordinate and monitor those accounts, complete the enrolment, replace the DEWS signatory or pay the fine by the deadline cannot properly be characterised as concealment by me or attributed exclusively to me.
I do not deny that a DEWS compliance issue existed. I deny that I concealed it or solely caused the final fine and alleged consequential loss. I promptly disclosed the preliminary notice and instructed the relevant employees to act. The documentary evidence establishes an objection, the removal of the former accountant’s portal access, a transition to the incoming team, Ms Lolita’s subsequent Super User appointment and repeated notices addressed to the Claimants. The Court should therefore distinguish any underlying contribution arrears from the post-handover failure to complete the regulatory process and mitigate the loss.
Response [2] [3] – I deny the assertions intentions to cause harm, and deliberate concealment I am such conduct will only only damage and I no reason to willfully cause damage and latter be sued for it.
Document: Decision Notice of Fine and Dews email correspondence
114. The Claimants requested that DIFCA waive the penalty, but, the prescribed time period for appealing DIFCA’s decision had expired. Consequently, the First Claimant had no option but to pay the penalty at the end of October 2024 so that the Company could proceed with the issuance of employment visas for new recruits. [1] The First Claimant requests repayment of this fine and the legal costs incurred by the First Claimant in ascertaining all the information surrounding this matter, including the SCT cases brought against the Second Claimant and/or the First Claimant as a result of the FIrst Claimant not being able to cancel visas on time. Notwithstanding the financial crises and damages the Claimants continue to suffer, First Defendant fraudulently misrepresented the Second Claimant’s financial health and operational status.
Response [1] – I accept that I received the preliminary DEWS notice on 15 April 2024. The same notice was separately delivered by DIFC to the Company’s registered accountant mailbox, accountant@haircreators.net. I did not conceal it. On the same day, I telephoned Abeer Kurdi and instructed her to submit an objection through the DIFC Portal and complete the necessary DEWS enrolment documents with the assistance of the Company’s former accountant, Mr Shadi Zayat. I then immediately forwarded the complete notice and attachment to Abeer. That same-day forwarding is proved by the contemporaneous email.
At that time, Abeer and Shadi were serving their two-week resignation notices. My evidence is that Abeer submitted the objection, demonstrated it to the incoming salon manager, Ms Rexhina, and instructed her to follow up with DIFC. This is independently corroborated in part by DIFC’s email of 27 May 2024, which expressly records an objection raised by Hair Creators Salon Ltd and gives the Company until 15 June 2024 to complete its DEWS enrolment and employee payments.
Shadi subsequently handed the Company’s accounting records to the newly appointed accountant, Ms Lolita Tines. Abeer and Shadi had left by May, and my earlier team had entirely left the Company by approximately mid-May. Responsibility for following up the objection, enrolment and regulatory correspondence therefore passed operationally to the incoming management.
The transition of portal control is also documented. On 25 June 2024, DIFC emailed Shadi at his personal address, shadyzaiat@gmail.com, confirming that his access to the Client Portal for Hair Creators Salon Ltd had been deactivated with effect that day following a request submitted by the entity’s Super User. The email copied Rojin Haj Ali and me. This objectively confirms the removal of the former accountant’s personal portal access. The email does not identify the individual who submitted the Super User request.
The subsequent documents further prove that the incoming management had notice and the means to act. A portal-user update was submitted on 29 June. On 1 July, DIFC requested re-upload of the signed authorisation, and Rojin forwarded that requirement to Abeer, the Company accountant mailbox and Ms Lolita. On 3 July, DIFC confirmed that Ms Lolita had been appointed Super User with extensive Company, employee, financial and other permissions.
The formal USD 19,000 Decision Notice was issued on 10 July—after the former accountant’s access had been removed and after Ms Lolita had become Super User. It was sent to the Company’s registered accountant mailbox and addressed directly to the First Claimant, Klesta Eshja. A reminder was sent on 17 July before the 25 July payment deadline, followed by another reminder on 9 August.
The correspondence shows that the incoming management used a mixture of personal email addresses and the Company’s registered accountant mailbox during the transition. Formal DIFC notices continued to be delivered to the registered Company mailbox, which Ms Lolita later accessed and used. Any failure to coordinate and monitor those accounts, complete the enrolment, replace the DEWS signatory or pay the fine by the deadline cannot properly be characterised as concealment by me or attributed exclusively to me.
I do not deny that a DEWS compliance issue existed. I deny that I concealed it or solely caused the final fine and alleged consequential loss. I promptly disclosed the preliminary notice and instructed the relevant employees to act. The documentary evidence establishes an objection, the removal of the former accountant’s portal access, a transition to the incoming team, Ms Lolita’s subsequent Super User appointment and repeated notices addressed to the Claimants. The Court should therefore distinguish any underlying contribution arrears from the post-handover failure to complete the regulatory process and mitigate the loss.
Document: Decision Notice of Fine and Dews email correspondence
Response [2] – I deny fraudulently misrepresenting the Company’s financial health. The Claimants have not identified the precise false financial statement allegedly made by me, when and to whom it was made, why it was false when made, how it induced the transaction, or what loss was caused by reliance upon it.
The independent ADIB Merchant Services confirmation dated 4 October 2023 records that Hair Creators Salon Ltd, under merchant ID 4001714, generated AED 3,656,361 in card transactions during the 12 months from October 2022 to September 2023, averaging AED 304,696.75 per month. It also certifies that there were no chargebacks during that period. The document bears the merchant-services signature and official stamp.
Those figures are independently corroborated by the ADIB account statement later produced and relied upon by the Claimants as EX‑CL‑08. For the eight overlapping months from February to September 2023, the merchant-services letter records AED 2,313,358 in gross card transactions, while EX‑CL‑08 records AED 2,256,118.54 in corresponding credits described as “Merchant Payment 4001714.” The difference is approximately 2.47%, which is consistent with merchant-processing deductions and settlement timing. The close monthly correspondence demonstrates that both records concern the same genuine business receipts.
EX‑CL‑08 was generated on 15 February 2024 and, according to my evidence, supplied to the Claimants’ representative before the Share Transfer Agreement. It displayed not only the Company’s merchant receipts, but also its expenditures, loan deductions and other liabilities. The Claimants therefore had the financial information from which they could assess both the Company’s income and its obligations before completing the acquisition. Their subsequent production and reliance upon that same statement is inconsistent with an allegation that the Company’s true financial activity was concealed from them.
The official assignment letter dated 29 January 2024 further records that all receivables under merchant ID 4001714 were assigned to the Company’s RAK Bank account ending 101002. That document explains why the same merchant-settlement income subsequently appeared as recurring credits in RAK Bank rather than ADIB. It demonstrates continuity of the Company’s business receipts and the corporate purpose of the RAK account.
I do not suggest that gross card turnover alone proves net profitability or the absence of liabilities. Turnover, profit, liabilities and overall financial health are different matters. My answer is that the independently certified turnover disproves any sweeping suggestion that the Company lacked genuine substantial operations, while the pre-contract ADIB statement disclosed the receipts, expenditure and liabilities necessary for the Claimants to assess its financial position.
The Claimants’ reliance on Mr Salem Dwela v Damac Park Towers Company Limited does not establish fraud. The Court of Appeal held only that an arguable misrepresentation claim could proceed to trial and expressly recorded that no fraudulent-misrepresentation claim had been pleaded. When the case later proceeded to trial, the misrepresentation claim was dismissed on the facts. The Claimants in this case must still prove a particular incorrect statement, inducement, actual reliance and resulting loss. The independent income confirmation and the pre-contract financial disclosure materially contradict those essential allegations..
Document: Merchant ID 4001714, generated AED 3,656,361 in card transactions
115. The First Defendant and the [1] Third Defendant retained possession of the contact number (+971 55 6165769) that had been used by the Second Claimant for advertising the business, booking purposes, conducting operations, and facilitating transactions with third parties including the DIFCA. Although the contact number was registered under the First Defendant’s name, it had been utilized exclusively for the operation and promotion of the business as advertised in DIFC Public Registry, Letterheads, invoices and the others.
Response [1] – I accept that the personal mobile number was on sometimes used for matters related to the second Claimant, I deny the assertions of exclusivity, the two contracts in dispute stated the term “Telephone” as an asset assigned for transfer the which is also presented on the Letterheads, invoices and other company materials, there is no term identifying my personal number or any contract. I rely on the Entire Agreement term.
116. Upon the sale of the shares, the First Defendant failed to transfer the contact number to the First Claimant or the business as part of the handover process. Instead, the number was improperly retained or misappropriated by the First and Third Defendants. This action has potentially compromised the business’s competitive position, including but not limited to the following.
Response [1] – I require the Claimants to Identify the contractual bases for this allegation or any material agreement that my Personal Mobile Number was included in for transfer, there is no term identifying my personal number or any contract. I rely on the Entire Agreement term and I deny that the Third Defendant had anything to do with my personal number.
Document: DU Mobile Bill
117. The [1] First and Third Defendants did not handover the contact number used by the Second Claimant Instead, they used this number to [2] solicit existing and potential clients who were approaching the Second Claimant, thereby creating a misleading association with the Second Claimant’s business. [3] This misrepresentation caused confusion among clients and third parties, leading them to believe they were engaging with the Second Claimant’s business. Consequently, the Defendants were able to divert clients and secure financial transactions for their own financial gain, resulting [4] in unfair competition against the Second Claimant.
Response [1] – I require the Claimants to Identify the contractual bases whereas the Third defendant and I had any obligations to transfer my personal number.
Response [2] – I deny the solicitation asserted without evidence to the contrary I rely on the earlier client messages wherein I provided clients contacted me personally with contact of the Second Claimant, this is documented in my correspondence with the Claimants’ representative.
Response [3] – there is many other salones with lawful licence in the DIFC and it can not be considered as unlawful competition, the Third Defendant is not a party to the contract these allegations are based on, her lawful work and hard earned income cannot be fully stopped because of the Share Transfer in dispute, the Claimants are required to specify the contract that give them Rights against the Third Defendant.
Document: DU Mobile Bill
118. Moreover, the [1] First Defendant misrepresented the terms of the sale, including Clause 1 of the Agreement, which pertained to the transfer of assets, by [2] failing to disclose that the contact number was not an asset of the business. It appears that the Defendants retained the contact number with the ulterior motive of leveraging it to solicit clients to a competing business i.e Hair Crafter’s Company LTD (Second Defendant) a.k.a Grove Salon and/or Hair by Salah [3] they had established prior to the sale of the Second Claimant’s shares.
Response [1] – the agreement clause 1 is not related to my personal phone number, I deny any presentation of such a promise and I recall requesting a disclosure of documents that the Claimants’ real estate Agent relied on for drafting the contracts now allegedly breached.
Response [2] – there is no term in the entire agreement that Identify my personal mobile number as a company owned property no was there any presentation I made as a promise to transfer my 18 years old personal number.
Response [3] – Based on the Second Defendant’s documentation, regarding the purchase and registration dates of the shares:
- Purchase Agreement Effective Date: Jul 05, 2024. This is the date the Company Share Transfer Agreement was entered into between the transferor (Sukant Mishra) and the transferee (Iuliia Valiullina).
- Board Resolution Date: Jul 20, 2024. The Corporate Board Resolution to sell and accept the new shareholding structure was ratified to take effect from this date.
- Actual Registry Certification Date: Aug 13, 2024. The DIFC, Registrar of Companies certified the true copy of the share transfer document identifying Iuliia Valiullina as the registered proprietor on this date.
Document: Second Defendant Documentation
119. The First Defendant [1] misled the First Claimant into purchasing the shares of the business by asserting that he intended to relocate to the Syria ( as confirmed in the [2] statement of Sokol Cici, the agent who introduced the First Defendant to the First Claimant and would strictly adhere to the covenant under Article 4 of the Agreement. [3] This clause explicitly restricts the First Defendant from engaging in any acts or activities that compete with the nature of the business for 3 years from the date of completion of the Agreement.
Response [1] – I deny any assertion of relocating and I further nedy the misstated facts in the witness Statement of the First Claimant’s real estate Agent, on 20 March 2024 I rejected that non-competition term in writing and refused to sign the second agreement that the Agent drafted during negotiations, I offered the Agent a refund of the deposit he paid, the Agent responded that he will delete that term from the drafted agreement, this is documented and the correspondence is still on my personal phone until the minute. I further deny that the real estate Agent introduced me to the First Claimant or facilitated any connection between us before the two contracts were already signed and executed on 26 March 2024.
Response [2] – if the Agent misrepresented the Company Share Transfer Agreement terms to his paid client the First Claimant or promised her that these terms she requested are binding me personally that is not a wrongdoing that I am liable for, I recall requesting that Agency to disclose material documents they referred to in Clause No. 5 and 7 of base contract dated 14 Feb 2024, the first contract, what are these documents and informations they referring to and what was the pre contract base they relied on, I deny that the contract was drafted by relying on verbal promises.
Response [3] – The Article 4 the Claimants rely on Company Share Transfer Agreement dated 20 march is non-existent term while Clause 11 is imposed on the Second Claimant in its company capacity not on me in personal capacity or name, the Term clearly stating the “the Company agree not to engage”
Document: Share Transfer Agreement full copy HR
120. However, during the trial proceedings in SCT-352-2024, [1] as reflected in the court record, the First Defendant stated that he had changed his mind regarding relocation and further argued that [2] he is not legally restricted from competing against the Second Claimant.
Response [1] – Paragraph 120 is denied. The judgment in SCT-352-2024 does not record that I said I had changed my mind about relocating to Syria, nor does it record any argument by me concerning a right to compete with the Second Claimant. SCT-352-2024 was a separate employment proceeding concerning cancellation of my employment visa. The Court recorded that I withdrew all claims except visa cancellation, treated the DEWS penalties and Sale and Purchase Agreement issues as separate matters, and ordered the Second Claimant to cancel my visa because the employment relationship had ended by resignation.
I also deny ever representing to Mr Sokol Cici or the First Claimant that I would relocate to Syria. My separate legal position is that the non-compete clause was addressed to “the Company” and did not impose a personal three-year restriction upon me. That contractual position is not an admission that I competed unlawfully, diverted clients, or breached any obligation.
If the Claimants rely upon words allegedly spoken during the SCT hearing, they must produce the official recording or transcript and identify the exact words and context. The judgment itself does not prove their assertion.
Document: Judgment with Findings of H.E. Justise Nassir al Nasser in SCT-352-2024
121. Two specific actions led the First Claimant to discover that the [1] First Defendant and Third Defendant had established another business (the Second Defendant) of a similar nature, which directly competes with the Second Claimant’s business and is located 2 kilometres away.
Response [1] – Paragraph 121 is denied as pleaded. The First and Third Defendants did not jointly establish, acquire or own Hair Crafters Company Ltd.
The documentary record shows that Hair Crafters was an existing, separately licensed business before the sale of Hair Creators. Its licence records the company trading as The Grove Salons from Unit CC4 by October 2022, and its separate tenancy commenced in November 2023.
The Third Defendant resigned from Hair Creators on 13 June 2024, effective 28 June 2024. She subsequently entered into a separate share-transfer agreement effective 5 July 2024. Payment of AED 350,000 was acknowledged on 21 July 2024, and the share certificate dated 12 August 2024 records the Third Defendant alone as proprietor of all 1,000 shares. No document records the First Defendant as a shareholder or joint owner.
The First Defendant was identified as an authorised signatory only later, in October 2024, and his employment contract dated 14 November 2024 appointed him as a Hair Dresser. These later roles do not prove that he established, acquired or owned the company.
The mere fact that the businesses provided similar services or were approximately two kilometres apart does not establish unlawful competition, solicitation, diversion of customers or resulting loss. Paragraph 121 also refers to “two specific actions” but does not identify either action, its date, the person responsible, the supporting document or any resulting loss.
Document: SECOND-DEFENDANT-DOCUS
122. [1] The Claimants discovered, through bank statements disclosed in August 2025, that the Fourth Defendant received multiple transfers from the Second Claimant’s corporate accounts [2] without any contractual basis, board approval, or supporting documentation. These transfers include AED 20,000 on 3 February 2024, AED 20,000 on 16 February 2024, AED 10,000 on 11 March 2024, AED 10,000 on 12 March 2024, and AED 20,000 on 30 March 2024. These payments occurred immediately after the disbursement of a RAKBANK loan of AED 1,012,221 into the Second Claimant’s account on 28 December 2023, and the initial agreement with the First Claimant to purchase the Shares.
Response [1] – Paragraph 122 is denied as it alleges that the Claimants first discovered these transfers through bank statements disclosed in August 2025. The five transfers were already displayed in the Claimants’ own EXCL08, which they relied upon in support to their original Particulars of Claim dated 7 January 2025. They therefore possessed these records months before the alleged August 2025 discovery.
The statement records the five outward transfers totalling AED 80,000. However, it also records an inward transfers of AED 4,700 from “HAIRBYROJIN SALON LTD” on 22 and on 28 March 2024, making the net outward movement AED 75,300 before bank charges.
The entries alone do not prove that the payments lacked a contractual or commercial basis, approval or supporting documentation. Nor do they prove that the payments came from the RAKBANK loan, were improperly retained or caused any loss. The first transfer, dated 3 February 2024, also predates the initial agreement of 14 February 2024.
123. The First Defendant [1] has provided no justification for these transfers to the Fourth Defendant, and the Fourth Defendant has not produced any invoices, agreements, or commercial justification. The Claimants assert that these payments [2] represent misappropriated funds diverted by the First Defendant to the Fourth Defendant for personal benefit.
Response [1] – Paragraph 123 is denied. It is incorrect to allege that I provided no justification for the transfers. My Amended Defence, paragraphs 7.13–7.17, explains that the five payments represented remuneration owed to me for February and March 2024, which I directed to the Fourth Defendant for the support of my daughter, principally her schooling expenses.
The Claimants’ own EXCL33 is my employment contract dated 1 July 2021. It records total remuneration of AED 40,000 per month, comprising AED 24,000 basic salary and AED 16,000 in allowances. The five transfers total exactly AED 80,000, corresponding to two months’ contractual remuneration.
The pleaded basis was therefore payment of an employment liability, not payment for goods or services supplied by the Fourth Defendant. Consequently, no commercial invoice or agreement from the Fourth Defendant would ordinarily be expected. If remuneration was lawfully owed to me, directing it to a third party for family support does not convert it into misappropriation; it discharges the Company’s liability to its employee.
The Claimants must prove that the February and March remuneration was not outstanding, that the transfers exceeded my contractual entitlement, or that the stated salary explanation is false. The mere fact that the funds were ultimately used for a personal or family purpose does not establish dishonest diversion..
Document: My Employment Contract with Hair Creators
Document: CASH-DEPOSITS-From-1-March-2023-till-30-April-2024
124. The Fourth Defendant operated from premises [1] leased and paid for by the Second Claimant, used the Second Claimant’s staff, equipment, and branding, and benefitted from the Second Claimant’s marketing and goodwill. The [2] Fourth Defendant also used the Second Claimant’s POS-linked bank accounts, which were pledged to secure the First Defendant’s personal loan. The Claimants further discovered that the Fourth Defendant’s operations overlapped with the Second Claimant’s business, including shared suppliers, shared staff, and shared customer data.
Response [1] – it is denied that the second claimant paid any cost for the setup of the fourth defendant.
Response [2] – it is denied that the second claimant POS was linked, used or accessed by the fourth defendant no that the Business financing agreement no. is a personal, the Claimants are required to prove these allegation.
Document: My Employment Contract with Hair Creators
125. The Claimants assert that the Fourth Defendant knew or ought to have known that the funds it received were misappropriated, given: a. the marital relationship between the First Defendant and Ms. Rojin; b. their simultaneous employment within the Second Claimant; c. their shared access to the Second Claimant’s financial systems; d. the use of the Second Claimant’s premises, branding, and assets; e. the [1] First Defendant’s admission that he created the Fourth Defendant as a “gift” to his wife, without the mention of any financial consideration for any of the assets, equipment, fittings, fixtures or stock; f. the absence of any commercial documentation supporting the transfers.
Response [1] – Paragraph 125 is denied as it alleges wrongdoing by me. I make no admission on behalf of the Fourth Defendant. The allegation incorrectly assumes that the five payments were misappropriated and then attempts to infer knowledge from personal relationships. The underlying misappropriation is denied. My Amended Defence explains that the AED 80,000 represented two months of accrued remuneration owed to me under EX‑CL‑33, which records monthly remuneration of AED 40,000. I directed those funds to the Fourth Defendant to support my daughter, principally her schooling expenses.
As to the matters relied upon:
(a) My former marital relationship with Ms Rojin does not establish knowledge of wrongdoing.
(b) Any historical or simultaneous employment does not establish that either person knew the payments were improper.
(c) The allegation of shared access to the Second Claimant’s financial systems is denied. The Claimants must identify the system, credentials, dates and activity allegedly undertaken by Ms Rojin or the Fourth Defendant.
(d) It is denied that the Fourth Defendant used assets or funding belonging to the Second Claimant. Unit 130 had a separate lease-transfer and variation history. Its rent and fit-out costs were paid from Ms Rojin’s personal account, including the cheque paid to Falcon Interior Decoration LLC.
(e) Any alleged reference to the Fourth Defendant as a “gift” must be read in context. It referred to my personal assistance and funding for Ms Rojin’s project. It was not an admission that I gifted the Second Claimant’s assets, equipment, fittings, fixtures or stock. The Claimants must identify each allegedly transferred asset and prove its ownership, transfer, recipient and value.
(f) No commercial invoice was required because the pleaded basis of the payments was satisfaction of my employment remuneration, not the purchase of services from the Fourth Defendant.
The listed personal and historical connections do not prove that the Fourth Defendant knew or ought to have known of any misappropriation. The Claimants must first prove that the payments were wrongful and then prove knowledge of that specific wrongdoing.
Response [2] – it is denied that the second claimant POS was linked, used or accessed by the fourth defendant no that the Business financing agreement no. is a personal, the Claimants are required to prove these allegation.
Document: My Employment Contract with Hair Creators
126. The Claimants further assert that the Fourth Defendant assisted the First Defendant in diverting clients, goodwill, and business opportunities away from the Second Claimant, including using the “Hair Creators” branding and the misappropriated business contact number.
Response [1] – .
127. The Claimants seek relief arising out of the [1] unauthorised diversion and misuse of the Second Claimant’s monies and assets, including the transfer of part of the business to the wife (the Fourth Defendant) without valuable consideration and the continued routing of payments from the Second Claimant (and/or its related entities) to the Fourth Defendant (together, the Misappropriations). The remedies below are sought pursuant to the DIFC Law of Damages and Remedies (DIFC Law No. 7 of 2005, as amended) (the Damages & Remedies Law), the DIFC Law of Obligations (DIFC Law No. 5 of 2005, as amended) (the Law of Obligations), and the DIFC Courts’ equitable jurisdiction as applied within DIFC law.
Response [1] – I deny that the alleged unauthorised diversion or any misused assets and money, the Claimants were unable to prove such allegations with any material evidence or even establish that the authority that was allegedly breached no the contract term given rights to claim matters predated the contract.
128. Email exchanges between the First Defendant and the DIFCA on July 9, 2024 demonstrate that the [1] First Defendant and the Third Defendant, who are married, had acquired shares in an operating competitive business under the Third Defendant’s name [2] prior to the sale of the Second Claimant’s shares to the First Claimant.
Response [1] – Paragraph 128 is denied. The July emails do not demonstrate that the First and Third Defendants jointly acquired the Second Defendant before the sale of the Second Claimant. They establish the opposite chronology.
On 9 July 2024, I expressly clarified that SR‑297386 concerned “another salon” at Liberty House CC4 called Hair Crafters Salon Ltd and that it had “nothing to do with other requests done to Hair Creators Salon.” This clarification was necessary because DIFC had confused the two companies.
The email identifies Iuliia Valiullina alone as the proposed purchaser. It states that the current shareholder had submitted a request for the shares to be transferred into her name and that the process remained at the passport-verification and initial-approval stage.
The subsequent correspondence confirms that no transfer had yet been completed. Between 10 and 17 July 2024, passport verification repeatedly failed, SR‑297386 could not be submitted and the parties requested manual verification followed by the “subsequent transfer of shares.” My use of the expression “has bought” referred to the purchase agreement, not a completed or registered transfer.
The documentary chronology is:
- Iuliia gave notice of resignation on 13 June 2024, effective 28 June 2024.
- She entered into the separate share-transfer agreement on 5 July 2024.
- The July emails record the incomplete verification and regulatory process.
- Payment of AED 350,000 was acknowledged on 21 July 2024.
- Her registered ownership was documented by the share certificate dated 12 August 2024.
The Claimants themselves allege that the First Claimant obtained control of the Second Claimant in late June 2024. Accordingly, the 5 July agreement and 9 July correspondence occurred after that date, not before it.
Nothing in the emails states that I acquired, paid for or beneficially owned any shares in the Second Defendant. My assistance with the DIFC verification process does not establish joint ownership, and the marital relationship does not convert Iuliia’s separate acquisition into my acquisition.
The emails therefore do not prove prior acquisition, joint ownership, concealment or breach. At most, they prove that, following Iuliia’s resignation, a separate acquisition process for an existing salon was being pursued and remained incomplete during July 2024..
Document: THE JULY DIFC EMAILS WITH LOLITA CCed
129. Despite [1] their obligation to disclose this material fact, the First and Third Defendants acted with an ulterior motive to: a. Solicit potential clients; b. [2] Misappropriate funds belonging to the Second Claimant; and c. [3] Conceal fraudulent misrepresentations concerning the financial status of the business, including concealment of liabilities.
Response [1] – the assertions that Third Defendant was obligated to disclose her own business or was in need for a permission to is denied, her employment contract does not impose any duty to disclose or request any approvals following her resignation from the Second Claimant, if her acquisition of the shares in the Second Defendant were unlawful, the DIFC itself would reject such transfer. we require the Claimants to identify the contractual terms monaditing alleged obligations.
Response [2] – the allegation about misappropriated funds require detailed specifications in terms of amount, date, transactions and proof of the same with all due respect the broad term as pleaded with no material evidence is denied.
Response [3] – bad financial records are easily proven by a sample audited report such concern is true and the very first financial material disclosed to the Claimants’ real estate Agent was a 12 month bank statements showing genuine income and deductions of loan in the name of the company, now the if First Claimant having read and understood these transactions and decided to buy the company such decision was a choice and if not then the misrepresentation was in fact by her real estate Agent not First and Third Defendants, it is denied that the company was in bad financial status and the Claimants are required to prove it.
Document: THE JULY DIFC EMAILS WITH LOLITA CCed
130. The funds related to this loan, which were held in the Second Claimant’s account, were [1] withdrawn by the First Defendant to obscure these liabilities from the First Claimant. Furthermore, it has come to light that [2] these funds, considered an asset of the business alongside its income, were used between the early months of 2023 until the [3] mid of 2024 to pay off certain liabilities to an entity identified as ‘Liberty House’, the same entity that leases the properties where [4] the Third Defendant is currently located. This raises a reasonable assumption that the business funds, including the loan proceeds, were utilised to [5] acquire the Third Defendant’s shares and support its operations.
Response [1] – I admit withdrawing the business finance funds but not obstruct the First Claimant, I did not know her in 2023. The business finance funds as credited by the bank is 1,012000 dirham as a total, I refer to the total cash deposits and inward transfers records of the relative time period totaling 1,050,000 AED which is more than the loan total funds having been deposited into the other Company’s ADIB account between Feb 2023 and 30 April 2024 prior to the formal share transfer, These transactions and their source statements derive directly from pre-contractually disclosed company bank statements the Claimants’ submitted as (EXCL08) and utilized through the Company’s operating account for the direct and exclusive benefit of the Second Claimant. therefore the allegations on withdrawals are denied because the loan money is used in for the company benefit. and if we mention the money I deposited after the Share Transfer the
Document: Funds redeposited into the Second Claimant Account.
Response [2] – the agree that the funs are indeed company related funds and I must say that this is inconsistent with the Claimant assertion that the Loan is personal Loan.
Response [3] – I deny having any withdrawals made after 1 April 2024 and I request the Claimant to prove it.
Document: THE JULY DIFC EMAILS WITH LOLITA CCed
Response [4] – The four payments described as payments to “Liberty House” total AED 4,594.13. The supporting documents establish that they were paid to LIBERTY HOUSE PRINCIPAL BC GEN FUND, the body-corporate account used for utility and property charges.
The corresponding invoices and notices relate to my residential Apartment 2419 on the 24th floor of Liberty House. The residential leases identify me as the tenant, and the utility notices are addressed to me for Unit 24/2419. The payment amounts correspond to those residential charges.
These payments were not made to the Second Defendant, its seller or its business premises at Unit CC4. Apartment 2419 and Unit CC4 are separate premises. The fact that both are located in Liberty House does not establish any financial connection between them.
The payments were made between May 2023 and February 2024. The Third Defendant’s separate Share Transfer Agreement was effective only from 5 July 2024, and receipt of the AED 350,000 purchase price was acknowledged on 21 July 2024. There is no evidence tracing any of the AED 4,594.13 to that purchase price or to the Second Defendant’s operations.
Accordingly, the documents disprove the Claimants’ assumption that these Liberty House payments were used to acquire the Third Defendant’s shares or support the Second Defendant. A shared building name is not evidence of a shared tenancy, recipient or purpose.
Document: Apartment 2419 contract and Utility bills
131. To conceal these activities and erase tracks, the First Defendant [1] continued to exercise control over the Second Claimant company’s operations and financial transactions in his capacity as the Director and owner listed on the business license for a certain period even after the payment for the shares were completed when on the other side the [2] First Defendant was operating the Second Defendant along with his wife creating an evident conflict of interest.
Response [1] – the final installment against the share price was made on 1 May 2024, the day in which I submitted 100% share transfer request to the DIFC, for the First Claimant to become registered as Manager on the commercial license she had to complete the regularity procedure of attesting her passport, submitting the Portal application and get the ROC confirmation and the related Share Certificate before her registration as an Authorised Signatory on the commercial license of the Second Claimant, this process took at least 2 to 3 weeks, following the issuance of the new Share Certificate the First Claimant removed my name from the company commercial license at her first available opportunity without the need of any further approval from myself. contractually defined arrangement for managing the second claimant can not now be inter.
Response [2] – I deny that I operated the Second Claimant together with the Second Defendant at the same time, I rely on the Second Claimant Commercial License issued on 18 October 2024, in fact 4 month following the completion of the Share Transfer of the Second Claimant and following the SCT Court order to cancel my work visa issued from it.
Document: Grove Salon Commercial License
132. Notwithstanding this conflict, the First Defendant has [1] retained control over the Second Claimant’s email accounts, domain servers, and [2] business contact number, further enabling continued influence over the company and its affairs. The First Defendant has committed Deceit thus a violation of Article 31 of DIFC Law of Obligations which states.
Response [1] – The First Defendant’s direct evidence is that, from the website’s creation in 2019, the haircreators.net domain was acquired and administered through One.com, while the website’s content, design, galleries, images and other displays were created and published through Webflow. The domain service and the website publishing platform were therefore separate functions.
A website-development proposal dated 3 July 2023 was addressed to “Mr. Salah Masri, CEO – Haircreators.net” and expressly concerned the Hair Creators Salon business. The proposal states that Kent Tupas intended to use WordPress as the CMS. The First Defendant’s understanding is that Kent subsequently migrated or rebuilt the Webflow website content in WordPress and changed the design. However, the proposal proves the intended migration, not its completion; completion should be established by Kent’s evidence, technical records, WordPress records or contemporaneous communications.
The First Defendant’s evidence is that Mr Thomas, a full-time media manager employed by the Second Claimant, prepared fresh website content and communicated it to Kent for uploading and publication. This is consistent with Ms Lolita’s own witness statement identifying Thomas as involved with the website/accounts. It should be corroborated by Thomas’s employment record or job description, native Thomas–Kent communications, content files and platform collaborator or activity logs.
The supplied proposal is incomplete because bundle page 666 is absent. The pages produced contain no express maintenance or email-administration clause. The clause saying the resulting work would be the intellectual property of “Mr. Masri” is potentially ambiguous and must be explained by the fact that the proposal identifies him as CEO, concerns the Hair Creators business, and the Company paid the relevant service providers.
The Claimants’ bank material records recurring Webflow charges during 2023 and January 2024, a One.com charge of AED 920.67 on 9 November 2023, and payments of AED 400 to Kent Tupas on 13 February, 27 April, 4 May and 12 June 2024. The payments on 27 April, 4 May and 12 June occurred after the operational handover and support the existence of an ongoing web-designer relationship while the Claimants’ appointed management was operating the Company. The statements do not identify which individual initiated each transfer.
Webflow’s email of 12 September 2024 states that repeated attempts to charge the billing card failed, that the CMS hosting plan was cancelled, and that any connected custom domain was consequently unpublished. This supports an administrative non-payment explanation for the website going offline rather than deliberate deletion or obstruction. Because the notice was addressed to the First Defendant, it is still necessary to produce the earlier payment warnings, evidence that they were passed to the Claimants, and any request that the Claimants update the billing method.
On 15 October 2024, the Claimants’ accountant Ms Lolita Tines used accountant@haircreators.net to forward historical DIFC correspondence to the First Defendant, including messages from April, May, July and August 2024. This proves that the Claimants’ appointed accountant had access to the accountant mailbox and its historical contents by that date, contrary to an unqualified allegation of no past or present access.
Ms Lolita’s witness statement says that she did not witness any attempt by the First Defendant to restrict access to important business data. Her statement that Thomas and the First Defendant “apparently” controlled the accounts “as per the website guy” is not evidence from her own direct knowledge and does not identify any login, refusal, deletion or access event by the First Defendant. Her reference to Thomas nevertheless supports the Defence evidence that a Company employee was involved in the website workflow.
The One.com screenshot dated 31 August 2026 says only that haircreators.net is “with another provider.” It does not identify the current provider, prove who transferred the domain, state when any transfer occurred, or establish the status of the website or email hosting in 2024.
Accordingly, the presently available evidence does not establish that the First Defendant deliberately blocked access, refused a valid technical transfer, accessed confidential data after handover, or caused the alleged loss. The operational history instead identifies at least two other persons involved in website activity: Thomas, the Second Claimant’s employee responsible for content, and Kent, the external designer responsible for technical publishing. The Claimants should identify the particular credential requested, the date and recipient of each request, the alleged refusal, the service involved, the technical record proving the First Defendant’s control, and the loss caused. The strongest independent evidence would be the domain-transfer and DNS history, Webflow and WordPress account/activity records, One.com and email logs, the complete Kent Tupas contract, Thomas–Kent communications, and evidence from Kent and Thomas concerning the actual migration, administration and credential handover.
Documents and references
Ms Lolita Tines’ witness statement, particularly the passages concerning data restrictions and official email accounts..
WEB HOSTING DETAILS supporting file: Kent Tupas proposal, Webflow cancellation email and later One.com screenshot.
Website-development proposal dated 3 July 2023, supplied bundle pages 665, 667 and 668; bundle page 666 is absent.
Webflow CMS Hosting cancellation email dated 12 September 2024.
One.com domain-search screenshot dated 31 August 2026.
Claimants’ EX-CL-08 bank material: Webflow and One.com charges and AED 400 transfers to Kent Tupas, including PDF pages 124, 136, 139 and 202 of BinderEX CL08.
DEWS Hair Creators Ltd, Reference No. SR-206759 correspondence: emails forwarded by Ms Lolita from accountant@haircreators.net on 15 October 2024.
Response [2] – I deny that I operated the Second Claimant together with the Second Defendant at the same time, I rely on the Second Claimant Commercial License issued on 18 October 2024, in fact 4 month following the completion of the Share Transfer of the Second Claimant and following the SCT Court order to cancel my work visa issued from it.
Document: Grove Salon Commercial License
133. The First Defendant [1] operated the Second Claimant under the trade name “Hair By Salah,” managed the [1] business’s associated websites, and created social media accounts linked to the name “Hair By Salah,”.
Response [1] – I deny that the Second Claimant was operated under any different trade name, all of it documentations state its own name, the mere social media account Hair By Salah is my personal industrial identity, hair by salah was not a part of the share transfer contract not it is an asset owned by the Second Claimant, this was made known to the First Claimant and she was able to cancel the contract when I rejected the transfer of Hair By Salah after the misrepresentation her real estate Agent made regarding the ownership of it. any claim for additional assets from outside the scop of the contract is denied.
Response [2] – I deny blocking access or causing the alleged disruption. From the website’s creation in 2019, its administration was structurally divided: domain registration was handled via One.com, while design and hosting were managed through Webflow. I did not unilaterally control these functions. Operations were actively managed by the Second Claimant’s full-time media manager, Mr. Thomas, and an external web designer, Mr. Kent Tupas. Bank records confirm that the Claimants’ continued to pay Mr. Tupas between April and June 2024, proving an active, ongoing relationship with the webmaster well after the operational handover.
The website going offline was not an act of deliberate obstruction, but rather the result of administrative failure by the Claimants’ management. A September 12, 2024 notice from Webflow confirms that the CMS hosting plan and custom domain were unpublished strictly because repeated attempts to charge the billing card failed.
The Claimants’ unqualified allegation that they completely locked out of their accounts is factually incorrect. Evidence demonstrates that on October 15, 2024, the Claimants’ accountant, Ms. Lolita, actively used the accountant@haircreators.net address to forward historical correspondence. Furthermore, Ms. Lolita’s own witness statement admits she never witnessed the First Defendant restrict access to business data.
The Claimants web development proposal submitted itself stated that the webmaster intended to shift the site content to WordPress, and a latter search result in One.com stating the domain is “with another provider” failing to prove unauthorized transfer. To substantiate their claims, the Claimants must produce specific technical evidence, including DNS history, Webflow/WordPress activity logs, Thomas-Kent communications, and definitive proof of any specific credential request formally refused by the First Defendant..
Document: WEB-AND-EMAILS-HOSTING-DETAILS
134. The First Claimant asserts that [1] the representations made by the First Defendant during the sale of shares included assurances regarding the reputation, goodwill, and fame of the business, as well as its generated income, revenue, sales, and client records. These elements were allegedly reliant on the social media reach and credibility of the “Hair By Salah” trading name.
Response [1] – I deny any misrepresentation and conclusions to be made directly or indirectly to the First Claimant. I expected long term Due Diligence from 14 Feb until 1 May 2024 in which the First Claimant and her appointed representatives exercised their rights to find out any company related information matter to them and I further rely on my documented written rejection to transfer Hair By Salah on the 2 of April by which time the First Claimant was able to terminate the Agreement but chose to proceed therefore any allegedly made representation is required to proven by words, the person said such words, the time and the Claimants’ reliance on such misrepresentation with evidence.
Document: WEB-AND-EMAILS-HOSTING-DETAILS
Document: Marsela-WhatsApp-Correspondence Page 28/29
135. However, the asset, specifically the trade name and the social media account under the trade name, was not transferred to the First Claimant as stipulated in Clause 1 of the Agreement. Consequently, the business has suffered significant losses due to the First Defendant’s continued use of the trade name, which retrospectively connects with the Second Defendant.
Response [1] – the STA Clause No.1 is about the transfer of shares, there is nothing in it about virtual or digital assets, the list of items included for transfer on the second page of the Agreement identify the Social Media Assets of the Second Claimant being { Hair Creators } in reference to its instagram account among other platforms, there is no reference identifying { Hair By Salah } as digital asset agreed for transfer therefore I deny any obligations to handover my personal social account to the claimants and I further request them to identify the contractual terms they rely on.
Document: WEB-AND-EMAILS-HOSTING-DETAILS
Document: Marsela-WhatsApp-Correspondence Page 28/29
136. The Claimants discovered that the First and Third Defendants continues to [1] trade Second Defendant under the name “Hair By Salah.” The contact number used to promote the services of the Second Claimant is now being used by the Defendants as evidenced in the [2] issued tax invoices under the name “Hair By Salah.” Additionally, the Second Defendant operates from the Grove Salon location, which is registered under Hair Crafter’s Company LTD, and the written messages by WhatsApp confirms that [3] the personal bank account of the Third Defendant serves as the official business account of the Second Defendant.
Response [1] – the STA Clause No.1 is about the transfer of shares, there is nothing in it about virtual or digital assets, the list of items included for transfer on the second page of the Agreement identify the Social Media Assets of the Second Claimant being { Hair Creators } in reference to its instagram account among other platforms, there is no reference identifying { Hair By Salah } as digital asset agreed for transfer therefore I deny any obligations to handover my personal social account to the claimants and I further request them to identify the contractual terms they rely on.
Response [2] – the purported tax invoice is fake and I require the Claimants to prove its authenticity by showing the actual correspondence including full attachments.
Response [3] – the bank account of the Third Defendant is denied, the Second Defendant had its own commercial Bank account from ADCB and full statement of that account is filed, the Claimant failed to specify the term given them right to allege matters relate to the personal account of the Defendant.
Document: WEB-AND-EMAILS-HOSTING-DETAILS
Document: Marsela-WhatsApp-Correspondence Page 28/29
137. The First Defendant without the authorization and knowledge of the First Claimant continued to [1] gain access take sensitive information that are confidential in its nature such as the POS system of the business which is an [2] integrated software recently discovered was linked to the First Defendant’s email also, the business’s google accounts and google enabled location tracker was also connected to the First Defendant’s personal phone. Further, the First Defendant [3] admits that he continues to have key access to the server for email and website, which he refuses to handover.
Response [1] – The allegations concerning unauthorized access to sensitive data are overly broad, unparticularized, and are accordingly denied in their entirety. Regarding the POS Merchant ID 4001714, this service has been provided to the Second Claimant since 2021, and its monthly reports have been routinely routed to my personal email since that time. The network provider continues to direct these reports to me solely as a consequence of the First Claimant’s own inaction. The First Claimant refused to register herself as the Authorized Signatory with RakBank thus she can not request an update to the POS registered email address.
Furthermore, This bank registration remains pending since the sale in dispute because the First Claimant refuses to sign the requisite financing security instrument, a deliberate omission made to avoid being forced to satisfy the associated monthly repayment obligations.
Response [2] – the assertions about integrated spying software discovery are denied and the Claimants are required to prove the that by device name, the technology used and how that is done by myself.
Response [3] – I deny the purported admission I did not admit to have key access, the fact that my emails was historically used to keep the monthly payments satisfied on the domain hosting provider doesn’t prove that I had willfully taken down the company email addresses, I never received an email request to maigret the site to another provider or provide any informations about it because the webdesigner Mr Kent was in charge of that and he in fact shifted the domain and its contents to another hosting provider called WordPress without any further requirements from me. I have no benefit deleting these emails and to the contrary if I have access to the same now I will be able to support my position further with material correspondences that undermine the present allegations.
Document: WEB-AND-EMAILS-HOSTING-DETAILS
Document: Marsela-WhatsApp-Correspondence Page 28/29
138. The First Claimant upon taking full control of the license which enabled them complete access to the DIFC Portal for the business got aware that the First Defendant had been previously warned with penalty by the DIFCA for breach of Article 14(7) and 14(8) of the subject to Article 62 of the Data Protection Law, DIFC LAW NO. 5 of 2020 on 30 September 2021.
Response [1] – The allegations concerning unauthorized access to sensitive data are overly broad, unparticularized, and are accordingly denied in their entirety. Regarding the POS Merchant ID 4001714, this service has been provided to the Second Claimant since 2021, and its monthly reports have been routinely routed to my personal email since that time. The network provider continues to direct these reports to me solely as a consequence of the First Claimant’s own inaction. The First Claimant refused to register herself as the Authorized Signatory with RakBank thus she can not request an update to the POS registered email address.
Furthermore, This bank registration remains pending since the sale in dispute because the First Claimant refuses to sign the requisite financing security instrument, a deliberate omission made to avoid being forced to satisfy the associated monthly repayment obligations.
Response [2] – the assertions about integrated spying software discovery are denied and the Claimants are required to prove the that by device name, the technology used and how that is done by myself.
Response [3] – the fact that my emails was historically used to keep the monthly payments satisfied on the domain hosting provider does not prove that I had willfully taken down the company email addresses, I never received an email request to maigret the site to another provider or provide any informations about it because the webdesigner Mr Kent was in charge of that and he in fact shifted the domain and its contents to another hosting provider called WordPress without any further requirements from me. I have no benefit deleting these emails and to the contrary if I have access to the same now I will be able to support my position further with material correspondences that undermine the present allegations.
139. The Claimants are entitled to claim damages for the losses sustained as a result of the First Defendant’s breach of the Agreement and [1] non-performance of contractual obligations. under Article 77 of the DIFC Contract Law, DIFC Law No. 6 of 2004 which states,
“Non-performance is failure by a party to perform anyone or more of its obligations under the contract, including defective performance or late performance.” As a result, the damages include:
1. Loss of business revenue due to the failure to transfer and/or handover assets and clients
2. The reputational harm caused by the First Defendant’s actions, including the establishment of the competing business.
3. In cases of fraudulent misrepresentation, additional damages may be awarded to the Claimant.
Response [1] – the First Claimant herself is indeed the non-performing party to her written obligation on the first page of the two contract she signed to purchased the company and excepted all of its liabilities and all of its obligation in writing, on two contracts and refused to honour these obligations upon knowing about the personal guarantee of the company loan, the present mixed up allegations failing to present one material proof are designed to help her avoid paying her company loan and are denied.
140. In accordance with DIFC Contract Law, Articles 58 and 62 which states: Article 58, Co-operation between the parties “Each party is bound to co-operate with the other party when such co-operation may reasonably be expected for the performance of that party’s obligations.” Article 60, Determination of the kind of duty involved “In determining the extent to which an obligation of a party involves a duty of best efforts in the performance of an activity or duty to achieve a specific result, regard shall be given, among other factors, to: (a) the way in which the obligation is expressed in the contract; (b) the contractual price and other terms of the contract; (c) the degree of risk normally involved in achieving the expected result; and (d) the ability of the other party to influence the performance of the obligation.”
Response [1] – I accept the statutory provisions only as they are accurately quoted. I deny breaching any duty of cooperation. I pursued the share-transfer process, assisted with the handover and provided operational access. The remaining RAKBANK resulted from the First Claimant refusal to provide the Bank a replacement of my security-cheque in order to be the authorised-signatory, not from any refusal by me to cooperate. The Claimants must identify the particular contractual obligation, the cooperation allegedly required, the request made to me and the act or omission said to constitute the breach. it is respectfully submitted the First Claimant herself is in breach of the core written understanding she signed upon in the Memorandum Of Understanding on 14 Feb 2024.
141. The First Defendant breached the Agreement dated 20 March 2024 by: 1. Failing to transfer 100% of the Second Claimant’s shares to the First Claimant as stipulated under Clause 1.1 of the SPA. 2. Refusing to provide full access and control over: a. The Second Claimant’s bank accounts (RAK Bank and ADIB) b. Social media accounts, including Instagram and the domain server for the company’s website and email c. Customer contact numbers and other intellectual property that are essential to the business’s operations. d. Continuing to exercise control over the Second Claimant’s financial assets and virtual assets, including intellectual property and operations after the sale. 3. The First Defendant also breached the non-compete clause: a. Establishing a competing business, the Second Defendant (“Hair by Salah”), within 2 kilometers of the Second Claimant’s premises b. Diverting clients, suppliers, and goodwill to the competing business.
Response [1] – Paragraph 141 is denied in its entirety.
- Share transfer
The allegation that 100% of the shares were not transferred is inconsistent with the Claimants’ own case. APOC paragraph 1 admits that the First Claimant ultimately became the sole shareholder of the Second Claimant.
The contemporaneous DIFC correspondence shows that I applied to add the First Claimant as a shareholder on 26 March 2024, after receiving her required identification and financial documents. Preliminary approval was issued on 17 April 2024. When the final AED750,000 instalment was paid on 1 May 2024, I requested the transfer of 100% of the shares. DIFC confirmed the further regulatory procedure on 2 May 2024. Regulatory processing by DIFC was not a refusal by me to transfer the shares.
- Bank accounts
Operational access must be distinguished from being formally registered as a bank signatory. ADIB access was handed over, and operational control of the business was given to the Claimants’ appointed manager, Ms Rexhina Mena, on 1 April 2024.
I remained the RAKBANK authorised signatory because the Bank required the replacement of my security cheque, which the First Claimant declined to provide. My Defence states that the RAKBANK credentials were provided to Ms Rexhina on 17 April 2024.
The Claimants’ own EX-CL-08 contains an electronically generated RAKBANK statement issued on 14 June 2024. Their possession of that statement is inconsistent with their blanket allegation that no access or credentials were provided. However, the identity of the person who downloaded it can be conclusively established through RAKBANK’s audit records.
- Website, email and social-media systems
I deny deliberately withholding any Company-owned digital asset. The domain registration, website hosting, content-management system and email hosting were separate technical functions. The website was administered through the external designer, Kent Tupas, with content handled by the Second Claimant’s media employee, Thomas.
Payments to Kent continued after the handover. The Webflow email dated 12 September 2024 records that the hosting plan was cancelled following failed subscription payments, not because I deleted or obstructed the website. Ms Lolita subsequently used accountant@haircreators.net to forward historical Company correspondence, proving that the Claimants’ appointed accountant had access to that Company mailbox.
The Claimants must identify the particular credential requested, the date of the request, the alleged refusal, the person who actually controlled the relevant service and the loss caused.
- Telephone numbers and intellectual property
The two mobile numbers relied upon by the Claimants were registered in my personal name and were not expressly identified in the SPA as assets to be transferred. They must be distinguished from the Second Claimant’s business landline, Hair Creators branding, customer records and other Company-owned property. “Hair by Salah” was my personal professional identity. It was not transferred to or owned by the Second Claimant. I deny retaining or accessing confidential customer, POS or operational data after the handover.
- Alleged continued control
My remaining registration as the RAKBANK authorised signatory did not itself establish that I continued exercising operational control. It resulted from the Bank’s security-cheque requirements. The Claimants must identify every post-sale transaction or instruction allegedly made by me, together with its date, purpose, authority and resulting loss.
- Non-compete and the Second Defendant
I deny that the SPA imposed the alleged personal three-year restriction preventing me from working in my profession. The proposed personal restriction was rejected during negotiations. Clause 11 was expressed as an obligation of “the Company,” and its proper interpretation is a matter for the Court.
The APOC also incorrectly describes the Second Defendant as “Hair by Salah.” The Second Defendant is The Hair Crafters Company Ltd, trading as The Grove Salons. Annexure D27 shows that it was already an existing licensed business in October 2022. Annexures D35 and D29 identify Iuliia Valiullina as the purchaser and sole registered shareholder. Annexures D26 and D30 identify me only later as an authorised signatory and employee/hairdresser, not as purchaser or shareholder.
The fact that two salons were geographically close does not establish ownership, contractual breach or diversion. The Claimants have not identified any particular client or supplier diverted by me, the communication used, the resulting transaction or any corresponding loss.
142. In the circumstances, the First Defendant can properly be deemed a fiduciary of the Second Claimant in terms of Article 158 of the DIFC Law of Obligations, which states:
“Article 158(1) A person is the fiduciary of another if he has undertaken (whether or not under contract) to act for or on behalf of another in a matter in circumstances which give rise to a relationship of trust and confidence.”.
Response [1] – Paragraph .
143. As a fiduciary of the Claimants under the Agreement, the First Defendant owed express and implied obligations, including (but not limited to) the following, as stated by Justice Sir Richard Field in the case of (1) Marin (2) Marita V Markku [2019] DIFC CFI 042 “The fiduciary duty to act with loyalty in terms of Article 159 (1) of the DIFC Law of Obligations The fiduciary duty to act in good faith in terms of Schedule 3 (1) of the DIFC Law of Obligations The fiduciary duty to exercise the care, skill and diligence which would be exercised in the same circumstance by a reasonable person in terms of Schedule 3 (5) of the DIFC Law of Obligations.”
Response [1] – The First Claimant herself breached the fundamental term of the contract whereas she purchased the Company including all of its liabilities and other obligation related to it on 14 Feb and then on 20 March 2024, the two contracts included the same retained liabilities term and denied her obligation once she knew that the Company financing agreement is secured by a personal cheque which is not enforceable against her or her company, this calculated misconduct committed regardless the 1 million reduction in the purchase price that she herself admitted. the manufactured allegations in the present proceedings are designed to evade the loan repayment and prevent me from enforcing the contract terms the First Claimant herself signed. the unfounded allegations of fiduciary breach are denied.
144. The First Defendant owed the Second Claimant fiduciary duties of good faith, loyalty, and care. He breached these duties by:
B. Engaging in self-dealing by diverting business opportunities to the Second Defendant.
B. Misappropriating business funds to settle personal liabilities, including the AED 1 million loan.
C. Failing to disclose material conflicts of interest, including the competing business operated with the Third Defendant.
Response [1] – I admit owing these duties to the Second Claimant at the time I established it from scratch and until under my management the Company was generating a minimum income of 300,000 dirhams a month which is exactly why the First Claimant purchased it with its liability to pay back its Financing Loan, I deny that I breached any of these duties or diverted any of its clients and the claimants are required to prove that.
Response [2] – I spent the funds of the financing facility exclusively for the benefit of the Second Claimant as recorded on its Banking statement of account from ADIB and I further supported it with extra amount from my own and the Court is invited to read the banking records save for the 3 million I spent on its setup and preparation at first place, misappropriation of its funds is denied.
Response [3] – the Third Defendant in not a contracting party to any agreements and following her resignation she was not obligated to seek permission of any of the Claimants regarding her business.
145. As a former director and shareholder of the Second Claimant, the First Defendant owed statutory and fiduciary duties under Part 3 of the DIFC Companies Law (DIFC Law No. 5 of 2018)
Response [1] -.
146. Under the DIFC Companies Law, the First Defendant owed the following directors’ duties to the Second Claimant:
i. Duty to act within powers (Article 53): A director must act in accordance with the company’s constitution and only exercise powers for their proper purpose.
ii. Duty to promote the success of the company (Article 54): A director must act in good faith and in a way they consider most likely to promote the success of the company for the benefit of its shareholders.
iii. Duty to avoid conflicts of interest (Article 57): A director must avoid situations where their personal interests conflict with the company’s interests.
iv. Duty to exercise independent judgment and reasonable care (Articles 55 and 56): A director must exercise independent judgment and perform their duties with reasonable skill, care, and diligence.
Response [1] -.
147. The First Defendant failed to act within the scope of his authority as required under Article 53 of the DIFC Companies Law by:
I. [1] Continuing to act as the authorized signatory on the Second Claimant’s RAK Bank account after the sale, contrary to the Agreement and the Claimant’s instructions.
II. Making [2] unauthorized withdrawals of AED 28,677 payment for the loan’s EMI from the company’s bank account after the sale was completed.
III. Retaining access to and control over the Second Claimant’s [3] social media accounts and email server, despite no longer having any legal or beneficial ownership of the business. Failure to Promote the Success of the Company.
Response [1] – I deny the wrongful act as an authorised signatory and I relay on my email sent to the First Claimant personal email on 8 June 2024 requesting her to provide RakBank a copy of the new commercial license and all other company documents reflecting the ownership change and further provide the bank a replacement of the security cheque that I earlier signed.
Response [2] – I deny making any alleged unauthorised withdrawals and I relay to the contrary on the monthly deposits into the Rak Bank Account since the First Claimant dishonored her contractual obligation with documented account statements and cash deposit slips with total amount of 700,000 till.
Document: All Emails with Klesta and Marsela
148. Under Article 54 of the DIFC Companies Law, the First Defendant was obligated to act in a manner most likely to promote the success of the company. Instead, the First Defendant:
I. [1] Withheld critical business data, including customer and supplier information, from the First Claimant after the sale, hindering the smooth operation of the Second Claimant’s business.
II. [2] Diverted clients, suppliers, and goodwill to the competing business, the Second Defendant (“Hair by Salah”), causing the Second Claimant to suffer significant financial losses
III. Allowed DIFCA regulatory fines to accumulate during his tenure as a director, failing to ensure compliance with corporate filing and licensing requirements
Response [1] – I deny the broad withholding allegations and I require the Claimants to specify, data type, devices used, dates, software or system and present verifiable evidence.
Response [2] – the Second Defendant Name is Hair Crafters Company Ltd, Hair By Salah Is not a company or registered license and I deny the unparticularized allegation of diverted Clients with no evidence.
Response [3] – I forwarded the DEWS Notice of fine to the former business manager on the same day I received the proposed fine by Mon 15 april 2024, she in turn filed timely objection on the salon portal and advised the Claimants appointed manager to follow up and submit the team documentations, her resignation notice was over by end of May 2024 and left the company before any fine decision was formally imposed, this is documented.
149. Under Article 57 of the DIFC Companies Law, the First Defendant was obligated to avoid situations in which his personal interests conflicted with those of the Second Claimant. The [1] First Defendant breached this duty by:
I. Establishing the competing business, the Second Defendant, [2] in direct violation of the Agreement’s non-compete clause.
II. Diverting business opportunities and referrals from the Second Claimant to the Second Defendant.
III. Using the [3] Second Claimant’s confidential information, including customer lists, to solicit business for the Second Defendant.
Response [1] – such duty of avoiding conflict applied on me during my formal employment with the Second Claimant but after I left the company and especially the DIFC SCT Court ordered on 18 October 2024 that my work visa be cancelled, these alleged duties were no longer applicable on me and are denied to continue in effect.
Response [2] – the Non-Competition term is binding the Second Claimant itself it stating that “the Company Agree not to engage” and it does not bind me or my name, I rely on my written rejection to that term before the Agreement was executed and I rely on the written admission of the First Claimant’s Agent that he will delete that term and amend the agreement, if the Agent misrepresented that term to her or provided her untrue assurance regarding that term then that matter is between them to be sorted out, the Second Defendant was established years before the Second Claimant and the Third Defendant ownership of its shares does not make me the owner of it or prove that I established it.
Document: Sokol WhatsApp Correspondence Page 64/65
Response [3] – I forwarded the DEWS Notice of fine to the former business manager on the same day I received the proposed fine by Mon 15 april 2024, she in turn filed timely objection on the salon portal and advised the Claimants appointed manager to follow up and submit the team documentations, her resignation notice was over by end of May 2024 and left the company before any fine decision was formally imposed, this is documented.
150. Under Article 56 of the DIFC Companies Law, the First Defendant was required to exercise reasonable care, skill, and diligence in discharging his duties. He breached this duty by:
a. Failing to maintain proper financial controls and [1] permitting unauthorized withdrawals from the company’s accounts.
b. Allowing the Second Claimant to accumulate regulatory fines under DIFCA regulations and [2] incurring debt with Suppliers, demonstrating gross negligence in the management of the company’s compliance obligations
c. Failing to ensure a complete handover of the company’s assets and operational controls to the First Claimant, as required under the Agreement..
Response [1] – I deny permitting unauthorized withdrawals, I rely on the 1,269,890 AED were deposited in cash directly into the Second Claimant Bank Accounts between 1 March 2023 and 30 April 2024. these figures do not count any transfers between the 2 bank accounts of the company.
Document: CASH-DEPOSITS-From-1-March-2023-till-30-April-2024
Response [2] – the supplier debt is paid in full for the reasons I explained earlier and the DIFC Fines incurred after the handover date.
Document: SOA DBD Supplier
Response [3] – I dnay the broad allegations of failure to handover.
151. The First Defendant’s actions have caused significant harm to the Second Claimant, including:
a. [1] Financial losses resulting from the diversion of clients, suppliers, and revenue to the competing business.
b. Operational disruption caused by the [2] misappropriation of business assets and failure to complete the handover process.
c. Reputational damage due to the [3] accumulation of regulatory fines and failure to maintain the Second Claimant’s compliance with DIFC requirements.
Response [1] – no material records of financial damage have been pleaded nor there was a proof of direct financial damage arose from any alleged wrongdoing, to the Contrary I and the Third Defendant had incurred severe and documented financial loss with records exceeding 1.5 million seins the sale in dispute.
Document: Audited Financial report of the Second Claimant for the 2023
Response [2] – I deny the broad allegations of misappropriated company assets, and I require martial proof, detailed list of assets, and invoices .
Response [3] – I dnay that the 15 April notice itself was an already imposed penalty rather it is was a formal Notice of intended fine from DEWS which occurred after the 2 contracts. And sent on 15 April to the registered email address of the Second Claimant to which Ms Rexhina the newly appointed salon Manager had access and I received a copy on my personal email as well, during the relevant time, Ms Abier Al Kourdy was serving her 2 weeks notice after the Handover dated 1 April and indeed responded by rising an objection to DEWS via the DIFC Portal under SR 206759 on the bases that the company did not receive prior direction to enroll its employees before 15 April, further she guided the new Manager on how to follow up with the process, Ms. Shamma from the DEWS team responded on 27 May by referring to the objection raised and encouraged the Second Claimant to complete the enrollment before 15 June 2024 to avoid the said by that time the new salon accountant was already hired and had access to the DIFC Portal as evidenced by her own visa issuance and access to the company email as evidenced by her replies received with the necessary employees salaries informations as evidanced by the timely salaries paid on 30 May 2024 including the salaries of Lolita and the Manager Rexhina as evidenced in bank statement of account.
Document: Decision Notice of Fine and Dews email correspondence
152. The Claimants contend that the First Defendant’s breaches of directors’ duties under the DIFC Companies Law warrant:
a. [1] Financial losses resulting from the diversion of clients, suppliers, and revenue to the competing business.
b. Operational disruption caused by the [2] misappropriation of business assets and failure to complete the handover process.
c. Reputational damage due to the [1] accumulation of regulatory fines and failure to maintain the Second Claimant’s compliance with DIFC requirements..
Response [1] – no material records of financial damage have been pleaded nor there was a proof of direct financial damage arose from any alleged wrongdoing, to the Contrary I and the Third Defendant had incurred severe and documented financial loss with records exceeding 1.5 million seins the sale in dispute.
Document: Audited Financial report of the Second Claimant for the 2023
Response [2] – I deny the broad allegations of misappropriated company assets, and I require martial proof, detailed list of assets, and invoices .
Response [3] – I dnay that the 15 April notice itself was an already imposed penalty rather it is was a formal Notice of intended fine from DEWS which occurred after the 2 contracts. And sent on 15 April to the registered email address of the Second Claimant to which Ms Rexhina the newly appointed salon Manager had access and I received a copy on my personal email as well, during the relevant time, Ms Abier Al Kourdy was serving her 2 weeks notice after the Handover dated 1 April and indeed responded by rising an objection to DEWS via the DIFC Portal under SR 206759 on the bases that the company did not receive prior direction to enroll its employees before 15 April, further she guided the new Manager on how to follow up with the process, Ms. Shamma from the DEWS team responded on 27 May by referring to the objection raised and encouraged the Second Claimant to complete the enrollment before 15 June 2024 to avoid the said by that time the new salon accountant was already hired and had access to the DIFC Portal as evidenced by her own visa issuance and access to the company email as evidenced by her replies received with the necessary employees salaries informations as evidanced by the timely salaries paid on 30 May 2024 including the salaries of Lolita and the Manager Rexhina as evidenced in bank statement of account.
Document: Decision Notice of Fine and Dews email correspondence
153. The Claimants assert that the Fourth Defendant is liable in knowing receipt. The First Defendant wrongfully disposed of and/or procured the transfer of the Second Claimant’s assets (the “Misappropriated Assets”) in breach of the fiduciary duties, duties of loyalty, and duties of trust and confidence owed to the Second Claimant, including by causing payments and/or transfers on or about 3 February 2024, 16 February 2024, 11 March 2024, 12 March 2024, and 30 March 2024 from the Second Claimant’s corporate bank accounts to the Fourth Defendant’s account(s) in the aggregate amount of AED 80,000 (the “Impugned Transfers”). The Fourth Defendant beneficially received the Misappropriated Assets for its own use and benefit (and not merely as agent or conduit), including by applying the funds towards the operation of its business, payment of expenses, and/or settlement of liabilities.
Response to Para 153 – is denied. It is incorrect to allege that I provided no justification for the transfers. My Amended Defence, paragraphs 7.13–7.17, explains that the five payments represented remuneration owed to me for February and March 2024, which I directed to the Fourth Defendant for the support of my daughter, principally her schooling expenses.
The Claimants’ own EX‑CL‑33 is my employment contract dated 1 July 2021. It records total remuneration of AED 40,000 per month, comprising AED 24,000 basic salary and AED 16,000 in allowances. The five transfers total exactly AED 80,000, corresponding to two months’ contractual remuneration.
The pleaded basis was therefore payment of an employment liability, not payment for goods or services supplied by the Fourth Defendant. Consequently, no commercial invoice or agreement from the Fourth Defendant would ordinarily be expected. If remuneration was lawfully owed to me, directing it to a third party for family support does not convert it into misappropriation; it discharges the Company’s liability to its employee.
The Claimants must prove that the February and March remuneration was not outstanding, that the transfers exceeded my contractual entitlement, or that the stated salary explanation is false. The mere fact that the funds were ultimately used for a personal or family purpose does not establish dishonest diversion.
Document: My Employment Contract with Hair Creators
Document: CASH-DEPOSITS-From-1-March-2023-till-30-April-2024
154. At the time of receipt (and/or when it thereafter dealt with the Misappropriated Assets), the Fourth Defendant knew or ought reasonably to have known that the Impugned Transfers were made in [1] breach of the First Defendant’s fiduciary duties, including because of: (i) the close personal and operational relationship between the First Defendant and Ms. Roushin Bashar Haj Ali (“Ms. Rojin”); (ii) their shared employment within the Second Claimant; (iii) the operational overlap between the Second Claimant and the Fourth Defendant; and (iv) [2] the absence of any contractual, commercial, or lawful basis for the Fourth Defendant to receive funds from the Second Claimant. Further, the Fourth Defendant’s directors and/or controlling minds were aware from bank references, internal communications, and the nature of the transfers themselves that the funds originated from the Second Claimant and were not legitimately due to the Fourth Defendant.
Response [1] – is denied that my salaries of Feb and March transfers to the Fourth Defendant amount to a breach of my Fiduciary duty at the time when my employment contract was still in effect, I further submit that there was no contractual provision requiring me to seek any approval from the First Claimant during the ownership transitional phase.
Response [1] – It is incorrect to assert that I provided no justification for the transfers. My Amended Defence, paragraphs 7.13–7.17, explains that the five payments represented remuneration owed to me for February and March 2024, which I directed to the Fourth Defendant for the support of my daughter, principally her schooling expenses.
Document: My Employment Contract with Hair Creators
Document: CASH-DEPOSITS-From-1-March-2023-till-30-April-2024
155. In those circumstances, it is unconscionable for the Fourth Defendant to retain the benefit of the Misappropriated Assets. The Misappropriated Assets are identified and traceable to the Fourth Defendant through the Impugned Transfers, as particularised in the bank statements and transaction records exhibited at Ex-Cl-50, and the Claimants seek proprietary and/or restitutionary relief, including repayment, an account of profits, and such further orders as the Court considers just in respect of the Misappropriated Assets and their traceable proceeds.
Response [1] – is denied that my salaries of Feb and March transfers to the Fourth Defendant amount to a breach of my Fiduciary duty at the time when my employment contract was still in effect, I further submit that there was no contractual provision requiring me to seek any approval from the First Claimant during the ownership transitional phase.
Response [1] – It is incorrect to assert that I provided no justification for the transfers. My Amended Defence, paragraphs 7.13–7.17, explains that the five payments represented remuneration owed to me for February and March 2024, which I directed to the Fourth Defendant for the support of my daughter, principally her schooling expenses.
Document: My Employment Contract with Hair Creators
Document: CASH-DEPOSITS-From-1-March-2023-till-30-April-2024
156. The First Defendant owed fiduciary duties to the Second Claimant, including duties of loyalty, good faith, and to act in the best interests of the Second Claimant.[1] He breached those duties by misappropriating and/or procuring the transfer of the Second Claimant’s funds on or about 3 February 2024, 16 February 2024, 11 March 2024, 12 March 2024, and 30 March 2024, in the aggregate sum of AED 80,000 (the “Misappropriated Funds”), together with other withdrawals and diversions particularised elsewhere in these Amended Particulars of Claim.
Response [1] – is denied that my salaries of Feb and March transfers to the Fourth Defendant amount to a breach of my Fiduciary duty at the time when my employment contract was still in effect, I further submit that there was no contractual provision requiring me to seek any approval from the First Claimant during the ownership transitional phase.
Response [1] – It is incorrect to assert that I provided no justification for the transfers. My Amended Defence, paragraphs 7.13–7.17, explains that the five payments represented remuneration owed to me for February and March 2024, which I directed to the Fourth Defendant for the support of my daughter, principally her schooling expenses.
Document: My Employment Contract with Hair Creators
Document: CASH-DEPOSITS-From-1-March-2023-till-30-April-2024
157. The Fourth Defendant, acting by and through Ms. Roushin Bashar Haj Ali (“Ms. Rojin”), whose knowledge and conduct are attributable to the Fourth Defendant, dishonestly [1] assisted the First Defendant’s breaches of fiduciary duty by, among other things: (i) receiving and retaining the Misappropriated Funds into the Fourth Defendant’s bank account(s), including the transfers particularised in the bank statements exhibited at Ex-Cl-50; (ii) [2] using the Second Claimant’s premises at Unit GA-00-SZ-G0-RT-130, Gate Avenue, DIFC and the Second Claimant’s staff (including stylists, reception staff, and assistants under the First Defendant’s management) to operate and promote the Fourth Defendant’s business; (iii) diverting clients, bookings, and business opportunities away from the Second Claimant to the Fourth Defendant, including clients who contacted the Second Claimant’s business number and were redirected to the Fourth Defendant; and; (iv) concealing and misrepresenting the financial and operational overlap between the First Defendant, the Second Claimant, and the Fourth Defendant, including by withholding access to systems, suppressing or deleting records, and facilitating the continued use of the Second Claimant’s branding, equipment, and digital assets for the benefit of the Fourth Defendant.
Response [1] – I deny being assisted by any of the Defendants to breach any of my duties, at the time of the alleged breach, the Second Claimant was my company and I built its reputation and good being by my own hard efforts, therefore diverting its clients, staff or any other good away from it would be an act that I business leader would never do and cause loose to my own company income.
Response [2] – the allegations that Retail Unit 130 was the Second Claimants and used by the Fourth Defendant is a misstatment of fact, the time when unit 130 was leased by the Second Claimant, the Fourth Defendant was not excited yet, its sole shareholder Mr. Rojin was a salaried employee at the Second Claimant and her sales of good were credited into the Second Claimant bank account for its good and not diverted to any other person.
Document: My Employment Contract with Hair Creators
Document: CASH-DEPOSITS-From-1-March-2023-till-30-April-2024
158. In the circumstances, and applying the objective test for dishonesty as set out in Royal Brunei Airlines Sdn Bhd v Tan and Ivey v Genting Casinos, the Fourth Defendant’s assistance was dishonest. Ms. Rojin and/or the Fourth Defendant knew or believed the facts which rendered the conduct improper, including (a) that the funds originated from the Second Claimant; (b) that [1] there was no contractual or lawful entitlement to receive such funds; (c) that the [2] transfers were concealed from the First Claimant; (d) that the First Defendant was diverting clients and goodwill away from the Second Claimant; and (e) that the [3] Fourth Defendant’s operations were being funded and supported using the Second Claimant’s assets. Against those facts, the conduct would be regarded as dishonest by the standards of ordinary decent people.
Response [1] – I deny the assertions that there was no lawfulf entitlement, My Monthly Salary is an obligation of the Second Claimant to pay me pursuant to my full time employment contract, when I exercised my right and transferred my salaries to the Fourth Defendant bank account, the Fourth Defendant UBO is Ms Rojin herself therefore there is no more needed permissions or contract to justify these transactions.
Response [2] – the allegations that concealed is a misstatement of fact, the First Claimant by way of her appointed representatives reviewed the Company accounts before the conclusion of the contract and the formale share transferred, had they made any single enquiries at any point of time before 1 May, the Claimants pleading does not allege that they paid the purchase price and completed the transaction without seeing a single Account Statement or reviewing the company income against its expenses and transactions, I rely on the Bank Statement that the Claimants filed and relied on showing their own names and transactions regardless being Authorised Signatory of the Account proving they logged into the Company Account during the transitional phase and failed to exercise there are termination right as a stated in the share transfer agreement now such transactions are unlawful.
Response [3] – the Claimants are challenged to prove that the Fourth Defendant was funded by the Second Claimant.
Document: My Employment Contract with Hair Creators
Document: CASH-DEPOSITS-From-1-March-2023-till-30-April-2024
159. The Fourth Defendant is liable as a constructive trustee because it received trust property belonging to the Second Claimant, namely the funds transferred out of the Second Claimant’s bank account(s) on or about 3 February 2024, 16 February 2024, 11 March 2024, 12 March 2024, and 30 March 2024, in the aggregate sum of AED 80,000 (the “Misappropriated Funds”), as particularised in the bank statements exhibited at Ex-Cl-50 and the assets, equipment, fittings, fixtures and stock (“Property”) purchased by the Second Claimant as we all as the fines issued by the DIFCA. The Misappropriated Funds and Property were disposed of by [1] the First Defendant in breach of the fiduciary duties he owed to the Second Claimant, and the Fourth Defendant received them for its own beneficial use and not merely as an agent or conduit. In those circumstances, it was and remains unconscionable for the Fourth Defendant to retain the Misappropriated Funds. Whilst the Fourth Defendant has avoided its liabilities towards the regulator and shifted the burden of the fine to the Second Company, whilst trying to maintain that they are separate entities.
Response [1] – I deny the allegations in their pleaded form without an evidence establishes the alleged breach of fiduciary duty, the Claimants omitted to plead anything about the inward transactions back from the Fourth Defendant account and are recorded in the same exact Bank Statements the Claimants rely on, a party pleading dishonesty at least have to plead honest details of the facts they rely on.
The Claimants are challenged to prove that the Fourth Defendant was funded by the Second Claimant.
Document: CASH-DEPOSITS-From-1-March-2023-till-30-April-2024
160. The Fourth Defendant applied the Misappropriated Funds (and/or their traceable proceeds) to operate a competing business, including by meeting its operating expenses, supporting its commercial activities, and generating revenue and profits. The Fourth Defendant therefore holds the Misappropriated Funds, and any assets or mixed funds into which they can be traced (including within its bank account(s)), on constructive trust for the Second Claimant. Accordingly, the Second Claimant is entitled to trace the Misappropriated Funds into the hands of the Fourth Defendant and into any substituted assets or mixed accounts, and seeks: (i) a declaration that the Fourth Defendant holds the Misappropriated Funds and their traceable proceeds on constructive trust for the Second Claimant; (ii) an account of profits and/or equitable compensation in the amount of AED 80,000 (or such other sum as the Court assesses); and (iii) proprietary relief, including restitution and orders for tracing and recovery of the Misappropriated Funds and/or any substituted assets.. Unjust Enrichment
Response [1] – I deny the allegations in their pleaded form without an evidence establishes the alleged breach of fiduciary duty, the Claimants omitted to plead anything about the inward transactions back from the Fourth Defendant account and are recorded in the same exact Bank Statements the Claimants rely on, a party pleading dishonesty at least have to plead honest details of the facts they rely on.
The Claimants are challenged to prove that the Fourth Defendant was funded by the Second Claimant.
Document: CASH-DEPOSITS-From-1-March-2023-till-30-April-2024
161. The Fourth Defendant was enriched by receiving funds belonging to the Second Claimant, namely the Misappropriated Funds (as defined above), being transfers as identified thus far from the Second Claimant’s bank account(s) on or about 3 February 2024, 16 February 2024, 11 March 2024, 12 March 2024, and 30 March 2024, in the aggregate sum of AED 80,000 (and/or such other sums as are proved), as particularised in the bank statements exhibited at Ex-Cl-50. The Fourth Defendant applied those monies to meet its operating expenses and to fund the operation and expansion of its business, thereby obtaining a direct financial benefit.
Response [1] – I deny the allegations in their pleaded form without an evidence establishes the alleged breach of fiduciary duty, the Claimants omitted to plead anything about the inward transactions back from the Fourth Defendant account and are recorded in the same exact Bank Statements the Claimants rely on, a party pleading dishonesty at least have to plead honest details of the facts they rely on.
The Claimants are challenged to prove that the Fourth Defendant was funded by the Second Claimant.
Document: CASH-DEPOSITS-From-1-March-2023-till-30-April-2024
162. The enrichment was at the Claimants’ expense because the monies were paid out of the Second Claimant’s accounts (or otherwise derived from the Second Claimant’s assets), resulting in a corresponding deprivation to the Second Claimant.
Response [1] – I deny the allegations in their pleaded form without an evidence establishes the alleged breach of fiduciary duty, the Claimants omitted to plead anything about the inward transactions back from the Fourth Defendant account and are recorded in the same exact Bank Statements the Claimants rely on, a party pleading dishonesty at least have to plead honest details of the facts they rely on.
The Claimants are challenged to prove that the Fourth Defendant was funded by the Second Claimant.
Document: CASH-DEPOSITS-From-1-March-2023-till-30-April-2024
163. [1] There was no lawful basis for the transfers, and/or there was a total failure of basis for the payments. In particular: (i) there was no contract, invoice, loan, salary entitlement, dividend, reimbursement entitlement, or other legal ground requiring or permitting payment by the Second Claimant to the Fourth Defendant; (ii) the payments were [2] not authorised by the Second Claimant’s board or management in accordance with its internal governance; and (iii) the payments were procured and/or directed by the First Defendant in breach of his fiduciary duties.
Response [1] – The five transfers, totalling AED 80,000, were not gratuitous payments or funds used to finance the Fourth Defendant. They were paid from remuneration accrued to me under my Employment Contract dated 1 July 2021, which provided a monthly salary of AED 40,000.
The transfers represented outstanding remuneration for February and March 2024 and were directed to Hair by Rojin for child-support and schooling expenses. All five transfers occurred before the operational handover on 1 April 2024 and before completion of the share transfer.
At the relevant time, I was the Company’s manager and registered bank signatory. The Defence therefore denies that the payments lacked a lawful basis, were unauthorised, or constituted any breach of fiduciary duty. The Claimants must prove the absence of salary entitlement, the alleged lack of authority, and any resulting loss..
The Claimants are challenged to prove that the Fourth Defendant was funded by the Second Claimant.
Document: CASH-DEPOSITS-From-1-March-2023-till-30-April-2024
164. It is unjust for the Fourth Defendant to retain the benefit because it received and retained the Misappropriated Funds in circumstances where it knew and/or ought reasonably to have known that the payments were not due and were sourced from the Second Claimant’s assets without proper authorisation, including given the close personal relationship between the First Defendant and Ms. Rojin, their shared employment, and the operational overlap between the businesses. The Claimants therefore claim restitution of AED 80,000 (or such sum as the Court assesses), together with interest, and/or an order for repayment and reversal of the Impugned Transfers, without prejudice to the proprietary and equitable remedies pleaded elsewhere.
Response [1] – The five transfers, totalling AED 80,000, were not gratuitous payments or funds used to finance the Fourth Defendant. They were paid from remuneration accrued to me under my Employment Contract dated 1 July 2021, which provided a monthly salary of AED 40,000.
The transfers represented outstanding remuneration for February and March 2024 and were directed to Hair by Rojin for child-support and schooling expenses. All five transfers occurred before the operational handover on 1 April 2024 and before completion of the share transfer.
At the relevant time, I was the Company’s manager and registered bank signatory. The Defence therefore denies that the payments lacked a lawful basis, were unauthorised, or constituted any breach of fiduciary duty. The Claimants must prove the absence of salary entitlement, the alleged lack of authority, and any resulting loss..
The Claimants are challenged to prove that the Fourth Defendant was funded by the Second Claimant.
Document: CASH-DEPOSITS-From-1-March-2023-till-30-April-2024
166. The Fourth Defendant used the “Hair Creators” branding, logo, and goodwill belonging to the Second Claimant, causing confusion among clients and suppliers and diverting business. This included the use of the Second Claimant’s trade name, visual branding, signage, social media handles, and digital assets on or about April–July 2024, including through Instagram, WhatsApp communications, online booking links, and invoices issued under the “Hair by Salah / Hair Creators” name. At all material times, the Second Claimant had substantial goodwill in the “Hair Creators” name and get-up through trading since 2021 from its DIFC premises, with an established client base and supplier network.
Response [1] – .
167. By using the “Hair Creators” branding and get-up, the Fourth Defendant made misrepresentations (whether express or implied) that: (i) the Fourth Defendant’s business was the Second Claimant’s business; and/or (ii) the Fourth Defendant was connected with, authorised by, or a continuation or branch of the Second Claimant; and/or (iii) services provided by the Fourth Defendant were provided by or affiliated with the Second Claimant. These misrepresentations were calculated to deceive and did in fact cause confusion among actual and prospective customers and suppliers, including misdirected calls, WhatsApp messages, and client enquiries intended for the Second Claimant but diverted to the Fourth Defendant.
Response [1] – .
168. As a result, the Second Claimant has suffered and will suffer damage, including: (i) diversion of custom and loss of revenue; (ii) loss of control over its reputation and brand; and (iii) dilution of goodwill and customer relationships. The Claimants seek: (a) an injunction restraining further passing off and use of the “Hair Creators” branding or get-up; (b) delivery up or destruction of infringing materials; (c) an account of profits or, at the Claimants’ election, damages; (d) corrective statements if appropriate; and (e) interest and costs..
Response [1] – .
169. The [1] Fourth Defendant was used as a façade by the First Defendant to conceal wrongdoing, evade fiduciary obligations, and divert assets, and the Claimants rely on this allegation only to the extent necessary as a remedy of last resort where ordinary causes of action and enforcement against the true wrongdoer are inadequate.
Response [1] – Fourth Defendant was established in 2021 early 2022 as per the DIFC Records, the First Claimant signed her offer to buy the Second Claimant in 2024 so mixing the events happed 2 years apart is a calculated conduct to not a mistake and is denied.
170. The Court is entitled to pierce the corporate veil under Prest v Petrodel and CMS Dolphin v Simonet where a person under an existing legal obligation or liability deliberately interposes a company under his control to evade or frustrate that obligation by impropriety. The Claimants will say that the “evasion principle” is engaged on the following facts (among others):
Response [1] – Fourth Defendant was established in 2021 early 2022 as per the DIFC Records, the First Claimant signed her offer to buy the Second Claimant in 2024 so mixing the events happed 2 years apart is a calculated conduct to not a mistake and is denied.
171. Control: The First Defendant exercised de facto and/or de jure control over the Fourth Defendant, including through his relationship with Ms. Rojin, his involvement in its establishment, and his operational authority over its business activities, finances, and day-to-day management.
Response [1] – it is denied, the Fourth Defendant was managed, operated and controlled by it sole shareholder or eals the name and trade license would not have been change.
172. Existing obligation: At the time of the relevant conduct, the First Defendant owed fiduciary duties to the Second Claimant, including duties not to misappropriate assets and not to divert business opportunities, arising from his role as director, manager, and controlling mind of the Second Claimant.
Response [1] – it is denied, the Second Claimant itself was established and funded by myself and buy the principale Hair Creators Fz Llc located in Dubai Knowledge Park. now allegations that I made any wrongdoing to cause damage to my own company while under my own management is illusionary and denied.
173. Impropriety and evasion: The First Defendant caused or procured the diversion of the Second Claimant’s funds, business, and opportunities into the Fourth Defendant, including the Impugned Transfers totalling AED 80,000, and the use of the Second Claimant’s premises, staff, branding, and client relationships, with the purpose and effect of placing assets and revenues beyond the Second Claimant’s reach and thereby evading or frustrating the First Defendant’s fiduciary obligations and liabilities.
Response [1] – it is denied, the Second Claimant itself was established and funded by myself and buy the principale Hair Creators Fz Llc located in Dubai Knowledge Park. now allegations that I made any wrongdoing to cause damage to my own company while under my own management is illusionary and denied.
174. Causation and necessity: The interposition of the Fourth Defendant was instrumental to the evasion, including because assets and revenues were held in the Fourth Defendant’s name, enforcement against the First Defendant alone would be inadequate, and there is a real risk of dissipation or concealment of assets if the corporate structure is respected
Response [1] – the Claimants are first required to prove their allegations of misappropriation of assets and of cost allegedly incurred for the setup of the Fourth Defendant before.
175. Accordingly, and only insofar as required to prevent injustice and give effect to the Court’s orders, the Claimants seek an order that the Fourth Defendant’s separate legal personality be disregarded to the extent necessary, and/or that the Fourth Defendant be treated as the First Defendant’s nominee or alter ego in respect of the Misappropriated Funds and related assets, so that judgment and relief (including proprietary and monetary relief) may be enforced against those assets. This is pleaded without prejudice to the primary claims in knowing receipt, dishonest assistance, constructive trust, and unjust enrichment.
Response [1] – the Claimants are first required to prove their allegations of misappropriation of assets and of cost allegedly incurred for the setup of the Fourth Defendant before.
PRAYER FOR RELIEFS
The Claimants respectfully request this Honorable Court to grant the following reliefs:
1. Damages and Compensation
i. AED 1,500,000 for the purchase price of the business, on the basis that the SPA was induced by fraudulent misrepresentation.
ii. AED 500,000 for losses arising from misappropriation of assets, inventory, and revenue.
iii. AED 250,000 for reputational harm and loss of goodwill caused by the Defendants’ actions.
iv. AED 150,000 to cover DIFCA regulatory fines and penalties incurred as a result of the First Defendant’s negligence.
v. Reimbursement of the Rent Charges overpaid by the Claimants
vi. Outstanding liability owed to the Supplier as a result of First Defendant’s non payment in the sum of AED 57,478.44,vii. Due to the nature of the financial damages caused, the Claimants have appointed an independent financial expert to assess the damages incurred, including the anticipated damages. The Claimants reserve the right to amend them and the rest of the claims subject to the report.
viii. restitution of all funds transferred from the Second Claimant to the Fourth Defendant
ix. Compensation for all Property held on constructive trust by the Fourth Defendant for the Second Claimant;
x. Fourth Defendant to account to the Second Claimant for all profits made using the Second Claimant’s Property and/or the funds that were diverted to the Fourth Defendant by the First Defendant in breach of the First Defendant’s FIduciary Obligations to the Second Claimant and the Fourth Defendant’s acceptance of diverted corporate funds resulting in unjust enrichment;
2. Restitution for wrongdoings and unjust-enrichment
An order for restitution in favor of the Claimant.
3. Account of Profits An order requiring the Defendants to account for all profits earned from the use of the Second Claimant’s assets, intellectual property, and diverted clients.
4. Injunctive Relief (RDC Part 25)
i. A freezing order preventing the Defendants from dissipating assets within or outside the jurisdiction.
ii. An injunction restraining the Defendants from continuing to operate the competing business (Second Defendant), “Hair by Salah,” within the restricted area.
iii. An injunction restraining the Defendants from continuing to use the contact number +971 55 6165769 to solicit potential clients and impede business of the Second Claimant.
5. Disclosure Orders An order requiring the Defendants to disclose all documents and communications relating to the competing business, including financial records, client communications, and marketing materials. An order seeking the disclosure of undisclosed debts and obligations including concealed liabilities further disclosure of the Loan Agreement and financial statements for past 2 years in the RAK Bank Corporate Account which Claimants fail to have complete access.
6. Interest and Costs Interest on all sums awarded at the rate determined by the DIFC Courts. Costs of the proceedings, including legal fees incurred by the Claimants. 7. Further or Other Relief Any additional relief the Court deems just and appropriate.