Revoked banking access.
APOC paragraphs 74, 81, 94 and 96. In particular, it explains why the banking profile remained formally in your name while the account could nevertheless be operationally accessed and used by the Claimants’ employees. The First Claimant’s appointed employees were provided with operational access through the existing authorised-signatory profile.
Revised trial response note
After the First Claimant became the sole shareholder, she did not replace the AED1.3 million security cheque securing the Company’s RAKBANK financing facility. RAKBANK therefore did not register her as the authorised signatory or provide separate online-banking facilities in her name. I remained the registered authorised signatory because my security remained attached to the Company’s financing facility, not because I retained ownership or operational control of the Company.
On 17 April 2024, I provided the existing online-banking credentials to the First Claimant’s appointed management team. Her accountant, Ms Lolita, independently confirms that she was given login credentials for both RAKBANK and ADIB while her work was being directed by the First Claimant. The bank records thereafter show statement requests, beneficiary administration, employee salaries, supplier payments and company expenses.
The later banking restriction was imposed by RAKBANK following the expiry of the Company’s trade licence, KYC and other corporate documents. It was not a deliberate revocation of access by me. I respectfully request that these matters be verified directly by RAKBANK.
Information that should be requested from RAKBANK
The Court request should ask RAKBANK to confirm:
* Every authorised signatory registered between 1 March 2024 and the account suspension date.
* Whether the First Claimant applied to become an authorised signatory or obtain online-banking facilities, and the result of that request. * Whether replacing the existing security cheque was required before the First Claimant could become authorised signatory.
* The amount, number and purpose of the security cheque and the financing facility it secured.
* Whether the First Claimant declined or failed to provide replacement security.
* The User ID or banking profile through which the account was accessed from 17 April 2024 onwards.
* Available login dates, device information, IP addresses and session records.
* The maker, approver and system records for: The statement requests in May and June 2024; Adding Lolita and Rexhina as beneficiaries on 30 May; Transfers to Claimant-appointed employees; DIFC Investments and other material payments.
* Who requested the blocking of card ending 4007 and the password change recorded on 24 August 2024.
* The precise date and reason the User ID and online-banking services were suspended, including whether this resulted from expired trade-licence, KYC or corporate documentation.
One point should be reconciled expressly: the financing amount pleaded elsewhere is AED1,012,221, whereas the security cheque was AED1.3 million. The bank should confirm that the cheque’s face value was security for that facility and explain why it exceeded the facility amount. This will prevent the Claimants from presenting the two figures as an inconsistency. The strongest final position is therefore not merely that “the Claimants had access.” It is that formal bank authority remained with you because of unresolved security requirements, while operational access and use were provided to and exercised by the First Claimant’s management team.
The complete ADIB SMS export adds important evidence. Its strongest value is the combination of repeated successful portal logins, a documented bank-imposed KYC restriction, and exact matching transfers between RAKBANK and ADIB used to pay the Company’s rent.
Most important findings
The complete ADIB SMS export adds important evidence. Its strongest value is the combination of repeated successful portal logins, a documented bank-imposed KYC restriction, and exact matching transfers between RAKBANK and ADIB used to pay the Company’s rent.
1. Repeated ADIB access before the alleged “late June” access.
The export records 365 successful ADIB Direct Portal login notifications overall.
After the 1 April 2024 handover, it records 11 successful logins: 3 April 14 April 24 April — three separate logins 1 May 2 May 7 May 8 May 15 May — two separate logins The nine logins from 24 April onwards are consistent with your evidence that credentials were provided to the Claimants’ employees on 17 April.
The two logins on 15 May are particularly important because: Lolita joined the Company on 10 May; She states that the First Claimant directed her work during May and June; and She admits that she was given ADIB and RAKBANK login credentials.
The SMS export does not identify the person physically using the credentials. However, the combination is strong circumstantial evidence of operational access by the Claimants’ team.
2. ADIB itself confirms the cause of the restriction
The SMS export does not identify the person physically using the credentials. However, the combination is strong circumstantial evidence of operational access by the Claimants’ team.
The export contains the following sequence: 5 March 2024: ADIB warns that the Company’s KYC information has expired. 4 April: ADIB gives a “last chance” warning before services are blocked. 20 May: ADIB confirms that account services have been restricted because the identification record remained unupdated.
This is direct bank-generated evidence that the ADIB restriction was imposed by the Bank for expired KYC/documentation—not because you changed a password or deliberately revoked access.
This materially answers APOC paragraphs 80, 81 and 96. However, it is mixed evidence because the Claimants may argue that, as the registered authorised representative, you received the warnings and should have updated the records.
Your response should be that updating the banking records required the incoming shareholder’s documentation and cooperation. ADIB should confirm exactly what documents were required and who could provide them.
3. Exact proof that RAK funds paid Company rent
This is the strongest new transaction finding.
April–May rent 26 April: RAKBANK records AED90,000 transferred to “HAIR CREATORS SALON.” 26 April: ADIB records a matching AED90,000 credit. 30 April: RAKBANK records a further AED21,000 transfer to “HAIR CREATORS SALON.” 30 April: ADIB records the matching AED21,000 credit. 1 May: ADIB clears Company cheque 500159 for AED110,458. Therefore, AED111,000 was transferred from RAKBANK into the Company’s ADIB account immediately before the AED110,458 rent cheque was paid.
June–July rent 26 June: RAKBANK records AED110,458 transferred to the Hair Creators ADIB account, expressly described as “Salon Rent CHEQUE 500160.” 26 June: ADIB records the exact AED110,458 credit. 1 July: ADIB records cheque 500160 for AED110,458 being cleared. This proves a complete cross-bank transaction chain: RAKBANK Company funds → ADIB Company account → Company rent cheque. It directly challenges the broad allegations in APOC paragraphs 95, 96 and 103 that RAK funds were not used for the Second Claimant’s benefit.
4. Substantial operational activity on 2 May
On 2 May: ADIB received five credits totalling AED100,000. A successful ADIB Direct Portal login occurred at 11:44:18. Nineteen principal debits followed, totalling approximately AED95,560, plus transaction charges. The pattern appears consistent with a batch of operational payments, potentially payroll or suppliers.
However, the SMS does not identify the beneficiaries. ADIB transaction advices or the full statement are required before describing these as salary payments.
5. Pre-contract disclosure chronology is corroborated
The export records: Two successful portal logins on 15 February 2024; A further login on 17 February; A login and branch visit on 26 February; and A login on 1 March. The two 15 February logins closely correspond with your pleaded case that the ADIB statement later produced by the Claimants as EX-CL-08 was generated on 15 February and sent to their representative on 19 February. This supports Amended Defence paragraphs 5.25–5.26.
The SMS proves the portal was accessed on 15 February; Annexure D3 or the native communication must prove that the resulting statement was transmitted to the Claimants’ representative.
Later account-administration events
The final page records: 30 July — complaint reference 680828 opened; 31 July — complaint closed; 6 August — ADIB SMS service unsubscribed; 15–16 August — information-update request 3649838 received and completed; 19 August — further information-update request 3663598 received; 20 August — an ADIB card dispatched through Aramex. These events suggest active dealings with ADIB after the transfer.
They may show that the Claimants were taking steps to update the Company’s banking arrangements. However, the SMS does not identify: Who submitted the complaint; Who unsubscribed the SMS service; What information was changed; Whose Emirates ID was used; or To whom the new card was delivered. Those records should be requested from ADIB.
Effect on the pleaded allegations
| APOC allegation | Assessment |
| Paragraph 72 — due-diligence obstruction | The February portal logins corroborate your pre-contract statement-generation case, but transmission must be proved through Annexure D3. |
| Paragraph 74 — only limited bank access | Materially challenged by repeated portal logins and Lolita’s admission that she had credentials. |
| Paragraph 80 — inconsistent ADIB access because KYC was not updated | Partly corroborated: ADIB confirms KYC expiry and restriction. Responsibility for supplying the required documents remains disputed. |
| Paragraph 81 — only brief supervised access | Materially challenged by repeated logins between 24 April and 15 May. User identity still requires ADIB audit logs. |
| Paragraph 94 — Defendant deliberately changed banking access | This allegation concerns RAKBANK, but the ADIB record demonstrates that restrictions can be bank-imposed for regulatory reasons rather than deliberately imposed by you. |
| Paragraph 95 — money not used for the Company | Directly challenged by the RAK-to-ADIB transfers funding the rent cheques. |
| Paragraph 96 — accurate access only obtained in late June | Materially challenged by April and May portal logins and Lolita’s admitted credentials. |
| Paragraph 103 — Company funds used for personal benefit | The rent-funding chain disproves that inference for at least AED221,458 transferred from RAK to ADIB. It does not determine the purpose of every transaction. |
Trial note
The Claimants’ allegation that they obtained accurate banking access only in late June is inconsistent with the contemporaneous banking records. The ADIB export records repeated successful portal logins after the 1 April handover, including nine successful logins after I provided the existing credentials to the Claimants’ team on 17 April.
Two further logins occurred on 15 May, after Ms Lolita joined the Company and while, by her own evidence, she was being directed by the First Claimant and possessed the ADIB and RAKBANK credentials. ADIB subsequently confirmed on 20 May that services had been restricted because the Company’s KYC and identification records had not been updated.
The restriction was therefore imposed by the Bank and was not a deliberate revocation by me. The combined RAKBANK and ADIB records also prove that RAK funds were used for the Second Claimant’s benefit. AED90,000 and AED21,000 were transferred from RAK to ADIB on 26 and 30 April and funded the AED110,458 rent cheque cleared on 1 May. A further AED110,458 was transferred from RAK to ADIB on 26 June and funded the corresponding rent cheque cleared on 1 July. These are documented Company-to-Company transfers used to discharge the Second Claimant’s rent obligations.
1. Harmonised transfers between RAKBANK and ADIB
Using 17 April 2024 as the banking-access handover date, the complete RAKBANK and ADIB SMS exports materially support your case. They show continued access, coordinated transfers between the accounts, and payments benefiting the Second Claimant.
| Period | RAKBANK debit | Matching ADIB credit | Evidential assessment |
| 9 Feb 2024 | AED20,000, expressly to Hair Creators Salon | AED20,000 same day | Exact and expressly identified |
| 12 Feb 2024 | AED4,000 | AED4,000 same day | Strong match, but RAK SMS omits beneficiary |
| 28 Feb 2024 | AED65,000, expressly to Hair Creators Salon | AED65,000 same day | Exact and expressly identified |
| 1 Mar 2024 | AED4,000 | AED4,000 same day | Probable match; beneficiary not identified |
| 17 Apr 2024 — access boundary | |||
| 26 Apr 2024 | AED90,000, expressly to Hair Creators Salon | AED90,000 same day | Exact and expressly identified |
| 30 Apr 2024 | AED21,000, expressly to Hair Creators Salon | AED21,000 minutes later | Exact and expressly identified |
| 2 May 2024 | AED6,000 | AED6,000 shortly afterwards | Probable match; beneficiary not identified |
| 26 June 2024 | AED110,458, expressly to Hair Creators Salon | AED110,458 same day | Exact and expressly identified |
The expressly identified RAK-to-ADIB transfers total: Before 17 April: AED85,000 From 17 April onwards: AED221,458 Combined: AED306,458 Including the three highly probable same-day matches, the combined figure becomes AED320,458.
2. The post-handover rent-payment chain
The most compelling company-benefit evidence is:
1- RAKBANK transferred AED90,000 on 26 April and AED21,000 on 30 April into ADIB. On 1 May, ADIB cleared company cheque 500159 for AED110,458. On 26 June,
2- RAKBANK transferred AED110,458 into ADIB. On 1 July, ADIB cleared company cheque 500160 for exactly AED110,458.
Therefore, two rent cheques totalling AED220,916 were funded through the coordinated use of the RAKBANK and ADIB accounts.
This materially contradicts any sweeping allegation that the transferred money was neither deposited into a company account nor used for the Second Claimant’s benefit. It does not, by itself, trace every dirham of the AED1,012,221 loan.
3. Evidence of banking access after 17 April
The combined records show: Nine successful ADIB Direct Portal logins between 24 April and 15 May 2024. RAKBANK account statements generated on 23 and 25 May, 9 and 14 June, 24–26 July and 23 August. On 30 May, Lolita Tines and Rexhina Mema were added as named RAKBANK beneficiaries, followed by a payroll-like series of employee transfers. This complements Ms Lolita’s evidence that she was given the ADIB and RAKBANK credentials by Ms Rexhina. Together, this materially challenges APOC paragraphs 81 and 96, particularly the claim that the First Claimant obtained only brief access in May and could not access accurate banking details until late June.
However, the SMS messages were received on your telephone and do not themselves identify the person operating the portal. The Claimants’ identity as users must be established by combining: Ms Lolita’s admission; the evidence of credentials being handed over on 17 April; the named employee-beneficiary activity; and preferably, the banks’ user and device audit logs.
4. Company-related DIFC payments
From 17 April to 30 July 2024, card 4007 was used for eight completed payments to DIFC Investments totalling AED27,935.50. Similar payments existed before 17 April. This supports your Defence that “DIFC Investments” was an established company-related payee for rent, regulatory, employment, utility or administrative expenses.
It materially answers APOC paragraph 96(b), but the corresponding DIFC invoices should be produced wherever available.
5. Restrictions and password changes
The records must be presented carefully: ADIB expressly stated on 20 May that services were restricted because the identification records had not been updated. RAKBANK issued later warnings regarding the expired trade licence, Emirates ID and KYC documents, followed by digital-banking blocks. But on 24 August 2024, RAKBANK also recorded that card 4007 was blocked “as per request” and that the digital-banking password was changed.
The SMS does not identify who requested the block or changed the password. Therefore, the evidence supports bank/document-related restrictions, but bank records are still required to determine responsibility for the 24 August events.
Short trial response note
“The banking-access handover occurred on 17 April 2024. The complete RAKBANK and ADIB SMS records show that the accounts continued to be actively operated afterwards. There were repeated ADIB portal logins, numerous RAKBANK statement requests, the addition of the Claimants’ employees Lolita Tines and Rexhina Mema as beneficiaries, and continuing employee and company-related payments. The two accounts were operated together: RAKBANK transfers of AED90,000 and AED21,000 funded the ADIB account before rent cheque 500159 for AED110,458 cleared, and a further RAKBANK transfer of AED110,458 funded ADIB before rent cheque 500160 for the same amount cleared. This contradicts the allegation that the funds were not deposited into company accounts or used for the Second Claimant’s benefit. The records prove the activity, but bank audit logs should be obtained to identify the individual user responsible for each transaction.”